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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyses existing and new impetus for cross-national regulatory systems for 
modern biotechnology sparked in southern Africa by the 2002/03 food aid crisis. The study 
examined the roles the African Union (AU), the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), who, together with 
other regional and international bodies have initiated processes to assist the 14-country 
SADC region towards cross-national similarity or convergence of biosafety systems. This 
case study research was guided by the three factor conceptualisation of Per Olof Busch and 
Helge Jorgens (2005), which proposes harmonisation, diffusion and coercive imposition as 
three distinct international mechanisms causing policy change and policy convergence.  
Theoretical perspectives, data gathering and analysis approaches adopted an 
interdisciplinary and holistic approach in navigating the complex technological, regulatory 
and socio-political settings. Data was collected primarily using questionnaires, semi-
structured interviews and document review throughout the study period, and in-situ 
observation of processes and organisational interactions during a three-month internship at 
NEPAD in the middle of 2007.  
Different stakeholder understandings of convergence, and fluctuating motivations and 
fears regarding its emergence and implementation were observed. The processes towards a 
transnational framework were viewed as more important than the outputs thereof. Minimal, if 
any convergence had occurred in entire regulatory systems, or policies, while lower level 
targets such as policy scopes, objectives, institutional arrangements and regulations had 
converged to varying extents. The three SNOs had played different roles in this, singly or 
collectively, particularly via ideational and epistemic influence exerted through interplay 
between the three mechanisms proposed by Busch and Jorgens (2005), with diffusion of 
practices being most prominent.  
Therefore, and as observed by other researchers, the three mechanisms were not 
mutually exclusive, and their effect on spread of policies depended a lot on contextual factors 
within organisations, sectors, countries and the region. The thesis introduces the notion of 
layered convergence as one feasible outcome of the cross-national processes.   
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
 
‘How, for instance, was Malawi to move maize donated by the United States, and thus 
obtaining [genetically-modified] Bt-maize, through Tanzania in mid-2002 in the 
absence of complementary biosafety protocols in Tanzania and Malawi, and in the 
absence of associated testing machinery?’ – (Steven Were Omamo and Klaus von 
Grebmer, 2005: 2) 
 
1.0 Background  
Arguably, there are few better ways of capturing the dilemma that faced countries of southern 
Africa during the food emergency of 2002/03 than the statement above. The food crisis 
captured the attention of stakeholders from both sides of the pro- and anti-genetic 
modification divide; which centre on the uncertainties around genetically modified foods 
particularly in the areas of trade, food safety and environmental safety; among other 
dimensions.  In a statement issued on 27 August 2002, the United Nations acknowledged 
that;  
 
‘Concerns have been expressed in southern Africa about the unintentional 
introduction of GM maize varieties into the region as a result of plantings or spillage 
of whole kernel maize provided as food aid …’ but further noted that ‘Based on 
national information from a variety of sources and current scientific knowledge, 
FAO, WHO and WFP hold the view that the consumption of foods containing GMOs 
now being provided as food aid in southern Africa is not likely to present human 
health risk. Therefore, these foods may be eaten …’ before reiterating that … ‘The 
ultimate responsibility and decision regarding the acceptance and distribution of food 
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aid containing GMOs rests with the governments concerned, considering all the 
factors outlined above’ (United Nations, 2002)1. 
 
There could not have been a less enviable background for making these choices: a 
humanitarian crisis threatening the lives of nearly 13 million people and perennially weak 
regulatory and decision-making systems for biosafety. The contention by some anti-GM 
actors was that not enough was being done by donor countries to source food aid from non-
GM sources, making it difficult to separate the food aid from the aggressive efforts by some 
countries to promote GM crops and foods in developing countries (Prendergast, 2004)2. As 
fate would have it, there was a repeat of these controversies in March 2004 following similar 
food deficits in Angola and Sudan’s Darfur region and attendant food aid packages: leading 
to assertions by some anti-GM activists that:  
 
‘… the uncomfortable reality is that the plight of the hungry is used by the powerful to 
justify trade domination; poor countries and their peoples are pawns in an unequal 
global power game’ (Mulvany, 2004)3. 
 
The above are but a few of the realities facing countries in southern Africa as they wrestle 
with the challenge of feeding their populations, among other dimensions, in the face of the 
contested benefits and risks presented by new technologies such as gene-based 
biotechnologies (Birner and Linacre, 2008). Indeed, like elsewhere in the world, African 
                                                
1 UN statement on the use of GM foods as food aid in Southern Africa: 
http://www.fao.org/english/newsroom/news/2002/8660-en.html 
2 In: GM food aid controversy erupts again in Africa: article by Kate Prendergast, June 6, 2004: 
http://www.truthforce.info/?q=node/view/262    
3 In: The dumping ground: Africa and GM food aid: article by Patrick Mulvany, April 29, 2004: 
http://www.organicconsumers.org/biod/africa050404.cfm   
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countries have engaged in the debate on the pros and cons of modern biotechnologies and 
products thereof for a greater part of the last two decades (Paarlberg, 2000). However, and 
for countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, the debate 
changed irreversibly and fundamentally in content and nature as a result of the challenges 
spawned by the food emergency of 2002/2003, which brought countries face-to-face with 
decision-making in the face of regulatory uncertainty and a humanitarian crisis. The dilemma 
revealed the limited preparedness within countries, and the region to deal with these 
challenges, belying the many years of individual and collective efforts to develop and 
implement effective regulatory systems. Meanwhile, the fact that there was no unanimity at 
sub-national, national and regional levels on the technology and how to regulate it added the 
proverbial spanners in an already congested works. More on these efforts, challenges and the 
broader issues on the technology will be given throughout this thesis. 
 
Using this cross-national food security and technology challenge as a starting point, this 
thesis analyses the efforts for development of cross-national biosafety systems in the SADC, 
that were ignited or reinvigorated by this unprecedented challenge, looking specifically at the 
roles of supranational organizations, who, among other organizations, stepped up to the 
challenge of assisting countries develop and/or strengthen their systems.  
 
1.1 The defining nature of the 2002/03 food crisis 
Southern African countries have found themselves at the throes of food emergencies in the 
past, for example in 1991, when a severe drought, combined with inadequate human, 
infrastructural and organizational capacity in domestic markets to severely constrain food 
supplies leaving millions of people on the verge of starvation (Omamo and von Grebmer, 
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2005:2). The food emergency of 2002/03 had, by and large, the same cast of issues – 
drought, infrastructural, organizational and policy factors – BUT with an additional challenge 
– that the thousands of tonnes of food available to help cover the shortages were suspected to 
contain unspecified amounts of genetically modified (GM) maize. Uncertainties around food 
and environmental safety, regulatory preparedness, among other challenges, meant that some 
countries were unwilling to accept the food aid, with some governments going on record to 
choose starvation, rather than have their people consuming ‘poisonous food’ (e.g. Panos 
Report No.49, 2005:30). The challenges that this dilemma presented ranged from the 
grandiose and perennial challenges of putting in place regulatory and institutional 
arrangements to the mundane logistical hurdles of ‘how to load grain into rail cars and trucks 
with minimal escape, how to cover the loaded cars and trucks and how long to allow the 
trucks to sit in given positions’ (Omamo and von Grebmer, 2005:2). As exemplified by the 
quotations presented earlier, the scenario created tension at various levels, within countries, 
between countries, with food relief agencies and donors, among others, as countries of the 
region individually and collectively endeavoured to make the best decision under pressure 
from the food emergency and the uncertainty posed by the suspected GM-food (Moola and 
Munnik, 2007).  At the policy level, the dilemma is attributed with having raised the political 
temperature around regulation of biotechnology, both within countries and at the cross-
national level. At the national level for example, a number of decisions and measures had to 
put in place to guide decision-making, with some countries, e.g. Zimbabwe and Malawi, 
deciding to distribute only milled grain and Zambia refusing the grain outright (Mafa, 2004; 
Moola and Munnik, 2007). At the regional level, SADC agriculture ministers cited the lack 
of a harmonized regional position on GMOs as creating serious operational problems in the 
movement of food and non-food items, and recommended the formation of an advisory 
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committee on biotechnology and biosafety to develop guidelines on this issue and the broader 
issues around biotechnology (SADC 2003). Meanwhile, SADC Heads of State in their 
August 2003 Summit in Maputo, Mozambique, set a deadline of December 2004 for all 
countries of the SADC region to put in place national biosafety systems (SADC, 2004).  
 
While all this is happening, the key issues and realities for biosafety are that while there is a 
significant level of agreement on the potential risks associated with GM technology; for 
example environmental risks from gene flow to non-cultivated plants, agronomic risks from 
resistance problems in the GM crops and in weeds, co-existence challenges between fields of 
farmers using GM-crops and those not using them; among others – there is still considerable 
disagreement within and across countries regarding the importance of these risks and the 
scientific possibilities for adequately assessing and addressing them (Birner and Linacre, 
2008). Add to these the disagreements on the so-called non-science issues, such as labelling 
of food and feed derived from GM crops, and socio-economic issues around the technology, 
one then begins to understand the emergence of a continuum of regulatory systems, ranging 
from the ‘stringent’ EU system on one end to the ‘permissive’ US system on the other end 
(Levidow et al, 1996, Paarlberg, 2000). As noted by Arcuri (2001), a ‘regulatory divide’ has 
emerged, championed by ‘technocrats’ on one hand, who believe in a rational application of 
the science to identify and manage the risks; and a ‘deliberative’ philosophy on the other 
hand, which embeds scientific knowledge within policy and societal debates (cf. Birner and 
Linacre, 2008). These divides also exist in the SADC region, and how they militate against or 
cultivate fertile grounds for cooperation were among the key areas of focus for this research.  
 
 18 
This research endeavoured to explore and investigate existing and new regulatory responses 
to the above and bigger challenges presented by modern biotechnology, in particular looking 
at the challenge of cross-national cooperation. As alluded to, one of the responses to the 
cross-national regulatory challenge which has dominated policy agendas in the region for a 
long time, and with more prominence after the food emergency, is that of harmonisation of 
national regulatory systems. Harmonisation is touted by its promoters as one way in which 
countries can leverage weaker national and sub-national regulatory capacities, and develop 
synergies that will place them in a strong position to deal with the dynamic challenges 
presented by the technology. Admittedly, and as will be detailed throughout this thesis, a 
number of organizations and programmes have entered the policy arena, to champion the 
harmonisation agenda directly, or to tackle other levels within the policy/regulation 
development spectrum. This study focused on the roles of three supranational organizations 
(SNOs), and elected to look at the desire for cross-national cooperation in biotechnology 
management from the broader perspective of policy convergence, with harmonisation being 
but one of these mechanisms towards the collective responses to the collective challenge. 
Further details on these issues are presented throughout the thesis, starting with the upcoming 
section on why the three supranational organizations were chosen, and some details on the 
broader issues around biotechnology and biosafety in the study region. 
 
1.2 The three supranational organizations and the cross-national challenge 
The scenario presented above is only a tip of the iceberg as far as processes for regulating 
biotechnology at various levels in Sub-Saharan Africa broadly are concerned. There are 
wider technology development and regulation issues that the countries have grappled with for 
a long time, and as would be conceivable, the supranational organizations are only one subset 
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of a multitude of actors playing different roles in the issue area. This research is an empirical 
study into the roles of three SNOs; the African Union (AU), New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) and Southern African Development Community (SADC), in the 
development of cross-national policy, regulatory and administrative systems for managing 
modern biotechnology in southern Africa, with a special focus on agricultural biotechnology. 
The three organizations, together with a wide range of other national, regional and 
international bodies and programmes, have all initiated measures and processes to assist 
countries in the SADC region to work together in the development and implementation of 
biosafety systems4. It is emphasized in these organizations’ programmes and by proponents 
of convergence, that having similar systems for managing modern biotechnology will ensure 
that inter-country collaboration, resource-sharing, experience sharing and other collective 
efforts will reduce many policy and regulatory hurdles and assist countries meet global and 
regional obligations, including having adequate regulatory preparedness to deal with 
challenges such as the 2002/03 food crisis (see tables 1 and 2). It is however important to 
note at this stage that, as with the broader technological and regulatory issues around 
biotechnology, the desire for convergence was not an uncontested issue, and hence in seeking 
to understand the feasibility of this policy agenda, the study investigated the motivations and 
fears around this issue.  In addition, given the different levels at which the countries in the 
14-member regional economic grouping are utilizing the technology, and therefore the 
different levels and forms of biosafety challenges that they face, and in light of many issues 
impacting on the biosafety issue area, this research was conceived with the objective of 
                                                
4 In this study, a national biosafety framework or system is defined as “a combination of policy, legal, 
administrative and technical instruments that are developed to ensure an adequate level of protection in the field 
of the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology that 
may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into 
account risks to human health” (ref; UNEP-GEF, 2006) 
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understanding how the three organizations were assisting regulators in the countries and the 
region towards convergence, and also to understand the extent to which this convergence has 
been or would be achieved. The study was embarked on also with the motivation to garner 
empirical evidence from Africa in the growing field of cross-national policy convergence, 
especially looking at the role of supranational organizations. Policy convergence research is 
admitted to be still falling short of being a global research agenda mainly because empirical 
evidence from Africa is largely missing from the fray (Heichel et al, 2005). On the other 
hand, the focus on biotechnology/biosafety is a crucial one as many countries the world over 
are grappling with how to effectively harness and utilize the technology (Somsen, 2007:20; 
Russell and Vogler, 2000:10), and for the SADC region, a repeat of the 2002/03 quandary 
was described by some policy actors as ‘not an option’. Meanwhile, for Africa in particular, 
though contested, biotechnology interventions are seen as a necessary addition to the battery 
of possible solutions to the challenge of solving the problem of perennial food insecurity in 
many parts of the continent (Blackie, 2000). Thus an in-depth understanding of how the 
technology can be managed at a multi-country level is crucial to gain fuller understanding of 
the issues. It was also recognized that while there had been many efforts towards getting 
countries to cooperate at regional level in regulation development and implementation of 
biosafety systems (see Timeline in Table 3) these efforts had not been studied from an 
academic standpoint, and this study aimed to contribute towards filling that gap. 
 
Studies in the European Union (EU), United States of America (USA), Asia, elsewhere in 
Africa and other parts of the world regarding the regulation of genetically modified (GM) 
foods have shown that different societies answer identical problems in different ways (see for 
example Levidow, 2006; Murphy et al, 2006; Murphy and Yanacopulos, 2005; Odame et al, 
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2003; Newell, 2003), and that the socio-political context matters a great deal in this regard 
(Somsen, 2007: 21; Scoones, 2002 & 2005). As revealed in relation to the food aid 
controversy, much of the debate and controversy around GM foods and other products of 
modern biotechnology concern the regulation of risk, and given that risk is socially 
constructed, this research aimed to explore how different forces and interests were coming 
together towards some form of transnational governance framework, under the influence of 
the SNOs.  
 
1.3 Research question 
One observation from the policy debates on harmonisation was that while there was 
increasing interest in harmonisation and the cross-national collaboration in management of 
biotechnology broadly, there was limited theoretical and empirical evidence on the type of 
regional collaboration that was preferred (cf. Paarlberg, 2006; Birner and Linacre, 2008). 
Admittedly, there were different forms that this collaboration could take, and this research set 
out to shed some light into an understanding of these issues based on the region-specific 
context of the SADC. The over-arching question for this research was: whether, how and to 
what extent have the three supranational bodies (SADC, NEPAD and AU) contributed to 
cross-national convergence of biosafety regulatory systems in the SADC region?  
Among other targets, the research also hoped to fulfil the following:  
• To contribute to knowledge and understanding of how ideas spread across nations and 
the extent to which national factors influence and refract cross-national pressures.  
• To contribute to understanding and analysis of institutional and policy adjustment at 
national level, and the ways in which SNOs assist and influence these processes.  
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• To contribute to wider theoretical and empirical debates on regional integration in 
Africa and beyond.  
• To contribute to analytical models of policy convergence through application and 
interrogation of the typology proposed by Busch and Jorgens (2005) [to be introduced 
in section 1.5]. 
The research started from the premise that the biosafety systems in the countries were 
divergent and that the divergence was inherent in the technology, the regulatory systems and 
the processes around these. It was also hypothesised that the causes of this divergence could 
be identified and isolated as a way towards identifying the conditions under which 
convergence might occur with influence from the three SNOs. As with the convergence 
hypothesis (Tinbergen, 1961), this research also started with the assumption that all the 
different systems in the countries had good and bad features, and the desire for countries was 
to improve on where they were weak through adopting innovations from abroad. A further 
assumption was that the three SNOs, among other players, were trying, through promoting 
rational learning practices, to assist countries tap the best lessons, in the face of a myriad of 
facilitating and hindering factors, which the research also sought to unravel.  
 
The research question was crafted to be able to elicit both qualitative and quantitative 
responses: whether and to what extent (which sought evidence for convergence – both 
qualitative and quantitative, looking at the specific aspect of a biosafety system under 
consideration); how (which referred to the mechanisms in operation within the typology used 
– also based on both qualitative and quantitative). These issues are discussed further 
throughout the thesis.  
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The question also reveals that this study was focusing on the three supranational 
organisations with a specific interest in how the convergence process was taking place under 
their influence. While the SNOs were acting as an organising force, the convergence issue 
was constructed in particular ways within the countries and the region as a result of this 
mediation. There was prior recognition that the influence of the three organisations emanated 
from the many powers that they brought to the policy arena, which included political clout, 
financial and technical resources, economies of scale, among others (see Box 4).  
 
1.4 Key theme of the research  
The key theme of this research is convergence, which is premised on growth in similarity of 
policies, policy scope, institutional and implementation arrangements, among others. The 
research design was based on the different conceptions of similarity, how it occurs and how 
to measure it. There was a constructivist perspective that similarity had indeed emerged or 
appreciable strides towards it had been made, and the task was to measure it, or gather 
different views on how far it had emerged, and how the three SNOs had contributed to its 
emergence. An open-ended strategy grounded in participants’ accounts, document reviews 
and observations and underpinned by theory on key issues around policy convergence was 
used.  
 
This research drew inspiration from other studies and published works on cross-national 
policy convergence, and on multi-actor interactions broadly [for example Busch and Jorgens 
(2005); Dolowitz and Marsh (2005); Seeliger (1996); Holzinger, et al, (2006); Franzese and 
Mosher (2002) and Gauthier (2002); to name a few]. The cross-cutting, multi-level and 
multi-actor nature of biotechnology and biosafety issues, combined with the cross-national 
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level at which the issue was being investigated, meant that a number of conceptual and 
theoretical perspectives would come to the fore in trying to understand this issue. The 
research was about how countries are attempting to manage risk at a multi-country level, and 
about how they are endeavouring to be innovative within the different pressures they face as 
individual countries and as a collective entity. The desire was to try and understand how the 
differences on many fronts around this issue within the countries were serving as a rallying 
point for the desired transnational governance arrangement, with the mediation of three 
supranational bodies, themselves employing different means to get to the desired end.  
The main focus of most studies on policy convergence is on policy output, i.e. the policies 
adopted by the countries, as opposed to the policy outcome. Policy outcomes are usually 
affected by many intervening variables, which make it difficult if not impossible to relate the 
outcomes directly to the causal mechanisms of convergence. Therefore it would not be 
surprising to find convergence at the level of output, but divergence at the outcomes level. 
This was borne in mind as the research unfolded. 
 
With respect to research hypotheses, many authors are in agreement that formulating 
hypotheses on the level of convergence is a difficult task because identifying the level or 
‘point’ of a policy to then come up with a convergence point is not always easy (Holzinger 
and Knill, 2005a). Convergence implies decrease in variation among policies over time, and 
the unit of measurement is thus the decrease in standard deviation from one point in time to 
another. A change in the regulatory level means a shift either downwards or upwards of the 
mean between the two measurement times (Botcheva and Martin, 2001). Therefore to assess 
convergence, and a shift in the regulations, a reference point is needed. In this study the 
commencement time reference point was 2002, at which point it is assumed the convergence 
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mechanisms championed by the three organizations were only beginning to take root, and the 
systems in the countries were characterized by extensive diversity. The study covered a 6-
year period up to 2007. In this period the three organizations were most active, and due to the 
intensity of discussion of biosafety issues at national, regional and international levels, 
measurable convergence was expected.  
 
In addition to setting reference frames for the measurement of convergence, researchers are 
in general agreement that measurement of convergence is removed from the coincidence 
domain if observation of the phenomenon is made in a large sample of countries (Leifferink 
and Jordan, 2002). There is a possibility for changes to run parallel in two countries with 
different national sources of change. This was the motivation for looking at the 14-country 
SADC region, as opposed to comparing only a few countries in the same region. In addition, 
national policy is also admittedly a multifaceted concept, and clarity was needed well in 
advance regarding where the convergence would be examined. Use of the Busch and Jorgens 
conceptualisation and other writings from mainstream literature on convergence in 
investigating the convergence effects of the three organizations also helped to make the 
dependent variable more tractable. 
 
1.5 Theoretical framework for this study  
It was recognized from the start of the research that because of their multiplicity and ever-
changing nature, a single framework could not adequately explain the approaches and 
mechanisms being employed by the three organizations. In addition, given the pervasive 
nature of the technology and policy arena being looked at, assuming a narrow framework 
approach was deemed to be less fruitful in bringing out and explaining the issues around the 
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study topic. A broad and integrative framework was preferred, hence the study interrogated 
the utility of the three-factor typology proposed by Busch and Jorgens (2005). The three 
broad mechanisms proposed are discussed further in the literature review (Chapter 3). Briefly 
they are: (1) cooperative harmonisation of domestic practices by means of international legal 
instruments or supranational law; (2) the coercive imposition of policy practices by means of 
economic or political conditionalities and (3) the interdependent but uncoordinated diffusion 
of practices by means of cross-national imitation, emulation or learning.  This model is 
recognised as one of the more systematic typologies of possible mechanisms of convergence 
(Weibust, 2007; Lehtonen, 2006). More detailed information on each of the mechanisms and 
the model will be provided and discussed in Chapter 3. 
  
This study looked at the technological and policy context of southern Africa, with an interest 
in the institutional responses spearheaded by the three supranational organisations in creating 
a transnational governance framework for biosafety. Two conceptualisations of convergence 
were observed among stakeholders from commencement of the research, convergence as it 
relates to having a framework to be implemented at regional level, and as it relates to having 
similar systems that will be implemented independently by the countries. Towards 
understanding these, and guided by the three-factor typology proposed by Busch and Jorgens, 
this study investigated the existence of and interplay between harmonisation, coercive 
imposition and diffusion of policy practices in the region as a result of the efforts of the three 
organisations. This was all done in full appreciation of how policy processes in the individual 
countries differed at various levels, including but not limited to policy entrepreneurship, issue 
expansion and venue shopping, i.e., the different sources of policy ideas for policy actors (cf. 
Schattschneider, 1960: 56). Further elucidation of how these different national level factors 
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affected the feasibility and extent of convergence was also investigated by this study, though 
to a limited extent.  
 
Much of the literature on policy convergence focuses on availing evidence for policy 
convergence, and the limited understanding of the mechanisms which cause convergence has 
been highlighted by many authors (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Holzinger and Knill 2005b; 
Drezner 2001; Bennett, 1991, among others). For this research, the limited research on 
convergence in the area of biotechnology policy in Sub-Saharan Africa made demonstration 
of convergence a logical starting point. The study further explored and sought to explain the 
mechanisms and facilitating factors for convergence, drawing on the systematic 
conceptualisation of three analytically distinct classes of mechanisms through which 
international processes, actors and institutions contribute to domestic policy change and 
cross-national policy convergence proposed by Busch and Jorgens (2005).  
 
1.6      Structure of the thesis 
With this introduction and background to the research, the rest of the thesis continues as 
follows: chapter 2 gives details on the broader biotechnology and biosafety terrain of the 
SADC region, further revealing the context within which the transnational cooperation is 
being championed by the SNOs and other players; chapter 3 gives the theoretical issues 
around this research, through taking an in-depth look at cross-national policy convergence, 
and other theoretical perspectives impacting on the research. Chapter 4 details the data 
collection, analysis and interpretation methodologies used, as influenced by the theoretical 
perspectives and the research objectives. Chapter 5 highlights the setting or context in which 
the research was undertaken; starting in the first section with an analysis of the challenges 
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and realities presented by the regional context, and in the second part looking at the 
organisational and technological context. This chapter serves the dual function of expanding 
background information and availing empirical data from the research. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 
comprise the findings from the research; starting with stakeholder narrations on convergence  
(chapter 6), followed by an unbundling of the narrations, first looking at the multiple 
understandings of convergence (chapter 7) and secondly looking at the motivations behind 
the narrations and the understandings (chapter 8).  Finally, Chapter 9 analyses and 
discusses the results based on the Busch and Jorgens typology, relating the research question 
to the various theoretical perspectives, the research findings and the realities of the context. 
The chapter ends with some conclusions of the research and its implications and 
recommendations for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2: TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY SCENARIO IN THE SADC – BEYOND 
  THE FOOD CRISIS 
 
‘If chemistry and physics underwrote state power through the twentieth century’s two 
great conflagrations, it now seems biology’s turn to define new roles for the 
government’ (Jasanoff, 2005: 36).   
  
2.0 Introduction  
The preceding chapter has presented the problem tackled by this thesis within the context of 
the regulatory and technological challenge emanating primarily from the food emergency 
challenge which the region faced in 2002/03. However, and as alluded to earlier, the 
quandary faced by the countries belied the many years and resources invested in efforts to 
develop the technology and systems for managing it, at a time when various forms of 
biological sciences are taking centre stage in national development agendas the world over. 
This chapter presents an overview of some of the technology development and regulation 
efforts taking place within individual SADC countries and at the regional level. Within the 
bigger focus of the research, this chapter brings to the fore some of the sources of motivation, 
strength, weakness and opportunities for the countries in their participation in a transnational 
regulatory framework, and for the SNOs as they facilitate spread of policy innovations across 
the national boundaries. 
 
2.1 Biotechnology 
Biotechnology, defined5 broadly as the use of living organisms or parts thereof in the 
production of goods and services, has revolutionized many human endeavours that rely on 
biological processes. Activities in agriculture, health, environment and industry have had a 
radical facelift as a result of developments in biotechnology. These developments have 
                                                
5 See Convention on Biological Diversity (www.cbd.int)  
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brought together advances in disciplines such as engineering, chemistry and biology, to 
hasten processes, and to enable the development of processes and products that were not 
imaginable before the advent of these technologies.  
 
Southern African countries are employing various levels of biotechnology (see Table 1 
below) in a wide range of fields, which include agriculture, environment management, 
forestry, health care and industry. The potential of the technology to deal with some of the 
challenges facing the countries has been documented in national development strategies, 
especially agricultural, science and technology and industrial policies, and some steps have 
been taken towards harnessing the technology (e.g. SA Biotechnology Strategy, 20026; 
Zambia Biotechnology Strategy, 20047 and Zimbabwe Biotechnology Policy, 20068). Table 1 
below gives a summary of the biotechnologies being used in the different SADC countries, 
especially in agriculture, and the levels of progress towards putting in place policy and 
regulatory systems: 
 
Table 1:  Levels of use of biotechnology and status of development of biosafety systems 
in SADC countries (as of June 2008) 
   Country Level of use of 
biotechnology 
Status of 
development of 
Biosafety  Systems 
Ratification  
of CBD & 
Cartagena   
 Protocol  
Key current 
Requirements 
Angola Mainly traditional 
techniques, e.g. tissue 
culture (TC), 
fermentation and 
biological nitrogen 
fixation (BNF). No 
genetic engineering 
(GE) research, trials, 
or commercial 
There is no biosafety 
policy or legislation 
But there is a Ministerial 
Decree on importation of 
GMOs (since 2004) 
Ratified both the 
Convention on 
Biological Diversity 
(CBD) and Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety 
Participates in the 
UNEP-GEF Project  
Development of 
policy and 
regulations 
Capacity building – 
legal, infrastructural  
and technical  
Public awareness 
                                                
6 http://www.pub.ac.za/resources/docs/biotechstrategy_2002.pdf  
7 See Mulenga  (2006).  
8 See Mafa (2004) 
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releases 
Botswana TC, BNF, artificial 
insemination (AI), 
molecular diagnostics 
(MD) and 
fermentation. No GE 
research, trials or 
commercial releases 
There is no biosafety 
policy or legislation in the 
country; but there is a 
2004 Cabinet Memo, 
which stipulates 
obligations for declaration 
of GMO imports. A draft 
national biosafety 
framework initiated in 
2002 with UNEP/GEF 
funding still  being 
finalised 
Ratified both the 
CBD and Cartagena 
Protocol, 
Participates in the 
UNEP-GEF Project 
Development of 
policy and 
regulations 
Capacity-building – 
legal, technical and 
infrastructural 
Public awareness 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
Mainly TC and BNF. 
No GE research, 
trials or commercial 
releases 
Draft biosafety regulations 
in place (since 2005). No 
policy as yet 
Is Party to both the 
CBD and the CPB. 
Participates in the 
ASARECA 
programme 
Finalisation of 
regulations; 
development of 
policy and 
strengthening of 
overall technical and 
regulatory capacity.  
Lesotho TC, MD and BNF. 
No GE research, 
trials or commercial 
releases 
There is no biosafety 
policy or legislation, but a 
Multisectoral Task Force 
was set up to develop a 
national biotechnology 
and biosafety policy and 
legislation   
Ratified both the 
CBD and Cartagena 
Protocol, 
Participates in the 
UNEP-GEF Project 
Development of 
policy and 
regulations 
Capacity-building – 
legal, technical and 
infrastructural 
Public awareness 
Madagascar TC, AI, BNF and 
fermentation. No GE 
research, trials or 
commercial releases 
Has a draft biosafety 
policy and legislation 
Ratified both the 
CBD and Cartagena 
Protocol, 
Participating in the 
UNEP-GEF Project 
 
Development of 
policy and 
regulations  
Policy and legal 
capacity building 
Public awareness 
Malawi TC, fermentation, AI, 
MD and BNF. 
Limited GE research 
in agriculture and 
forestry. Has carried 
out field trials of Bt-
maize and cotton 
Has legislation on 
Biosafety (2004) and a 
National Biotechnology 
Policy which was 
approved in July 20089.  
Ratified both the 
CBD and Cartagena 
Protocol, 
Participates in the 
UNEP-GEF Project 
Finalisation of 
policy, and aligning 
regulations to the 
Protocol 
Public awareness 
and participation  
Mauritius TC, MD, BNF and 
fermentation. GE 
research on potato 
and sugar cane and 
contained trials on-
going.  
Has no biosafety policy 
but the Genetically 
Modified Organisms Bill 
(No. 44 of 2003) was 
passed into law in March 
2004 
Ratified both the 
CBD and Cartagena 
Protocol, 
Participates in the 
UNEP-GEF Project 
Policy development 
and aligning 
regulations to the 
Protocol 
Public awareness 
and participation  
Mozambique TC, MD and BNF. 
No GE research, 
trials or commercial 
Has no biosafety policy 
nor legislation, but set up 
in 2004 a National 
Ratified both the 
CBD and Cartagena 
Protocol, 
Expediting 
development of 
policy and 
                                                
9 ISAAA Crop Biotech Update (18 July 2008) 
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releases Biosafety Working Group 
to develop a policy and 
legislation  
Participates in the 
UNEP-GEF Project 
regulations 
Legal, technical and 
infrastructural 
capacity building 
Public awareness 
Namibia TC, fermentation, AI 
and MD. Has a 
GMO-testing 
laboratory. No trials 
or releases  
Has a Biotechnology and 
Biosafety Policy passed in 
1999 but does not have 
regulations 
Ratified both the 
CBD and Cartagena 
Protocol, 
Participates in the 
UNEP-GEF Project 
Expediting 
development of 
regulations 
Capacity building – 
technical, legal and 
infrastructural 
Public awareness 
South Africa Active research and 
commercial use of 
most biotech 
techniques, including 
trials and releases of 
GE cotton, soya and 
maize 
Has had a biosafety 
framework, the GMO Act, 
since 1997, which has 
been undergoing review 
since 2004 
Ratified both the 
CBD and Cartagena 
Protocol, 
Participates in the 
UNEP-GEF Project 
Expediting review 
of legislation to 
align it with the 
Protocol 
Public awareness 
and participation in 
decision making on 
biosafety 
Swaziland TC, AI, MD and 
BNF. No GE 
research, trials or 
commercials 
Has had a Biosafety 
Committee since 2001. 
Has a draft Biosafety 
Policy and a draft 
Biosafety Bill  
Ratified both the 
CBD and acceded to  
Protocol, 
Participates in the 
UNEP-GEF Project 
Completing policy 
and regulations  
Technical, legal and 
infrastructural 
capacity building 
Public awareness 
and participation 
Tanzania TC, AI, BNF and 
MD. Limited GE 
research. Trials of Bt 
cotton and maize 
conducted in 2004 
There is a 2nd draft Policy 
and 1st draft Biosafety Bill 
Ratified both the 
CBD and Cartagena 
Protocol, 
Participates in the 
UNEP-GEF Project 
Implementation of 
policy and legal 
arrangements 
Legal, technical and 
infrastructural 
capacity building 
Public awareness 
and participation 
Zambia TC, AI, BNF, MD 
and fermentation. GE 
research on cassava 
on-going. Also trials 
for Bt-cotton, and 
maize conducted 
Has Biosafety Regulations 
(2007) and a National 
Biotechnology and 
Biosafety Policy (2004)  
Ratified both the 
CBD and Cartagena 
Protocol, 
Participates in the 
UNEP-GEF Project 
Aligning regulatory 
system to Cartagena 
Protocol  
Capacity-building – 
legal, technical and 
infrastructural  
Public awareness 
and participation 
Zimbabwe Has active research 
programmes in all 
major techniques, 
including trials of GE 
maize and cotton 
Has had Biosafety 
Regulations since 1998, 
and a Biotechnology 
Policy (2005). These are 
now managed by a 
Biotechnology Authority , 
Ratified both the 
CBD and Cartagena 
Protocol, 
Participates in the 
UNEP-GEF Project 
Review of current 
legislation to align it 
to the Protocol 
Technical, legal and 
infrastructural 
 33 
which was set up in 2006.  capacity building 
Public awareness 
and participation  
 Sources: African Centre for Biosafety http://www.biosafetyafrica.net/south.htm; Moola and Munnik (2007); 
Mnyulwa and Mugwagwa (2005); www.isaaa.org/; Mafa (2004); Mulenga (2006), RAEIN-Africa (2005) 
 
The so-called ‘traditional’ or ‘low-end’ biotechnologies are the most widely used, especially 
in agriculture, where techniques such as tissue culture, biological nitrogen fixation and 
artificial insemination are in use in almost all the 14 countries. Higher level biotechnology 
techniques, such as marker-assisted selection and genetic engineering are used in only a 
handful of the countries, for example Malawi, Mauritius, South Africa, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, with South Africa being the only country that has reached the commercialisation 
stage insofar as products of genetic engineering are concerned (Mnyulwa and Mugwagwa, 
2005). In fact, up to end of 200710, South Africa was the only country in the rest of Africa to 
have commercial plantings of GM crops, having grown GM maize, cotton and soyabean for 
close to 10 years. The scenario above shows that the countries are facing varied levels of 
pressure, targets and obligations with respect to putting in place biosafety systems, and this 
also relates to extraneous issues such as food aid.  Table 2 gives details on which country has 
received food aid, this being a further illumination of how the pressure exerted by the food 
emergency of 2002/03 was not necessarily uniform across the countries as may be discerned 
from a cursory analysis. 
  
2.2 Biosafety  
From a biological science perspective, the concept of biological safety (or biosafety) has 
paralleled the development of the science of microbiology and its extension into new and 
                                                
10
 Burkina Faso and Egypt joined the so-called ‘Biotech Countries’ in the middle of 2008, with commercial 
plantings of Bt-cotton and Bt-maize respectively (Source: International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-
biotech Applications, July 11 2008 Bulletin)  
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related areas (e.g. tissue culture, recombinant DNA, animal studies, among others). The 
knowledge and skill gained by microbiologists necessary to isolate, manipulate and 
propagate pathogenic microorganisms required parallel development of containment 
principles, facility design, and practices and procedures to prevent occupational infections in 
the biomedical environment or release of the organisms to the environment. However, as 
used under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB)11 to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD), the concept of biosafety refers to the legal actions that an importing country 
is entitled to take under international environmental law with the aim of protecting the 
biological diversity of its conventional plants and animals against the risk of contamination 
through imported varieties or species consisting of so-called Living Modified Organisms 
(LMOs) (cf. Mackenzie et al, 2003). These actions consist primarily of preventive or 
precautionary trade measures, and such restrictions or bans include the elaboration, 
negotiation and implementation of pertinent standards, and the institutionalization and 
international ‘harmonization’ of the related regulatory framework and procedures. They also 
take into consideration the legally less clearly circumscribed concerns over related public 
health issues and socio-economic considerations. All these provisions aim at a non-
hierarchical and mutually supportive relationship with other international agreements, 
especially with World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules, with the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission standards on food safety, and with the International Plant Protection 
Convention12; among others. Box 1 below gives a brief description of the Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety.  
 
                                                
11 The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the United Nations’ Convention on the Sustainable Use of Biological 
Diversity, adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 29 January 2000, 
http://www.cbd.int/biosafety/ 
12
 See: http://www.ecolomics-international.org/headg_biosafety.htm#What_is_biosafety_ 
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Box 1: Brief Treatise: The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety was adopted in January 2000 as a supplement to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) to serve as the global framework on biosafety. 
The Protocol addresses the safe handling and use of living modified organisms (LMOs) that 
may have adverse effect on biodiversity, taking into account risks to human health and 
focusing specifically on transboundary movements (CBD Secretariat, 200713). Countries are 
given authority by the Protocol to assess the risks posed by LMOs before they accept them. 
Their acceptance or rejection of the products is enshrined in the advance informed 
agreement, and the precautionary approach emphasised by the Protocol. A communication 
mechanism for exchange of information and experiences on biosafety with the world 
community is provided via the Biosafety Clearing House (BCH) Mechanism.  
The Protocol makes it clear that Parties to the Protocol must develop or have access to the 
‘‘necessary capacities to act on and respond to their rights and obligations’’. National 
capacities are seen as a necessary prerequisite for the successful implementation of the 
Protocol, hence many national, regional and international agencies have been engaged in 
assisting countries, singly or in groups, to develop the necessary technical and regulatory 
capacities. The efforts of the three supranational organisations are seen as some of these 
many efforts towards equipping countries for implementation of the Protocol and 
strengthening their risk management and decision-making with respect to biosafety.  
 
Even before the advent of the CPB, there were many efforts to build regulatory and technical 
capacity in countries (including developing countries) for the development and enforcement 
of mechanisms for safe use of biotechnology. However, since its entry into force in 
September 2003, the Protocol has served as a key driver of both national and international 
processes in the handling of products of modern biotechnology. In addition, and looking 
specifically at countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, many policy and regulation development 
models used elsewhere in the world have been availed to key stakeholders, governments and 
                                                
13 http://www.cbd.int/biosafety/ 
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organisations to employ in the policy development process (e.g. the ISNAR and UNEP 
models and the African Model Law on Safety in Biotechnology, cf. Paarlberg, 2000). 
Lessons have also been drawn from the European and American experiences.  
 
2.3 Pressure from Protocol obligations
14
 
Currently, although all the SADC countries have signed and/or ratified the Protocol, most of 
them are all still struggling to honour their obligations with respect to domesticating its 
provisions into their respective national legal systems (Mayet15, pers comm., 2007). This has 
been due to a number of factors, including the perennial lack of prioritisation of biosafety 
issues in the respective national agendas, lack of financial resources and trained manpower 
or expertise in the field of biotechnology, as well as limited of awareness of biotechnology 
issues by policy makers, lawyers and the general public (RAEIN-Africa, 2005). The absence 
of active research programmes employing modern biotechnological techniques in the 
majority of the countries has also been seen as a hindrance to the development of national 
policies and regulations. In other words there is a lack of adequate technological 
developments to act as a catalyst for development of regulatory mechanisms (Ushewokunze-
Obatolu, 2005; Jaffe, 2006; also Table 1). 
 
Meanwhile, with respect to national policies and biosafety mechanisms, three clusters of the 
countries emerge16; those that have both policies and regulatory mechanisms for 
biotechnology/biosafety (and these are Malawi, Mauritius, South Africa, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe); those that have policies only, but no legal frameworks for biosafety (Namibia 
                                                
14
 See Table 2 
15
 Mariam Mayet is a lawyer and the director of the Johannesburg-based African Centre for Biosafety 
16
 Source: On going personal communications between author and various sources in the countries, see Table 1 
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and Lesotho), and those that are still at various stages in the process of developing both their 
policies and their regulatory frameworks (Tanzania, Angola, DR Congo, Mozambique, 
Swaziland, Madagascar, Botswana). However, even within each category, the countries are 
not necessarily at the same specific level and they have employed different approaches and 
mechanisms17 to attain that particular status, and the lengths of time and amount (and type) of 
resources18 spent to achieve this also differ.  This different status of countries forms a key 
variable in the quest to understand the different national motivations for cross-national 
convergence; especially whether and how countries are prepared to ‘step up’ or ‘step down’ 
to the agreed regional convergence level.  Will there be an efficiency-mandated outcome, or 
a ‘race to the bottom’19, the latter being one of the stakeholder fears regarding the effect of 
globalisation and/or homogenisation of practices in general (cf. Heichel et al, 2005).  
 
2.4 Drivers for biotechnology/biosafety policy development 
Countries of the SADC region recognise the importance of issues of good governance as they 
relate to biosafety, including individuals’ constitutional rights to information and rights to a 
clean and safe environment. The recognised potential of modern biotechnology in addressing 
some of the existing constraints, especially in agriculture, also serves as a driver towards 
establishment of effective regulatory mechanisms. Other issues relate to transparency and 
inclusiveness that touch on the making and implementation of relevant public policies 
(Ushewokunze-Obatolu, 2005). With these constitutional obligations in mind, a number of 
response mechanisms have evolved in these countries to cope with the biotechnology 
regulation challenge. It has been observed that the key drivers for biotechnology policy and 
                                                
17 E.g. workshops, think tanks, policy consultants, advisory committees etc 
18 Resources here include policy/legislation models used as well as the usual financial, human and other 
material resources 
19 See Chapter 2 for more discussion on this. 
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regulatory framework development in these countries20 include: responses to international 
obligations and pressures created by international legal instruments and processes, chief 
among these being the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (see Table 2 below). These scenarios 
can essentially be described as reactionary (Naluwairo, 2004), and countries in this category 
tend to refer more to Biosafety Policy, than Biotechnology policy, with the emphasis being 
more on minimising the risks posed by the technology, as opposed to a dual approach to both 
the risk regulation and technology development. There are also proactive scenarios, in which 
countries are responding to national goals and priorities and at the same time taking 
advantage of the existing international legal framework. These countries are putting in place 
broader biotechnology policies with the dual thrust of minimising the risks and maximising 
the benefits through deployment of the technology (Kalibwani et al, 2004).  There are those 
countries that are engaged in policy formulation processes mainly because the international 
framework provides funding mechanisms to engage in these processes. Such countries are 
also being reactive, and to some extent opportunistic. Then there are those countries engaging 
in the processes because other countries in the region are doing so, or because of pressure 
from other countries in the region, especially because of SADC’s shared objective of 
‘national development based on regional cooperation and integration’ (Ushewokunze-
Obatolu, 2005). This last scenario represents a ‘joining the bandwagon’ tendency, and also 
possibly reflects the existence of some hegemony in the region with respect to this 
technology or the various other facets that come with the technology. Meanwhile, some 
commentators argue that the flexibility of the Cartagena Protocol allows for these varied 
approaches and responses (e.g. Mayet pers. comm., 2007). 
 
                                                
20 See Table 1 for this characterization of the countries and the status of their biosafety systems, including 
protocol ratification  
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Table 2 Some sources of pressure on SADC countries to comply with the 
Biosafety Protocol  
Activity/Issue 
(Source of Pressure) 
Number of Countries 
Concerned 
Relevant Protocol Provisions Impacted on by Issue  
Development of 
national biosafety 
regulations  
All countries Article 2 (1) ‘Each Party shall take necessary and 
appropriate legal, administrative and other measures 
to implement its obligations under this Protocol’. 
Suspected GM Food 
aid from US and 
World Food 
Programme 
10 countries21 in the region 
have received food aid from 
US or WFP22 in the last 5 
years (exceptions – 
Botswana, Mauritius, 
Seychelles and South Africa) 
Article 6 (Transit and Contained Use), Article 7 
(Advance Informed Agreement), Article 8 
(Notification), Article 10 (Decision Procedure), 
Article 18 (Handling, transport, packaging and 
identification), Article 20 (Information sharing and the 
Biosafety Clearing House), Article 23 (Public 
Awareness and Participation) 
Field trials South Africa, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe 
Article 23 (Public awareness and Publication) 
Article 16 (Risk Management) 
Commercial 
plantings 
South Africa Article 23 (Public awareness and Participation) 
Article 16 (Risk management) 
Article 26 (Socio-economic considerations) 
Table compiled by author using data from www.wfp.org; www.cbd.int; and Moola, S and Munnik, V (2007) 
 
As highlighted in chapter 1, one argument among those advocating for cross-national 
convergence of the regulatory practices (including SADC agriculture ministers in their call 
for harmonisation) is that having similar systems would help countries deal with some of the 
challenges and obligations presented in table 2, above. More details on the issues in this 
table, including the types of biotechnology techniques being used in the different countries 
were presented in table 1. Meanwhile, the thesis now proceeds with a look at the broader 
issues around collective responses to problems, seeking to understand if the envisaged 
convergence is treading on a beaten path, or it is a radical break from norms elsewhere. This 
to a large extent has a bearing on the forces around the issue, and ultimately, its feasibility. 
                                                
21 Source – See Moola, S and Munnik V (2007). GMOs in African food and agriculture: Status report 2007, 
African Centre for Biosafety 
22 www.wfp.org/aboutwfp/facts 
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2.5 Need for collective action 
International relations scholars are in agreement that there is an increasing number of 
problems that national governments cannot solve unilaterally, for reasons that range from 
increased governmental responsibility in domestic affairs to the increase of collective 
problems attributable to globalisation and scientific progress (Hasenclever et al, 2000; 
Sampson, 1982; Finnemore, 1996:47). There has also been an ‘erosion of the long-familiar 
building blocks of the political world’ (Ohmae, 1995:7), and countries increasingly find 
themselves having to cooperate with others in dealing with collective dilemmas that 
transcend national boundaries. For developing countries, the area of regulation of modern 
biotechnology is one challenge largely viewed as warranting such collective action because 
of inherent country deficiencies, e.g. weak technical and decision-making capacities, among 
others (explained elsewhere in this thesis). However, cross-country cooperation is not an easy 
undertaking for political, economic and many reasons embedded in or transcending the 
countries. The conditions under which this cooperation is possible are thus the subject of 
intense research in public policy, international relations and allied areas (Stone, 2000). 
 
Coordination of policy at international level is complicated by many factors, starting with the 
ambiguity and disagreement about definitions of ‘policy’; which means different things to 
different people, and invariably contains and expresses the conflicts and tensions of 
contemporary society (Considine, 2005: 1). Policy-making happens in a world undergoing 
continuous change, with older institutions and governance systems breaking up, and new 
ones emerging. In most democracies, policies are essentially a result of multistakeholder 
processes, encompassing different sectoral and societal interests (Carlson, 1999: 50). Yet, the 
policy environment is recognised as one of the key variables that have to be thought about 
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and acted upon if countries are to benefit from any innovation or investment in research 
(Clark et al, 2005: 75). Countries of the SADC region have thus been making individual and 
joint efforts to develop and maintain a conducive policy environment with a balance between 
the risks and benefits of biotechnology. However, the biotechnology policy arena is highly 
contentious and has stagnated in many contexts as newer forms of modern biotechnology 
emerge (Puplampu and Essegbey, 2004). The new technologies are entering an already-
loaded context, where players have different prior beliefs and positions (cf. Mesegeur, 2005). 
For example, the issues of biosafety and convergence of biosafety systems are enmeshed 
within the political economy of GM food, especially the often conflicting objectives between 
trade and environment management obligations (Stevens, 1993; Murphy and Yanacopulos, 
2005) and this complicates the numerous dynamics at play (Russell and Vogler, 2000: 2). 
Another of the many challenges around the technology is that it is dominated by a 
diminishing number of GM biotechnology giants (Somsen, 2007: 98). Their aggressive 
corporate policies of control and the vulnerability of the region’s countries in the face of 
these powerful corporate actors and states is both a cause for worry, and a source of 
motivation for the convergence agenda, creating both the background and foreground for the 
research. As a result, biotechnology is not only a dynamic scientific discipline, but it is also a 
game of high stakes hinging on poverty, polarisation among interest groups and the 
seemingly elusive target for developing countries to develop adequate capacity levels to 
maximise the benefits and minimise the risks of the technology (cf. Walters, 2004; 
Kinderlerer and Adcock, 2005). The challenges at national level are understandably 
magnified when the issues play out at regional level.  
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Regional collaboration is seen by some countries as an opportunity to ‘internationalise’ or 
‘legitimise’ their domestic policy preferences and, among many other facets, this research 
explored the motivation as well as the costs and benefits of the desired regional governance 
mechanisms. For the policy analyst and researcher, a look at regional governance systems 
comes hand in hand with a high diversity of the subject matter that needs to be considered, 
necessitating integration of diverse expertise and different knowledge sets in trying to 
understand the issue. 
 
2.6 Towards convergence of the national biosafety systems
23
 
Kerr (1983) defines convergence as ‘the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop 
similarities in structures, processes and performance’. The various aspects of this widely 
accepted definition form the basis of the argument presented in this thesis. The concept of 
convergence and some of the mechanisms through which cross-national convergence can be 
achieved for example harmonisation, coercive imposition of policies and policy diffusion 
(see Busch and Jorgens, 2005; Holzinger and Knill, 2005a; Drezner, 2004), are the subject of 
this research. From the region, convergence is being championed both in terms of having 
similar systems in countries, and in the mechanisms for implementing these systems. From 
the researcher’s perspective, the interest is in convergence both as a process and an 
observable phenomenon.   
 
The mid-1990’s saw the commencement of development and implementation of a number of 
initiatives aimed at helping countries in the SADC collectively and singly to develop 
capacities to harness and manage biotechnology. To date, the region has gone through a 
                                                
23 Policy convergence can occur at sub-national level. However, this thesis is concerned with cross-national 
convergence, both in space and time.  
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developmental process punctuated by technological and political moments which have had 
short-, medium- and long-term impacts alike on development of national biosafety systems 
and convergence broadly. The timeline (table 3 below) shows some of these developments. 
The fact that the countries of the region and the various organisations felt it necessary to start 
initiatives to deal with biosafety issues, the fact that they were all experiencing by and large 
the same pressures from the technology, including regional and global obligations, and given 
the small pool of policy actors who were dealing with the issues in the countries and in the 
various cross-national initiatives; all formed part of the rationality behind expectations of 
convergence of the regulatory systems being developed (cf. Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 
2000). This expectation based on the effect of identical pressures and diminished ability to 
act singly is supported by much of the literature on policy convergence (Heichel et al, 2005).  
 
Table 3:  Timeline of key biotechnology/biosafety activities in the SADC 
       1963 OAU, precursor to the AU, formed 
Pre-1980 Limited cooperation in agricultural research or Science and Technology 
1980        Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC24) formed 
1981 Southern African Centre for Cooperation in Agricultural Research and 
Training (SACCAR) formed 
1990 Southern African Development Community (SADC) formed replacing 
SADCC 
1994 South Africa (SA), the biggest economy in the region, gains independence and 
joins SADC 
1994 Regional Biosafety Focal Point (RBFP) project commences with funding 
from the DGIS
25
 
1997 SA’s GMO Act launched 
1999 SA commences open growing of GM cotton in the smallholder farming 
                                                
24 Precursor to the SADC 
25 See for example, Chetsanga, C J and Chigogora, J L (2001). This project covered 12 countries in eastern 
southern Africa, with a main objective of building regulatory and technical capacity. It ended in 1997 
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sector (Makhathini Flats, KwaZulu-Natal Province) 
2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is completed, and some SADC countries 
sign and ratify it 
2000 Zimbabwe institutionalises biosafety system through Statutory  
  Instrument 20 of 2000 
2000 OAU Model Law on Safety in Biotechnology launched 
2001 SA starts commercial growing of GM maize 
2001 AfricaBio public biotechnology awareness project commences in 6 SADC 
countries 
2001  SARB biosafety capacity building project in 7 SADC countries 
2001 BTZ implements eastern and southern African regional consultation on 
biotech and biosafety. Need for harmonisation emerges as a key issue 
2001 UNEP phase 1 projects commence for some countries in the region 
2001 NEPAD launched, with a mandate for science and technology-led 
development of Africa 
2002 SADC Biodiversity Support Project launched 
2002 Bt-cotton trials in Zimbabwe; Biosafety regulations enacted in Mauritius 
2002/03 Food crisis in the SADC region and receipt of GM maize by some 
countries 
2003 SADC sends a team of scientists to Europe, USA and SA on a fact finding 
mission regarding the way forward on biotechnology processes and 
products 
2003 SADC Heads of State give a deadline of December 2004 for all countries 
to put in place biosafety mechanisms
26
 
2003 SADC Advisory Committee on Biotechnology and Biosafety (SADC 
ACBB) formed after the fact-finding mission; draw up guidelines on 
transboundary movement of GMOs in the region
27
 
2003  Zambia says ‘No’ to GM-maize grain, Malawi accepts the grain; Zimbabwe 
and Mozambique mill it before distribution 
2003 FANRPAN, IFPRI and NEPAD team up in a regional biotechnology policy 
dialogues project28 
                                                
26 SADC (2004) 
27 See SADC (2003) 
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2002 Malawi enacts her biosafety legislation 
2004  USAID’s Programme on Biosafety Systems commences activities on 
biosafety capacity-building 
2004 SA GMO Act undergoing revision and alignment with the Cartagena Protocol 
2004 SA biotechnology strategy published; Zambia’s Biotechnology and Biosafety 
Strategy is published 
2005 RAEIN-Africa launched 
2006 Zimbabwe completes National Biotechnology Policy, and sets up a 
Biotechnology Management Authority29 
2007 Zambia enacts Biosafety Act 
2007 SADC developing a Science, Technology and Innovation protocol 
2007 SADC ACBB relaunched 
 
The above is by no means an exhaustive timeline, but it serves to indicate of some of the 
major developments that have contributed to the prevailing status in the countries and the 
region. It is also important to note that most of the developments have not been done under 
any special or explicit ‘convergence agenda’, but that convergence was implicit or only 
incidental to the agendas of some of these different programmes.  Overall, there was a 
constant recognition that policy convergence efforts were not separate policy processes, but 
were part of wider policy processes, and they were therefore shaped by these processes. 
 
In addition, while all these developments have been going on at national and regional levels, 
a number of decisions, declarations and programmes towards convergence of biosafety 
systems in Africa have been put in place. These cover both the continental and sub-
continental levels, including the SADC region. Table 4 below gives details on some of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
28 NEPAD and IFPRI (2004) and Omamo and von Grebmer (2005) 
29 Mafa (2004) 
 46 
organisations that are engaged in activities towards cross-national convergence of biosafety 
systems in Africa: 
 
Table 4
30
:  Organisations/processes, geographical area of operation and focus of 
their activities in the cross-national convergence of biosafety systems in 
Africa 
 
Organization(s)/
Processes 
Geographical 
level of 
operation 
Focus of biosafety activities 
The Cartagena 
Protocol on 
Biosafety to the 
Convention on 
Biological 
Diversity 
Global Sets global rules and regulations on the transboundary 
movement, transit, handling and use of living 
(genetically) modified organisms that may have 
adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use 
of biological diversity, also taking into account risks to 
human health. Box 1 gives more information on the 
Protocol.  
The African 
Union (AU),  
The whole of 
Africa 
The AU set up a group of experts in June 1999 to draft 
a comprehensive framework of biosafety regulations 
that would serve as a model law to protect Africa’s 
biodiversity, environment and the health of its people. 
This initiative resulted in the African Model Law 
(AML) on Safety in Biotechnology which was 
finalized in May 2001. In July 2003 Decision 
EX/CL/Dec.20-74 (III)31 of the AU Executive Council 
endorsed the Africa-wide Capacity Building 
Programme in Biosafety in which adoption of the AML 
was encouraged for creation of ‘a harmonized Africa-
wide space and system in biosafety …’. In November 
2006, the Human Resources, Science and Technology 
Directorate of the AU Commission proposed an 
African Strategy on Biosafety32 in which, among other 
issues harmonisation through regional economic 
communities (RECs) and use of the AML was 
encouraged. A December 2006 Conference of AU 
Ministers of Agriculture33 declared an ‘African 
Position on GMOs in Agriculture’, emphasizing the 
precautionary approach and establishment of a 
‘mechanism to facilitate harmonisation of regulatory 
systems’ e.g. through encouraging and facilitating 
                                                
30 Table designed by author with information sourced from Ayele (2007), www.nepad.org, www.unep.org, 
www.africanunion.org, www.sadc.int (accessed May 2007) 
31 AU EX/CL/Dec.20-74 (III) 
32 AU (2006b). African Strategy on Biosafety 
33 AU Dec 2006a – An African Position on GMOs in Agriculture 
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dialogue between RECs. The AU Human Resources, 
Science and Technology (HRST) Directorate is 
currently implementing an Africa-wide Biosafety 
Capacity Building Project with funding from Germany.  
The Southern 
African 
Development 
Community 
(SADC) 
14 countries 
in southern 
Africa 
The SADC is recognised as one of the first RECs to 
develop guidelines on GMOs and Biotechnology, and 
this happened in response to the food aid crisis which 
followed the 2002 drought in the region34. In 2003, the 
SADC Secretariat, through its Food, Agriculture and 
Natural Resources (FANR) Unit set up the SADC 
Advisory Committee on Biotechnology and Biosafety 
(SACBB), to draft guidelines/recommendations on 
handling of food aid; policy and regulations (including 
harmonization); capacity-building; and public 
participation in biotechnology and biosafety. The 
Committee was reconstituted in 2007 after a three year 
period of low activity to develop and propose 
institutional arrangements for a ‘SADC Framework on 
the Safe Handling and Transboundary Movement of 
GMOs’35. The proposed framework recommends 
establishment of a SADC Biosafety Focal Point, to 
which Member States will communicate national 
decisions on GMOs. Among other provisions, countries 
will be responsible for monitoring their obligations 
under the Framework; while cooperation in research 
and development on biotechnology and biosafety is 
‘encouraged’ and the SADC Secretariat is tasked to 
‘coordinate and mobilise the required resources’. 
Disputes among countries will be referred to the SADC 
Tribunal (Article 16 of the SADC Treaty). Meanwhile, 
through the SADC Ministerial Council on Science and 
Technology, region is developing a Protocol36 on 
Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) in which 
harmonization of biotechnology policies and 
regulations is one of the targets. An STI Unit is 
proposed, to be housed in the SADC Secretariat.  
The New 
Partnership for 
Africa’s 
Development 
(NEPAD) 
All countries 
from across 
the continent  
In 2005 the NEPAD, in partnership with the AU set up 
a high level African Panel on Biotechnology (APB) to 
analyze the African biotechnology terrain and make 
recommendations on how best to use the technology 
for Africa’s development, including developing an 
African strategy on biotechnology and biosafety. The 
APB is mandated to propose and promote the adoption 
of a regional strategy that reflects Africa’s common 
values, articulates shared needs and a focus on 
                                                
34 e.g. Clark et al, 2005 
35 Ref – Draft SADC Framework on the Safe Handling and Transboundary Movement of GMOs 
36 Ref: SADC – Draft 2 – Protocol on Science, Technology and Innovation 
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common opportunities. The Panel has produced its 
report (Freedom to Innovate: Biotechnology in Africa’s 
Development, 2007). Dissemination to key partners and 
adoption of this report by regional economic 
communities and dissemination of the report to 
strategic partners is in progress. The NEPAD, through 
its Office of Science and Technology (OST)37 and the 
African Ministerial Council on Science and 
Technology also implements an African Biosciences 
Initiative (ABI) and the African Consolidated Plan of 
Action (CPA) for Science and Technology through 
Centres of Excellence in Eastern, Western, Southern 
and Northern Africa as part of a ‘dual approach’ to 
technology and policy development.  
The United 
Nations’ 
Environment 
Programme 
(UNEP) 
Some of the 
countries 
across the 
continent 
Some countries from the SADC region have 
participated in the Global Environmental 
Facility/UNEP Biosafety Project; starting with phase 1 
- Pilot Biosafety Enabling Activity; Phase 2 – 
Development of Biosafety Frameworks; and Phase 3 – 
Implementation of National Biosafety Frameworks. 
The different phases of the activity had different but 
complementary and cumulative objectives hinging on 
promoting information sharing and collaboration, 
especially at the regional and sub regional levels and 
helping countries comply with the CPB. For the SADC 
region, only Namibia participated in all three phases.  
 
 
These activities are a few of many other programmes and activities towards convergence that 
have taken place in other regions of the continent, some with an impact on activities in the 
SADC as well. For example, in 2006, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA)38 implemented a project entitled Regional Approaches to Biosafety in Eastern 
and Southern Africa (RABESA), with technical assistance from the African Centre for 
Technology Studies (ACTS). Among the recommendations were the need for cooperation at 
COMESA regional level in assessment and management of potential risks from GMOs, the 
                                                                                                                                                  
37 www.nepadst.org 
38 In May 2006, COMESA stakeholders endorsed plans by the COMESA to develop a regional policy on 
GMOs, to cover issues on commercial planting, trade and GM-food aid. Among other issues, a regional centre 
of excellence in biotechnology and biosafety and an expert’s panel will be set up (ISAAA, CropBiotech Update, 
June 2006). It is very important to see how this reconciles with the NEPAD, AU and SADC initiatives already 
in place. 
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establishment of ‘a regional panel of experts to advise on matters of biotechnology and 
biosafety’ and the establishment of centres of excellence in biotechnology and biosafety39. 
Among the conclusions from the RABESA project was the observation of expectations and 
pressures from extra-regional players. For example, the World Food Programme (WFP) had 
their own preferences on how harmonised regional policies for acceptance of GM food aid 
should pan out. Some fears for the WFP revolved around the additional time and monetary 
costs, e.g., if countries decided on regional harmonisation around ‘milling (of grain) prior to 
distribution’ (Paarlberg et al, 2006).   
 
The East African Community (EAC), to which one of the SADC states (Tanzania) belongs, 
has also taken some steps towards a common regional framework on biosafety, starting in 
2004 with the EAC Council of Ministers’ establishment of a regional experts’ panel to advise 
on biotechnology and biosafety. The experts recommended development of an EAC regional 
policy, legal and regulatory framework on GMOs, encompassing food security, environment 
management and public health. Further activities were held in 2006, and the pursuit of a 
regional regulatory approach and policy harmonisation were endorsed. Elsewhere, the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has also made steps towards 
regional harmonisation of biosafety systems; this being one of the recommendations from the 
June 2005 Bamako (Mali) ECOWAS Ministerial Conference on Biotechnology. The 
conference also recommended the ‘institutionalisation of the ministerial conference on 
biotechnology’40. What becomes clear from this look at the various players and what they are 
                                                
39 Wakhungu J W (2006) in Keynote Address to the Innogen Annual Conference 2006: Genomics for 
Development? The Life Sciences & Poverty Reduction, Regents College, London, 2006; entitled Biotechnology 
and Trade in Africa: The Case Study of the COMESA/ASARECA. See also  www.acts.co.ke; and Paarlberg et 
al (2006) on costs and benefits on various GMO policy options  
40 AU – African Position on GMOs in Agriculture (2006) 
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doing is that the convergence agenda is alive and moving forward in Africa, and the desire to 
study and understand it is therefore well placed. 
 
In all the above, cross-national convergence of biosafety systems is invariably seen as 
desirable from economic, regulatory, technological and environmental view-points as in all 
cases it will allow countries to share resources, draw lessons from each other, shorten 
technology and product approval processes and also positively impact on the environment 
conservation efforts of many of the countries (Ayele, 2007). However, the motivation and 
compelling factors for convergence (among other factors), from international and national 
perspectives were observed to be in a continual state of fluctuation, and the impact of this on 
the convergence agenda was one of the many interests for this study.  
 
2.7 Concluding remarks 
This chapter further elucidated the context for the analysis into how transnational 
mechanisms for governing modern biotechnology facilitated by three supranational 
organizations are taking root within the contentious and unstable biotechnology policy 
environment of southern Africa. This wider biotechnology/biosafety context of the SADC 
region was seen as crucial as it serves as a source of the constraints targeted by the cross-
national policy convergence, thus dictating the extent to which the facilitatory role of the 
three SNOs can be effective.  In addition to analyzing the emerging mechanisms towards 
cross-national policy similarity/convergence, the research also looks at the factors facilitating 
the action and impact of these mechanisms, and this context has highlighted some of these 
together with their fluctuating spatial and temporal locations. This context points to a 
backdrop with many and contending interests, values, power relations and knowledge 
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dynamics around the technology, within the member states, among stakeholders, and in the 
three supranational organizations, further pointing to a multilevel and multi-actor issue, from 
which only an integrative and multi-disciplinary approach would yield analytical insights.  
The thesis now proceeds with an analysis of some of the theoretical perspectives that were 
reviewed as part of seeking explanations for the obtaining and emerging policy scenario, and 
seeking methodological guidance to this end.  
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW  
‘From a governance perspective, the process of governing is an interactive one 
because no single actor has the knowledge and resource capacity to tackle problems 
unilaterally … and the powers of government tiers are no longer clearly distributed, 
as cooperation replaces hierarchy, and legislative competencies are shared among 
several levels …’ (Lyall and Tait, 2005: 4).  
 
3.0 Introduction 
This study sought to understand the roles that three supranational organizations were playing 
in bringing about cross-national convergence of biosafety systems among SADC countries. 
The first two chapters have presented the complex context in which this policy challenge was 
being tackled; a context, as highlighted in the theoretical framework, which created an 
empirical and theoretical imperative for broad-based or multi-pronged analytical approaches. 
The context underscored various technological, regulatory and organizational factors, and the 
contentions around the benefits and risks from the technology, which have all led to a 
diminished role of governments as sole decision-makers, and why different groups of actors 
and decision-makers, including the SNOs, have entered the fray (echoed by quote above). 
This chapter presents an analysis of the key theoretical perspectives that were consulted in 
seeking to understand how the three SNOs were dealing with these different dynamics in 
their facilitation of a transnational regulatory agenda for biosafety. Established theoretical 
perspectives provided insights for the data gathering methods employed by the study, and 
also brought explanatory power to illuminate and situate the findings from the study within 
the bigger fields in which the research is located. This literature analysis scanned available 
research with three interrelated objectives; firstly looking at perspectives around emergence 
of convergence, i.e. systemic conditions that could facilitate convergence, and how 
convergence happened under these conditions. The next objective was to bring out 
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perspectives around actor preferences vis-à-vis cross-national cooperation, i.e. who wanted 
convergence and why? And how did they frame the convergence, including what factors 
influenced them to push for convergence? The third objective was to look at convergence as 
having happened, looking at how it would endure and the threats to its sustainability in the 
face of different forces brought about by different human and non-human actors in the 
context. The literature review thus sought to reveal the theoretical and methodological 
approaches to dealing with these three, and the broader question of the research which sought 
to understand how and to what extent the three SNOs were influencing cross-national 
convergence of biosafety systems in the SADC region.  
 
The theories looked at also aimed to bring out alleged tensions and overlaps between what 
Martin and Richards (1995) identified as the common approaches to studying science and 
technology controversies; i.e. positivist, group politics, constructivist and social structural 
approaches. Biosafety was viewed as a science and technology controversy; in much the 
same way as it was a potential avenue for countries to alleviate their development challenges. 
From a positivistic perspective, there was room for both cognitive and social ‘truths’ in 
resolving the regulatory challenges, while the group politics approaches recognize the 
activities of groups such as expert panels and government bodies (Martin and Richards, 
1995). The constructivist perspective looks at the interaction of different cultures around the 
controversial science while social structural approaches look at social structures such as 
class, the state and patriarchy in shaping the relations around the issue. Each approach has its 
own limitations in emphasizing one set of issues or actors over others, and it was in this 
background that all approaches were kept in mind during the research. The whole thesis in 
the main is about how the three SNOs were innovating around the collisions and overlaps 
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between many interests, powers and knowledges in the quest for a cross-national governance 
framework for modern biotechnology. These tension areas varied in space and in time, and it 
was the sum total of these clashes which was being analysed with the view to concluding 
whether or not convergence was a positive-, negative- or zero- sum-game.  
 
3.1 Theoretical perspectives on key themes 
The literature search for this study was guided by the appreciation that this study was about 
boundary crossings at different levels (cf. Jasanoff 2005: 26; Keck and Sikkink, 1998), 
including but not limited to interests, disciplinary, institutional/organizational, sectoral and 
national level boundaries (Finnemore, 1996: 45), all this happening within a context where 
cooperation appeared to be an inevitable policy option, yet one where little understanding 
existed with respect to operationalisation. These boundaries represented both the motivation 
for convergence and the barriers that the process of cross-national policy convergence had to 
overcome. All this had to be achieved in the backdrop of different levels of utilization of the 
technology in question across the different boundaries, which entailed different functional 
needs, as well as different understandings of the envisaged output of the processes.  
An initial literature review showed that many theoretical perspectives could predict and 
explain this spread, for example, neofunctionalism could bring an understanding of the 
demand for transnational governance through shared functional needs around biotechnology 
and biosafety (Cichowski, 2007); regime theory also predicted space for transnational 
governance, for example through reduction of costs of information and policy innovation 
(Keohane, 1988; Marsh and Smith, 2000); the Actor-Network Theory pioneered by Latour, 
Callon, and Law (Callon, 1986: 200) could be a good descriptor from a socio-technical 
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perspective, and a recognition of the interaction between human and non-human actors in the 
issue area. Institutional theory (e.g. Scott, 2004), by considering the processes through which 
structures, including schemas, rules, norms, and routines, become established as authoritative 
guidelines for social behavior, also possessed explanatory potential. The ostensible 
preoccupation with stability and order in social life, however could be challenged with 
respect to the biosafety arena in the SADC. Systems and network theories were also 
reviewed; their emphasis on actors and linkages/knowledge flows between them being a key 
attribute. For the study region, the fluctuation in the number, location and identity of actors, 
and the intermittent linkages between them strengthened the case for more encompassing 
approaches to explaining the dynamics around biotechnology policy convergence. Therefore, 
in the final analysis, the multi-level, multi-actor and ever-changing nature of the biosafety 
arena in the SADC region made all these and other perspectives inadequate to tell explicitly 
how and when this convergence could happen. Thus a ‘pyramiding approach’41 was 
employed, where the relevant theoretical perspectives were brought together around the 
three-factor Busch and Jorgens typology employed by the study as an organizing tool. 
 
Meanwhile, it also emerged that the ‘newness’ of the technology had a number of empirical 
and theoretical implications, which impacted on the research as a result of how the 
technology influences framing of the regulatory responses. From a sociology of expectations 
point of view; looking at the technology from ‘risk’ and ‘potentials’ perspectives (Borup et 
al, 2006) was also important. Risk regulation and benefits framing are central to how the 
different interests and expectations are constellating towards the desired regional framework 
(cf. Rothstein et al, 2006).  
                                                
41 Metaphor derived by author from the concept of gene-pyramiding in molecular biology, where best effect is 
obtained from combining various genes within an ‘expression cassette’.  
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From an STS perspective, the research also desired to understand the users of a technology 
and a regulatory system, and how they perceived its utility in their system. Williams and 
Edge (1996) argue for a ‘social-shaping approach’ to technology and policy development – 
where there is interplay between technologies, as well as social and economic factors. This is 
also in line with the broader theories which question technological determinism, and attack 
the deficit model for claiming that the lay public has nothing to contribute in terms of 
relevant knowledge that might lead to simplification of a technical problem (cf. Wynne, 
2002).   Users in this case were the region, the countries and the implementing organizations 
and individuals at these levels. They all had different visions and imaginings of what they 
desired and what they perceived society to desire, and they channelled their knowledge to the 
policy arena through different means. The variation among these different actors in the 
different countries of the study region implied different social contexts and hence 
understandings and interpretations of the policy issue at hand (Irwin, 2001). The empirical 
perspectives results presented in chapters 6, 7 and 8 endeavour to show how these different 
challenges were negotiated at the level of policy and practice, how visions were 
deconstructed and reconstructed, and how the many boundary crossings, especially in terms 
of expertise among the operatives were dealt with (Haas, 1992; Sampson III, 1982; Jasanoff, 
1987), and precisely, what roles the three SNOs played in all these interactions.  
 
3.2 Collective problem and collective action – a governance challenge 
What has been presented in the background chapters and in the sections above confirm the 
shift from State-power, or the idea of governments as sole-decision-makers and arbiters, to 
processes of governance that encompass networks and groups of decision-makers (cf. Bevir 
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et al. 2003). This thesis presents a case study that highlights how these issues are negotiated 
at the cross-national level. Governance in this study was used more as it relates to the 
processes of creating conditions for ordered rule and collective action (cf. Stoker, 1998), 
within a context where ‘no single actor has the knowledge and resource capacity to tackle 
problems unilaterally’ (Kooiman 1993: 40). Particular interest was on how the complex 
interactions at various levels within the SADC biosafety terrain described earlier and 
throughout this thesis shaped the convergence agenda, and with what impact on the collective 
action desired.  
 
Therefore, while the study was focusing specifically on cross-national convergence of 
biosafety systems and the roles of the SNOs in this, the bigger issue under which this study 
fell is that of national and cross-national responses to technology. These responses were all 
happening at a time when technological, ecological, political, economic and social 
environments have continued to become so intricately enmeshed that changes taking place in 
one affect all others (Ruggie, 1975). Closely tied with these intricacies is the increasing 
complexity of new scientific and technological knowledge. Technology now involves much 
more than science, with social and economic imperatives playing prominent roles (cf. 
Williams and Edge, 1996). Together, these challenges combine to make capacities of national 
and international systems of management increasingly inadequate ((Ruggie, 1975; Lyall and 
Tait, 2005: 4) necessitating the emergence and development of innovative and new multi-
actor systems. The blurring of boundaries between the different disciplines has brought a 
challenging dimension to the systems being developed (Jasanoff, 1987) such that a purely 
technological intervention, for example, has to be looked at in light of its impacts and 
implications on other policy arenas. Technological determinism has thus been eroded by the 
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bigger political interests and other forces in the issues, both in terms of problem definition 
and in the formulation of solutions to the problems (Walters, 2004). In this research, 
countries were seen to be facing two major tensions, among others; tensions from the 
collective problem they were facing, and tensions from the collective action they had to 
undertake. The necessity of bringing policy makers and scientists together to chart an 
amenable policy response to the challenges brought by modern biotechnology came with a 
new challenge of how to make these groups work together in the backdrop of working 
arrangements in which they were not used to cooperating. Thus there was need to deal with 
these discipline-embedded challenges (Jasanoff, 1987) in the pursuit of sustainable and 
synergistic interactions between the individual and organizational actors. The strength of 
prior beliefs on the issue among the different actors affects the learning desired to break the 
different boundaries, with vague or weak prior beliefs being preferred if easier learning is to 
be achieved (Meseguer, 2005). Hence, the flow of knowledge across disciplines, as well as 
the organizational, sectoral and national boundaries can be described in terms of a system of 
innovation (e.g. Hall et al, 2001), with the specific challenge for this research being to 
establish how this flow occurs, e.g. through people or other resource flows between the 
actors. The systems of innovation are operational at all levels from the organizations to the 
regional levels.  
 
At the cross-national level, countries were at a quandary with respect to how to collectively 
deal with the problems and opportunities, while maintaining national autonomy and 
flexibility in doing so (cf. Ruggie, 1975). Information asymmetries and tensions from other 
obligations emanating from separate bilateral and multilateral relationships meant that 
countries were also facing ‘Prisoner’s Dilemmas’ (Schmidtchen, 1999; also Thomas, 2000). 
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In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the optimal outcome for the entire group of participants 
results from cooperation of the participants, but is put in danger by the fact that the optimal 
outcome for each individual is to not cooperate while the others do cooperate. In this case, 
countries thus also face a ‘fallacy of composition’ which masks the competition that exists 
between them for different resources and international attention, in the hope for reciprocity 
from those they are favouring (Sayer, 1995: 19; also Dobbin et al, 2007). This competition 
may also result in the phenomenon of ‘race to the bottom’ which Schram and Beer (1999) 
explain as 
  
implying ‘that [the] states compete with each other as each tries to underbid the 
others in lowering taxes, spending, regulation ... so as to make itself more attractive 
to outside financial interests or unattractive to unwanted outsiders. It can be opposed 
to the alternative metaphor of "laboratories of democracy." The laboratory metaphor 
implies a more sanguine federalism in which [states] use their authority and 
discretion to develop innovative and creative solutions to common problems which 
can be then adopted by other states"(page 1).  
 
Cross-national convergence of policies and regulatory systems had to overcome these 
tensions, and from a rationalist perspective of ‘problems creating incentives for their own 
solutions’ (Haas, 2004), the desire for convergence was seen as one of the responses to these 
tensions (cf. Bennett, 1991). The background was thus becoming the foreground, with the 
context not only shaping the work of policy makers, but having also become the target of the 
interventions by the organizations. 
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3.3 Interdisciplinary approach 
It became clear after the analysis above, and as presented earlier about the context, that this 
cross-national policy convergence study was highly interdisciplinary and would require not 
one, but various different approaches and methods to increase understanding and to 
adequately cover the different issues impacting on this policy arena.  Klein and Newell 
(1997) define interdisciplinary study as ‘a process of answering a question, solving a problem 
or addressing a topic that is too broad or complex to be dealt with adequately by a single 
discipline or profession’. This need to look beyond the subject-knowledge of a single 
discipline has also been recognized in many other disciplines, e.g. health care research and 
multicultural curriculum reform studies (Cornwell and Stoddard, 1994) among other areas. 
On the other hand, while cross-national policy convergence is an area of intense research by 
many scholars, notably political scientists and economists, the lack of consistent theoretical 
frameworks guiding the research has been bemoaned. This has been attributed partly to the 
varied nature of the researchers engaging in research on this issue, and their concentration to 
a large extent on finding empirical evidence to demonstrate convergence, at the expense of 
development of theoretical perspectives (Heichel et al, 2005). This presents a catch-22 
situation for interdisciplinary research, in terms of this apparent poor return on contribution 
to theory development, yet in terms of explaining dynamics within the normative realm, this 
approach wields more power. Mark Considine (2005: vi) calls this desire to balance practice 
(policy) and theory walking ‘a tightrope’ for both practitioners and researchers. A deliberate 
choice was made to walk this tightrope in this research, recognizing that for the cross-
national convergence of biosafety systems in the SADC, and as mentioned earlier, a number 
of theoretical perspectives could have ample potential to predict the emergence of 
convergence, to explain the processes going on as well as explain and shed some light on the 
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failures and successes of the efforts. To this end, this section looked at literatures explaining 
different mechanisms through which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements 
and institutions could move across space and time as a first step towards unpacking the 
various other theoretical perspectives impinging on this issue. The aim was to look at both 
the predictive and explanatory power of the perspectives, and identifying the gaps that were 
there with respect to these two, and then informing the subsequent data gathering and 
interpretation stages. This review and analysis was guided by the research question which 
was seeking an understanding of how three supranational bodies were influencing the 
processes towards cross-national convergence of biosafety systems in the SADC region in 
the backdrop of the boundary crossings that had to be undertaken.  
3.4 The question of policy convergence 
Policy convergence has received a lot of attention in recent years, with most attention being 
on areas where rapid technological change is happening. Biotechnology is undoubtedly one 
of these rapidly growing technologies (Heichel et al, 2005; Bandelow, 2006). However, and 
as some authors have written, while accepting the policy problem posed by the technology, 
and that policy choices are constrained by the technology choice, it still remains to be seen 
how authoritative decisions towards similar policies are made in the face of all this (Weibust, 
2007; Faria, 2002). It is argued that a technological imperative has to be avoided if 
objectivity is to be obtained (Levy, 1997; Jasanoff, 1987), also recognizing that countries 
learn differently from the technology using different mechanisms within their structures, 
usually with the objective of maximizing on their own beliefs (Meseguer, 2005). Already, for 
the SADC region, different subnational, national and regional positions on the technology’s 
risks and potentials and how to deal with them abound.  
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As mentioned earlier, for this study, the limited research on cross-national convergence in the 
area of biotechnology policy in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) made demonstration of 
convergence a logical starting point, even in the backdrop of much of the literature on policy 
convergence being dominated by the focus on availing evidence for policy convergence as 
mentioned elsewhere. In addition, the study further explored the mechanisms and facilitating 
factors for convergence, organizing the research and data analysis around the three-factor 
conceptualization of Busch and Jorgens (2005).  
 
There have been many classification schemes for the different mechanisms through which 
convergence occurs [e.g. Bennett (1991), Jordan (2005), Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), 
Seeliger (1996), Busch and Jorgens (2005), Rose, 2000, Drezner, 1991, Holzinger and Knill 
2005a)]. In fact Rose (1991) talks about ‘scholarly competition’, and the ‘marking of 
academic turf’ in convergence research. However, a close analysis of the different 
classification schemes shows that they all invariably denote two broad characterizations of 
these mechanisms; one category based on voluntarism and the other on non-voluntarism. 
This is with respect to the choices available to policy actors across the countries in the 
adoption of the policy innovations from abroad. The non-voluntary characterizations can be 
further split into two; one cluster based on coercion of weaker recipients (e.g. countries, 
organizations or policy groups) by more powerful ‘donors’ or ‘drivers’ of policies to adopt 
policy innovations; and the other where countries have ‘interdependence’ which results in 
countries having no choice but to cooperate in order to deal with their collective development 
challenges. The latter cluster is what Busch and Jorgens (2005) describe as coercive 
imposition (see section 3.6.2), while others (cf. Bennett 1991) describe it as penetration. As 
Bennett explains, in this instance, ‘countries are forced to conform to actions taken elsewhere 
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… e.g. through pressures from multinational companies seeking a common regulatory 
framework, or through the activities of international organisations seeking to force laggards 
to conform to the rules adopted by other members of the club’. Political and economic 
sanctions as well as other measures such as monopolization of information and expertise can 
also be used to coerce countries to conform to certain practices (Dobbin et al, 2007).  
 
On the other hand, the voluntary mechanisms are characterized by free-willed and rational 
‘utilization of evidence about a programme or programmes from elsewhere and drawing 
lessons from that experience’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). It can also happen through elite 
networking and growth of policy communities (e.g. Meseguer, 2005) both at national and 
cross-national levels. A number of studies have been conducted to investigate the prominent 
role of transnational knowledge networks (Yanacopulos 2005; Considine, 2005: 70) and they 
all emphasise the crucial role of shared histories and trust in facilitating effective knowledge 
transfer across the different boundaries (e.g. Considine, 2005: 45). It is also argued that such 
cases result from the existence of shared ideas amongst a relatively coherent and enduring 
network of elites engaging in regular interaction at the transnational level, and that these 
elites are ‘bound by knowledge and expertise of a common policy problem and a shared 
concern for its regulation’ (Levy, 1997). Bennett (1991) refers to these as transnational policy 
communities of experts and professionals that share their expertise and information and form 
common patterns of understanding regarding policy through regular interaction (international 
conferences, government delegations and sustained communication). The roles of the experts 
are not the same as emulation, as they involve a shared experience of learning about 
problems and the development of a common perspective or ‘international policy culture’ 
(Ikenberry, 1990: 89). In particular, experts and professionals potentially become a stronger 
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causal factor in convergence when they act as ‘policy entrepreneurs’, that is, ‘people who 
seek to initiate dynamic policy change’ (Mintrom, 1997: 739). A lot of these mechanisms 
were postulated to be at play within the biotechnology policy arena in the SADC, and this 
study sought to investigate their existence, and understand the technological and contextual 
factors that were facilitating the action of these mechanisms and the interplay between them, 
keenly tracing the influence of the three SNOs on these factors, and vice-versa. In particular, 
this study questions the assumptions of free-willed and rational learning among policy 
makers given the contentious biotechnology policy environment of the SADC region.  
 
 
3.5 Supranational organizations as knowledge networks and nodes in innovation 
systems 
 
The increasing role of supranational organizations and transnational knowledge networks in 
policy-making is widely recognized by many political scientists and policy researchers, their 
ostensible aim being to complement governments in dealing with increasingly complex 
governance issues (Hajer, 1995: 264; Yanacopulos, 2005; Cichowski, 2007). The SNOs bring 
many attributes to the policy arena, and they assume many capacities, including being 
sources of knowledge and expertise, political and financial clout, and legitimacy. They also 
increase bargaining power for individual states by increasing economies of scale. In this 
study, supranational organisations are recognised to be part of a 'network' of several 
interdependent actors involved in delivering services in the study region (cf. Stone, 2000; 
Mugabe, 2001). Among other functions, these networks are made up of organizations which 
need to exchange resources (for example, money, authority, information, expertise) to 
achieve their objectives, to maximize their influence over outcomes, and to avoid becoming 
dependent on other players in the game (Rhodes, 1997: xii). Of particular relevance to this 
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thesis, are the resources of knowledge, information and expertise which the three SNOs 
under focus bring. They act as knowledge organisations, performing such roles as 
information clearinghouses, initiating research and developing network infrastructure – 
starting newsletters, building data-bases, organising conferences, moderating e-dialogues and 
developing funding proposals on behalf of their members (Ambali42 pers. comm., April 
2007). By acting across national borders, supranational organisations enable actors to operate 
beyond their domestic context and their networks are thus the means by which organisations 
individually and in coalition can project their ideas into policy thinking across states and 
within global or regional fora (Stone, 2000). The SNOs and their networks are also 
recognised to be an organisational form with extraordinary capacities for innovation, 
managing risk, building trust, facilitating joint action and gathering information in a manner 
that flows around and between geographical, legal and institutional barriers (Stone, 2003), in 
this case putting them in an important position to help the resource-disadvantaged countries 
of the study region. When they include the active participation and involvement of decision-
makers, as is the case within the three SNOs analysed by this research (NEPAD, 2006), they 
have even greater potential to influence policy.  However, and as Stone (2000) observes, 
‘even without such political involvement, the norms, values and aspirations of networks can 
have significant impact on the climate of elite opinion and culture of public debate’ (also 
Beach, 2005: 45). She further notes that ‘the interaction of official decision-makers 
(politicians and bureaucrats) with relevant stakeholders and experts, helps to reinforce the 
credibility and legitimacy of network participants in the formulation and implementation of 
policy’. These dynamics were at play in the SADC region, and how they influenced the 
desire for cross-national policy convergence was of interest for this study. Literature on 
                                                
42 Prof Aggrey Ambali, Director African Biological Sciences Initiative in the NEPAD Office of Science and 
Technology  
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networks was thus seen as crucial in providing some explanation of how and to what effect 
knowledge and information about policy practices in one context was transmitted. These 
literatures also provided tools for assessing whether convergence took place for reasons that 
were reactive or purely pragmatic or whether it was ideological or epistemic, and this would 
be crucial when other sectors have to learn from the developments in the biosafety arena. 
 
3.6 The Busch and Jorgens Typology 
As mentioned elsewhere, the typology by Busch and Jorgens (2005) is recognised as one of 
the more systematic typologies for explaining convergence (Weibust, 2007: Lehtonen, 2006), 
not least for their endeavour to look at multiple mechanisms within a given context, but also 
for the broad range of factors covered by the mechanisms. This typology builds on 
conceptualisations developed by others; for example Bennett (1991) identified four causes of 
convergence as emulation, harmonisation, elite networking and policy communities, and 
penetration, and these all fall into the three categories espoused by Busch and Jorgens. An 
elaboration is given below on the three mechanisms constituting this typology.  
 
3.6.1 Harmonisation 
Harmonisation involves negotiation, legislation, compliance and enforcement, and is said to 
promote convergence as a consequence of political recognition of interdependence and 
awareness of the costs of divergence (Stone, 1999). It is accepted to be a largely state-
centred, multilateral process involving negotiations among sovereign states, and that policies 
are agreed on and formulated at this multilateral level before domestic implementation and 
compliance (Lehtonen, 2006). Harmonisation therefore involves some sacrifice of national 
autonomy and sovereignty (Stone, 2000). While participation in the multilateral discussions 
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and policy formulation was voluntary, once an agreement was in place, and countries had 
become party to it, there was limited choice in adoption of the policy proposals. Parties 
would be under obligation to comply, and would be seen to do so through monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms enshrined in some independent institutions (Busch and Jorgens, 
2005; Evans & Davies 1999). Among many proponents, harmonised positions were believed 
to be promoted and sustained by supranational institutions, for example the EU (see Stone, 
2000).  Likewise, international regimes which are sets of similar norms and principles, rules 
and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge, could also lead 
to harmonisation, through availing a platform to avoid discrepancies in policies or to 
duplicate effort (Hasenclever et al, 2000).  
 
The criticisms of harmonisation, apart from the challenge on national policy autonomy 
(Stone, 2000), include the problem of countries failing to meet their obligations for reasons 
beyond their control, and the limited deterrents for failing to comply. For example, countries 
in Africa perennially face technological and regulatory capacity challenges in the area of 
biosafety, and these are sometimes not addressed by the policy mechanisms to which 
countries become parties. Still in some cases, countries fail to access opportunities to build 
capacities because of lack of institutional mechanisms to access the opportunities 
(Ushewokunze-Obatolu, 2005). In the SADC region, and as mentioned earlier, harmonisation 
of biosafety systems has been the subject of many policy agendas at various levels for as long 
as the biotechnology debate has been alive. How this mechanism could be operationalised 
with the facilitation of the three SNOs was of interest for this research.  
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3.6.2 Imposition 
When countries adopt policy proposals which they would not have adopted in the absence of 
pressure from external actors, coercive imposition or coercion is described as having taken 
place. There are different mechanisms through which the coercion may take place, and, as 
mentioned earlier, these could be political, technological, social or economic pressures, and 
monopolisation of knowledge and expertise, among others. The actions of international 
organisations have also been identified to result in countries adopting policies and 
programmes they would otherwise not have adopted (Biersteker, 1992: 110). For example, it 
is contended that ‘much of the diffusion to the poorer countries of the world is done through 
donor agencies, so that the adoptions could hardly be seen as rational or autonomous choices 
by governments’ (Stone, 2000). The position of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) has been: 'no reform, no money' (Dobbin et al, 2007, see also Larmour 
2001). This leaves little room for local choice among the recipient countries. Unlike in cases 
of harmonisation where countries have a collective motivation to deal with the unfavourable 
externalities, in imposition, there may be two distinct groups, with different motivations for 
the policy innovation under focus (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000); those on whom the policies 
are being imposed are one group, and their motivations may be distinct from those who are 
imposing the policies, who constitute the other group. The former may have varying 
capacities and motivations for rejecting the policy proposals, and this will depend on the 
conditionality being applied, and how the recipient country feels it will fare in the event of 
accepting or rejecting the proposals (Stone, 2000). The imposing countries, on the other hand 
may be genuinely trying to help, but seeing the need to apply some force, or may simply be 
intending to spread their policy principles and values as a way of exhibiting their influence 
on the global terrain (Busch and Jorgens, 2005; Radaelli, 2000). As will be detailed later, the 
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existence of various coercive practices on the policy processes in the SADC region was 
repeatedly mentioned by many stakeholders to be a permanent feature of the policy terrain. 
The sources of the coercion were many, and could well include some players whose primary 
aim was to help the governments and policy actors in the region, e.g. the three SNOs. The 
same players were also providing leverage for policy actors to deal with coercive practices 
from other sources. This study sought to understand the roles of the three SNOs around these 
various contradictions.  
 
3.6.3 Diffusion 
Diffusion entails voluntarism on the part of the receiving countries. The diffusion literature 
suggests that policy percolates or diffuses gradually over an extended period of time. There is 
an emphasis of the spreading, dispersion and dissemination of ideas or practices from a 
common source or point of origin. According to Freeman and Tester (1996) this perspective 
posits gradual changes in policy with the advancement of knowledge and awareness as well 
as interdependence, but unlike harmonisation, there is no obligation surrounding the 
interdependence. Diffusion approaches pay more attention on the process and the conditions 
for increase in policy similarity rather than the content of new policies (Stone, 2000). 
Admittedly, there are different ways through which the policy innovations can diffuse across 
countries, notably learning, copying and emulation (Busch and Jorgens, 2005). Countries 
emulate, copy or learn from other countries for a number of reasons, including the rationalist 
motivation of looking for effective solutions even beyond one’s national borders. Desires to 
conform, or to gain legitimacy may also persuade countries to learn from others; the so-called 
identity-related motivations (see Keck and Sikkink, 1998, Busch and Jorgens, 2005). 
Diffusion is said to have an apolitical and neutral character (Peters, 2000), with a focus often 
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limited to broad historical, spatial and socio-economic reasons for a pattern of policy 
adoption (Freeman & Tester, 1996) neglecting political and other context-inherent dynamics 
involved. For this study and for biosafety issues in general, the need to assess the impact of 
these contextual dynamics was apparent because of the way technical and socio-political 
issues have become interwoven as actors jostle to position themselves to effectively deal with 
the policy challenge (cf. Harsh, 2008: 244). Meanwhile, a resurgence of interest in the field 
of diffusion in the 1990s, largely investigating effects of globalisation, brought with it a 
proliferation of labels. Lesson-drawing (Rose, 1991), 'policy band-wagoning' (Ikenberry, 
1990), 'policy borrowing' (Cox, 1999) or ‘policy shopping’ (Freeman and Tester, 1996), 
‘benchmarking’ (e.g. Papaioannou et al, 2006) and 'systematically pinching ideas' (Schneider 
& Ingram, 1988) are some of the terms used, and they are all voluntaristic in nature. This 
research was consistently on the look-out for these labels, with the aim of understanding how 
the three SNOs were dealing with the issues as they assisted countries to deal with regulatory 
challenges and opportunities at the cross-national level. 
 
3.6.4 Utility of the typology 
As described above, among other differences, these three classes of mechanisms are distinct 
with regard to their mode of operation, the principal motivations of policy makers to adopt 
policies and the leeway they grant national policy makers to influence the content and 
independently decide on the adoption of a policy or regulatory system (Busch and Jorgens, 
2005).  Examining everyday constructions of the convergence issues, and observation of 
policy processes, the three classes of mechanisms were seen to capture the range of options 
and forces facing the countries of the study region in their quest for a transnational 
governance framework for biosafety, and the aim was to understand how the SNOs were 
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innovating around the context through use of these mechanisms. Therefore, the typology of 
Busch and Jorgens was chosen for its ability to serve both cognitive purposes and systematic 
analysis of policy convergence using a combination of mechanisms. Most of the research on 
convergence is currently limited to analysis of single mechanisms (Heichel et al, 2005, 
Bennett 1991 and Drezner, 2001).  
 
The management of biotechnology is an area that is inherently multi-level and multi-actor, 
even within individual jurisdictions, thus there are bound to be multiple mechanisms shaping 
the convergence efforts, separately or in various forms of interaction through space and time. 
This study aimed to interrogate the utility of this typology with respect to explanation of 
cross-national convergence of biosafety systems in the SADC region by assessing how the 
approaches used by the three supranational bodies mentioned could best be described within 
this typology, including whether or not it was by design that a particular mechanism was at 
play. In addition to the mechanisms, the study also investigated (as much as was allowed by 
the bounded time of the study) the sub-national, national, and cross-national factors which 
facilitated the operation of a particular mechanism. Salient features of episodes or significant 
events (e.g. continental or regional policy directives, government decrees and others), the 
national and cross-national context, and their impact on policy convergence were also 
investigated, and the empirical evidence on these is presented and analysed later in this 
thesis. 
 
3.7 Measurement of convergence 
Different definitions and reference points for assessing changes in policy similarity over time 
have been developed and used by researchers (Holzinger, 2006). These different definitions 
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and reference points may entail different interpretation of empirical results. The basic and 
main concept of convergence is sigma (σ) convergence, and it states that the degree of 
convergence increases with the extent to which policies of different countries become more 
similar over time. Sigma convergence measures the decrease in standard deviation between 
two points in time (say t1 and t2) using the coefficient of variation (Botcheva and Martin, 
2001; Holzinger and Knill, 2005a). The main drawback with this notion of convergence is 
that coefficient of variation can only be used with metrical data, limiting the different aspects 
of convergence that can be measured and also imposing a restriction on the type of data that 
should be collected to satisfy this measurement.  
 
The concept of beta (β)-convergence measures the extent to which laggard countries catch up 
with leader countries, implying a faster strengthening of regulatory systems among the 
former than the latter. This conception is in line with the basic argument of the absolute 
convergence thesis which states that, over time, all countries will become similar, predicting 
a slowing down in growth among leading countries and more rapid growth within the 
‘chasing pack’. This proposition assumes ceteris paribus with respect to factors such as 
technology, population growth, and savings propensity (Tinbergen, 1961). Gamma (γ) 
convergence on the other hand, is measured by the changes in country rankings with respect 
to a certain policy, while delta (δ) convergence measures the change in the distance of a 
given policy from a certain reference policy, e.g. that of the best-performing country in a 
given set (Heichel et al, 2005). 
 
One of the recognised limitations for all the conceptions of convergence is the difficulty to 
unambiguously measure and rate policies, especially given the different policy measures 
 73 
which may be part of a policy in different countries. On the other hand, convergence also 
suffers from saturation effects, where the level and speed/rate of convergence is affected by 
the extent of similarity at the beginning of the measurement period (Holzinger, 2006), and 
the level of enthusiasm with the issue over time (Meseguer, 2005). Thus, during the process, 
countries reach a point where they cannot converge any further, and this depends on a 
number of factors, including, as mentioned, how different they are at the beginning of 
measurement. It is thus feasible that measurement may start when countries have reached 
saturation point already, depending on the imperatives and aspirations of countries with 
respect to the convergence. These issues were certainly at play in the SADC region, and they 
are looked into and discussed further in the analysis of empirical findings from this study.  
 
3.8 Explaining different responses 
While convergence could have a cause that applies uniformly across countries (such as 
scientific knowledge), differences in response could not have the same uniform explanation. 
Holzinger and Knill (2005b) argue that the degree of convergence under the different 
mechanisms was affected by existing similarities among the adopters, such as culture and 
policy legacies. Institutional legacies were said to affect costs of adjustment; where higher 
costs predicted partial adoption of a policy (Holzinger and Knill, 2005a).  
 
Holzinger and Knill have also written about the difficulty of determining the importance of 
one convergence mechanism over others in cases where two or more mechanisms were in 
operation in adoption of the same policy innovation. In fact, empirically, it is very difficult to 
isolate the effects of each mechanism from those of others, and in cases where two or more 
mechanisms were present and predicted the convergence outcome, their contribution had to 
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be recognized. They also further noted that one mechanism might be facilitating convergence 
in one setting, but inhibiting it in another. The interaction of the mechanisms with each other 
and with contextual factors thus not only made convergence an unpredictable process, but 
one whose trajectory could not be transferred from one context to another. With this 
recognition, this research looked at both driving and impeding factors around convergence of 
biosafety systems in the SADC as a response to the facilitation by the three SNOs and the 
other macro- and micro-contextual factors in the region.   
 
It was also recognized that the three SNOs could well be acting as intermediaries for bigger 
modernizing forces, and this research sought to explore and isolate this possibility. Other 
researchers have explored this, for example, in their paper on Europeanisation43 and 
globalization, Verdier and Breen (2001) admit that the debate was complicated, and that it 
was not clear whether the changes reflected global trends (globalization) or the forces at play 
were directly attributable to Europeanisation. Their research found evidence supporting the 
widely shared claim that the EU was an agent of globalization.  Leifferink and Jordan (2002) 
also recognized the possibility of ‘over-attributing outcomes to the EU’ in their search for 
EU-induced convergence in national environmental policies. They opted for the empirical, 
inductive route to deal with this. This approach was also adopted by this study. 
 
3.9 Studies on convergence – traditions, limitations and methodological challenges 
According to Holzinger and Knill (2005a), the first studies in the area of cross-national 
policy convergence date back to the 1960’s, although the topic itself gained further 
                                                
43 Europeanisation is accepted to be a fashionable but contested concept with no single or stable meaning. In 
this thesis, this term is taken to mean ‘the emergence, development and impacts of a European, institutionally-
ordered system of governance’ following Olsen, J P (2002) in ‘Europeanisation – a fashionable term, but is it 
useful?, ARENA Working Paper 01/02 
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popularity in the 1990s. The growth in international trade and commerce brought about by 
developments in technology in the last fifteen to twenty years – commonly referred to as 
globalization - has been mentioned as the major reason behind the increased interest in cross-
national policy convergence studies (Faria, 2002). The 1990s also marked the period in 
which issues on European integration came to the fore, with a number of researchers 
investigating the domestic impact of the Europeanisation drive and cooperation of European 
countries on matters of biosafety, and also the ‘transatlantic’ issues (see Holzinger and Knill, 
2005a; Murphy and Levidow, 2006; Wield et al, 2004).  
 
Studies on policy convergence have been carried out in many policy areas, most extensive of 
all being on social policy, fiscal policy, environmental policy and trade policy. There have 
also been some, but fewer studies on health policy, migration policy, agricultural policy and 
education policy (Heichel et al, 2005). With respect to biotechnology and biosafety, some 
studies have examined harmonization in the EU (see Levidow et al, 1996, Bandelow, 2006), 
revealing a number of institutional, technological and political pressures influencing the 
envisaged policy outcomes. 
In their review of empirical studies on policy convergence, Heichel et al 2005, also note that 
while the number of policy areas covered is fairly broad, a major limitation has been in the 
geographical regions covered by the studies.  The majority of the studies have been carried 
out in Europe and North America, with very few being carried out in Latin America, Asia 
and Africa. They attribute this to lack of available data and also to the heightened interest in 
Europeanisation and globalization issues which are easier to examine in integrated markets. 
The authors acknowledge that it was ‘still not possible to characterize convergence research 
as a global phenomenon because [researches on] Africa and Asia, for example are still 
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underrepresented …’ (Heichel et al, 2005). Even some of the key people championing 
convergence efforts in Africa have acknowledged the lack of academic input in the various 
processes taking place (John Mugabe44 pers comm., 2004). There was thus a need for 
processes towards convergence of biosafety systems in Africa to be studied and analyzed. 
This would enable fuller and more detailed insights into these processes and for empirical 
evidence from Africa to contribute to this growing field of convergence studies as well.  
 
With respect to theoretical frameworks used, Heichel and his co-authors (2005) 
acknowledged that while there had been an increased interest in convergence research in the 
last two decades, there was a diversification in research design. They attributed this partly to 
the huge emphasis on finding evidence of convergence as opposed to theory building and 
partly to the heterogeneity of researchers and disciplines taking part in convergence research. 
They concluded that some work still needed to be done with respect to developing common 
ground in convergence research for ‘research designs, concepts and operationalisations’ 
(Heichel et al, 2005).  By adopting and investigating the conceptual and practical utility of 
the three-factor conceptualization proposed by Busch and Jorgens, this study hoped to 
contribute towards the firming of theoretical perspectives around cross-national policy 
convergence. This approach also aimed to address the main limitation highlighted in current 
literature on convergence research which is that most of the work had focused on single 
mechanisms. The typology proposed by Busch and Jorgens looks at a combination of 
mechanisms and was used here to provide a framework to explain the ways in which the 
three supranational organizations and other players were influencing the cross-national policy 
convergence process. Lehtonen (2006) applied this typology to the environmental 
                                                
44 Dr John Mugabe: Director/Advisor of the NEPAD Office of Science and Technology (2002 – 2008)   
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performance reviews (EPRs) carried out by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) in its member countries. He found the typology useful and concluded 
that the mechanisms in operation, which were mainly social learning, socialization, 
persuasion and soft coercion, were dependent on the fact that the OECD was an organization 
without direct regulatory power; and also on the existence of environmental change agents in 
the member countries. Application of this typology in the SADC region on biosafety issues 
therefore should provide new insights, shaped by technological, organizational and socio-
political contexts of the study region, among other factors. 
The focus of most of the studies on gathering empirical evidence to demonstrate convergence 
at the expense of contributing to development of theories and the heterogeneity of the policy 
convergence research field have resulted in issues being looked at from diverse research and 
theoretical perspectives (Hozinger and Knill, 2005a; Heichel et al, 2005, Lenschow et al, 
2005). This not only imposed restrictions on comparability of research findings, but also 
brought problems even in definitions and distinction of convergence from closely related 
terms such as policy transfer, policy diffusion and isomorphism (Seeliger, 1996). This 
research followed the thesis that these terms referred to some of the mechanisms towards 
attaining convergence (Stone, 2000; Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Heichel et al, 2005).  
 
A number of methodological pitfalls, some based on how convergence is conceived, have 
also been identified (Holzinger, 2006), and, among other issues, was the fact that ‘policy is a 
notoriously slippery concept, and a difficult one to operationalise and measure’ (Considine, 
2005: 1; Keating, 2005: 14; Karagiannis and Radaelli, 2007). Clarity was needed regarding 
whether one was dealing with a policy field or a policy measure within a policy field; and 
whether one was dealing with policy outputs (measures) or policy outcomes (effects). Data 
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for these different aspects are different, and have different availability levels, for example, 
data on policy outcomes is more easily accessible, but is also subject to varied interpretations 
(Holzinger, 2006).  
 
Meanwhile, policy convergence, broadly defined as the growing similarity of policies over 
time (Kerr, 1983 and Knill 2005), reveals that convergence studies are concerned with the 
similarity of policies as an observable phenomenon. Scholars are in agreement that policy 
diffusion, transfer, learning, harmonization and others are pathways or mechanisms towards 
convergence, as alluded to earlier in this chapter (see also review by Heichel et al, 2005). 
However, it is acknowledged that convergence may be a result of other problem pressures 
and not necessarily the ones mentioned above (Knill 2005).  In addition, similarity, which is 
the main concept fundamental to convergence research, is viewed as arbitrary and 
ambiguous. Sartori (1991) argues that being ‘similar or different is a matter of degree and the 
cut off point can be set arbitrarily’. These ambiguities manifest themselves in many ways, 
including how the convergence can be achieved and how to define the convergence (cf. 
James and Lodge, 2003; Birner and Linacre, 2008). The methodology section details how 
these issues were dealt with in this study, because, ‘whether a study finds convergence, 
divergence or persistence of original policies depends very much on the [clarity of the] 
measurement concept’ (Holzinger, 2006; also Newmark, 2002). 
 
3.10 Concluding remarks 
This review of literature forms the basis on which the research methodology and data 
analysis for this research were done, and it sought to bring together various scholarly 
perspectives on how transnational governance measures emerge from contestations at various 
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levels. Other perspectives impacting on the various components of the research – individuals, 
organizations and countries, are also considered in the methodology and the analysis 
chapters. The focus of the research, as guided by the research question, revealed a number of 
areas which the research locks into. The research was looking at transnational governance of 
biotechnology; streamlining the focus to a look at governance of the technology as organized 
by risk and by stakeholder expectations of benefits from the technology with the aim being to 
maximize the benefits and minimize the risks. Like any issue in which there are different 
actors, there are different interests, power and knowledge dynamics that come to the fore. 
Apart from individuals, the actors include the three organizations, and the others that they 
interact with in this issue at sub-national, national, regional and international levels. The 
countries themselves, especially the international relations between them, also bring a further 
perspective to the context, as do the technology itself and its regulation. These issues and 
more led to only a few of the multiple angles from which the research question could be 
illuminated, and for which relevant literatures were reviewed and presented. For the 
objectives set out for this study, these issues were seen as the most direct, in terms of their 
impact on how the organizations under spotlight were influencing the process, and while this 
was the case, reference was made, in discussion of key theories around each, to other key 
perspectives around each issue. The multilevel, multi-actor, multi-jurisdictional and other 
facets of the research issue make it inherently amenable to analysis using different theoretical 
perspectives. Further reference to all this will be made in the methodology and results 
analysis sections. The thesis proceeds now with a look at the methodology employed by the 
study and as shaped by the literature just reviewed.  
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CHAPTER 4  METHODOLOGY 
 
 ‘To be practically adequate, knowledge must grasp the differentiations of the world; 
we need a way of individuating objects, and of characterising their attributes and 
relationships. To be adequate for a specific purpose it [knowledge] must abstract 
from particular conditions, excluding those which have no significant effect in order 
to focus on those which do. Even where we are interested in wholes, we must select 
and abstract their constituents’ (Sayer, 1992: 19). 
 
4.0 Introduction 
The literature reviewed and presented in the previous chapter served to situate, illuminate and 
unpack various ways of understanding the transnational governance mechanism for biosafety 
being pursued in the SADC within the broader literature on cross-national governance of 
technology, as dictated by the regional context. In particular, this research was looking at 
which of the three mechanisms; harmonisation, coercive imposition or diffusion of practices 
was in operation, and what factors, within the given contextual setting were facilitating the 
operation of a particular mechanism. This was but one of the many possible ways of looking 
at the research, but overall, the research was about the emerging governance framework, 
under the mediation of three supranational bodies, and within a loaded context of many 
potentially colliding technological and policy issues. 
 
This chapter presents the methodology employed by this study; starting with the justification 
for the approaches used, followed by a coverage of the cases focused on by the research; the 
three supranational organisations and other policy actors in the SADC region and beyond. 
The criteria and justification for selection of the three cases are given, together with the 
strengths and limitations of the strategy. The chapter also addresses issues surrounding data 
selection, data sources, data collection, timing and data analysis; followed by ethical 
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considerations of the research, and finally practical issues related to the research; all linked to 
the main goal of the study which is to understand the ways through which the three 
supranational organisations have contributed to cross-national convergence of biosafety 
systems in the SADC region. 
 
Box 2: Prelude – a recap on the context 
 
Southern Africa is a subcontinent in which countries are grappling with processes to set up 
and implement national policy and regulatory systems for biotechnology. The countries are at 
different levels with utilisation of the technology, and are therefore experiencing different 
technological motivations and pressures for regulating the technology. In addition to the 
internal pressure generated by the technology and other national imperatives, countries are 
also experiencing pressure from external sources, such as the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety which all the countries of the region are party to. There is also pressure from 
multinational companies in the biotechnology sector, and from the bilateral and multilateral 
arrangements to which the countries are party. All these and more operate differently in the 
different countries. There are also different players in the biotechnology/biosafety policy 
arenas across the countries, all making efforts to help countries develop the regulatory 
systems. Two broad classes of the sources of motivation for regulation of biotechnology at 
national and cross-national level have been identified: motivations based on regulation of the 
risks brought about by the technology; and motivations based on the desire for countries to 
have/enjoy benefits from the technology. The countries are on a continuum with respect to 
what is motivating them, with some being motivated primarily by the risk regulation thrust, 
while others are motivated more by the envisaged economic growth and other positives from 
deploying biotechnology.  
Among the different players influencing the policy processes in the countries and the 
subcontinent are supranational organisations, one of whose targets is to influence cross-
national similarity/convergence of the national policies across the region. Supranational 
organisations fall within the category which Maarten Hajer (1995:15) calls ‘secondary 
policy-making institutions’, and the objective of this study is to understand the ways in which 
these institutions influence the processes towards the desired cross-national convergence. The 
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study recognises that these organisations are only one of many other players championing 
this agenda, and one of the several challenges facing this research is to abstract/explicate the 
contributions of these organisations from the congested policy field.  
 
4.1 Approaching the study 
This research was motivated by the quote from Sayer (1992:19) given at the beginning of this 
chapter in trying to tackle the context given in the earlier chapters and recast in box 2 above. 
The starting point was an appreciation that the bigger desire from both academic and 
practical perspectives is to understand broadly how the convergence agenda is moving 
forward in the selected region. This is the ‘whole’ that is at stake, but from a feasibility point 
of view, and to enable an in-depth and more informative study, this research focused on the 
contribution made by supranational organisations to this ‘whole’. However, in 
contradistinction from what is alluded to in the statement above, this abstraction is not 
motivated by the other conditions or players being of lesser significance, but purely for 
practical reasons and a recognition that the other players within this multi-player field have 
received both academic and policy attention at other stages within the spatio-temporal setting 
of the region (e.g. Scoones, 2002; 2005 and Newell, 2003).  
 
4.1.1 Taking a realist approach 
Biotechnology regulation falls within the risk regulation domain and it is an inherently multi-
level and multi-actor policy field. The area is awash with conflict, and there are different 
motivations and cognitions behind the conflict. There are also many interests (including 
researcher’s own) and contentions around the issue and it is in this background that a multi-
method, reflexive approach was adopted (see box 3 below on dealing with my own interests 
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and prior knowledge). Overall, the methodology used was adaptive, as dictated by changes 
within this dynamic policy field.  
 
Inspired by Andrew Sayer’s reflections in the book ‘Method in Social Science: A Realist 
Approach’, this study was conducted from a realist perspective, acknowledging right from 
the start that ‘facts of contested sorts exist’, and that ‘there are different arguments 
concerning the reality …’ of the issue at stake. 
  
There were many reasons behind adopting this approach; and some of them are presented and 
discussed below: 
 
• Sayer argues that the quest for straight-forward causation and regularity has been 
fashionable, noting though that for social science, things may not always happen in 
neat packages. He further argues that there is so much preponderance with methods 
which assume that causation is a matter of regularities in relationships between 
events, and that without models of regularities, we are left with allegedly inferior, ‘ad 
hoc’ narratives. For this study, it was clear right from the start that there would be no 
clear and straight-forward cause-effect relationships among the various issues 
impacting on the convergence agenda. The quest for regularity was thus replaced by 
an objective and constructivist approach that looked at the social relations around the 
issues as having causal powers which may, or may not produce regularities, and 
which can be explained independently of them. There was thus more emphasis on the 
qualitative social and discursive aspects around the issue, as opposed to the 
quantitative methods which tend to emphasise discovering and assessing regularities.  
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• As presented elsewhere, the reality of the situation with policy activities around 
biosafety systems in the SADC is that there are many processes happening at the 
same time and, unlike in a natural science setting, it is not easy practically to isolate 
out particular processes. Therefore while this study was looking primarily at the ways 
in which supranational organisations were influencing the convergence process, there 
was no way in which the processes mediated by the other players within the policy 
arena could be isolated completely. Thus an adaptive and robust approach able to deal 
with these realities, while maintaining a firm focus on the target organisations was 
deemed ideal.  
 
• While this research inevitably relied on actor accounts and articulation of the issue, 
there was recognition that knowledge and facts around the issue were not limited to 
the spoken or written communications, but that it encompassed many kinds of activity 
and sources of knowledge all intricately linked to the issue. Thus a number of 
methods to access and understand the various bodies of knowledge around the issue 
were used. No source or body of knowledge was viewed as superior to the others. In 
all this, the study sought to balance between the practical and analytical aspects of the 
issues around the research. These issues are discussed further in the course of this 
chapter. 
 
4.2 The research 
The research was designed primarily as a case study of three organisations. The data 
collection methods were envisaged to be mainly use of a questionnaire, semi-structured 
interviews and document review, but as the research progressed, it emerged that close 
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observation of the processes through interaction with the various policy communities would 
be more effective in understanding the different opinions and cognitions around biosafety 
broadly and convergence specifically. Thus, when the opportunity for an internship at 
NEPAD arose, it presented a golden opportunity to be close to the activities, at least within 
the NEPAD setting (see section 4.6.1 {Data gathering, recording and storage} for more 
details). The day-by-day interaction between NEPAD and the other two organisations was 
also observed from this vantage position. 
 
One of the aims of this research was to contribute to development and firming of theoretical 
perspectives for studying policy convergence, and the literature reviewed for this study 
alluded to this need. The research strategy employed by this study thus aimed to serve this 
dual purpose of availing empirical evidence on convergence, while contributing to the 
firming of theoretical perspectives on the theme, guided by the Bush and Jorgens typology. 
Therefore in addition to being able to extract data from the research terrain, the research 
design employed also had an emphasis on identifying and analysing strengths, weaknesses 
and options for the methodological choices made. Due to these dual and interrelated aims, 
and also because of the pervasive nature of the technology at the base of the research field 
being examined, a multi-method research approach had to be employed encompassing 
literature survey, in-depth case studies of the three organisations and interviews with 
researchers, policy makers and other key stakeholders from the region and beyond.  
Box 3: Prior experience and reflexivity 
Being a biotechnologist and working for 6 years (1999 – 2005) on biotechnology and 
biosafety issues in Zimbabwe and the southern African region brought me face to face with 
the challenges facing the entire cross-section of stakeholders in dealing with biotechnology 
issues broadly, and biosafety specifically.  Embarking on the PhD studies was partly a result 
of wanting to make a difference in a ‘territory’ which I had become familiar with, and in 
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which, from my perspective, the policy and regulation challenges and progress towards 
solutions were largely remaining the same. Territory here means the geographical area in 
which the study was conducted, (southern Africa) and the policy area 
(biotechnology/biosafety). Opportunities and challenges alike were spawned by this 
familiarity with the context, and some of these are presented here. It is also important to 
quickly note that in any research endeavor, familiarity with the context also builds up as one 
maintains contact with the research area, and these same dynamics may arise, but at a 
different time during the course of the research.  
 
The opportunities brought about by my closeness to the context included my knowledge of 
some of the key individual and organizational players on the issue within the research terrain 
and beyond, a working knowledge of the status of issues, and knowledge of the various 
communication channels to reach the stakeholders. Some of the key stakeholders also knew 
me, and this meant we were starting from a position of trust, an aspect crucial for one to 
navigate through this dynamic and contentious research field.  
 
The challenges started from issue framing where, because of the failure to detect any 
progress, some very ambitious research questions were started off with. However, further 
reading and assessment of what could be done within the available time and financial 
resources led to a streamlining of the research aims. Further challenges were experienced 
with development of the sampling frame, where knowledge of some respondents led to some 
‘contempt’45 of what they could bring to the research. Some however, still had to be 
considered because of the important positions they occupied in their countries and 
organizations. How to present myself differently in the research context was another 
challenge, having been in the context in a different capacity before. Withdrawal from the 
context, and packaging the research issue in ways different from the everyday language of 
most policy operatives not only presented a new visage, but also prompted respondents to 
think in ways different from their everyday encounters with the research issues.  
 
Knowledge of the context and the issues also brought frustrations in cases where I felt there 
was misrepresentation of facts, for example on the status of existing policies and 
                                                
45 Used here to mean having limited belief that they could offer solutions to the challenges/problems at hand … 
e.g. because they could be part of the problem  
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programmes. The temptation to ask leading questions also had to be dealt with continuously, 
among other strategies, through rising to a level of objectivity and openness where answers 
were sought from current framings rather than prior knowledge. The temptation not to follow 
up on issues raised (on assumption that I knew what was being expressed) also had to be 
dealt with continuously. In some cases this consciousness escaped my attention, and gaps 
were seen in the data, and follow-up had to be made while the data was being analysed. For 
example, I realized as the study went on that the issues of capacity and capacity-building 
needed to be understood closely and in relation to each specific context.   
 
In the final analysis knowledge of the context allowed me to navigate through the research 
terrain, in the majority of cases without needing ethical approval to access researchers and 
organizations; but under the sustained pressure of keeping in check my own biases in the 
development and implementation of methodologies, and in the data analysis. 
 
4.3 Case selection criteria  
The three supranational bodies were chosen firstly for the positions that they have all taken 
towards convergence of biosafety systems and in accordance with the-most-different-systems 
approach which assumes that the causes for a phenomenon [convergence in this case] can be 
best identified if it occurs equally in (as a result of) different settings [the three supranational 
bodies] (Przeworski and Teune, 1970, cited by Seeliger, 1996). Secondly, researchers within 
the area of cross-national policy convergence acknowledge that while there has been an 
increasing role for supranational organisations in cross-national policy process, the 
mechanisms through which they influence this convergence are not clearly known (Peterson, 
2003). The selection and study of these three as specific cases was thus also aimed at 
contributing towards bridging this gap. Box 4 below presents brief descriptions on the 
organisations.  
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Box 4: The three organisations and their claims to cross-national cooperation 
The three organisations are all different, and influence policy processes in the target countries 
at different levels and through different mechanisms. The African Union has historical links 
to its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity, whose mandate was political solidarity 
among countries on the continent. The OAU championed a neoliberal political agenda, 
espousing respect for all countries, and recognition of the importance of the contribution of 
the various small ‘pieces’ towards the ‘whole’ of Africa. While lately more rigorous, and 
even then also championing economic integration of the continent, the pedigree of the AU is 
built around its political clout, dating back to the OAU. Even most of its structures reflect the 
representative political democracy reminiscent of most political systems. 
The NEPAD, on the other hand is an expert-driven socio-economic development framework 
for Africa, being essentially a programme of the AU. Because of its desire for a politics-free 
and more accountable development agenda, the NEPAD has sought to remove itself from the 
entrenched bureaucracy of the AU, and to present to the world and sympathisers a new 
development partnership that is not only neoliberal on paper, but in practice as well, and 
having unhindered efficiencies. NEPAD thus presents technical competence as its hallmark 
and trump card.  
The SADC is the regional economic community (REC) for 12 geographically contiguous 
countries of southern Africa and 2 Island States in the Indian Ocean. In addition to being the 
oldest among the three organisations, SADC brings closer home the shared political and 
economic realities and dreams of these neighbouring countries. SADC on paper embodies 
both the political clout, through offering a framework much closer to the countries’ realities, 
and an opportunity for the countries to pool and utilise their technical expertise together. 
SADC thus serves as both a rallying point (being the community), and a platform for solving 
the development challenges of the region. It presents both technical and political authority. 
 
The SADC region was chosen following a realisation that while there have been studies and 
analyses of issues around of policy and regulatory practices on some aspects of agricultural 
biotechnology and allied areas (e.g. Ayele 2007, Clark et al, 2005) there have not been any 
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detailed academic studies on convergence of biosafety systems in this region. The region was 
thus selected on this basis, and also in accordance with the-most-similar-systems approach, 
which assumes that a given policy problem and response [in this case convergence] should be 
observed in similar countries [the SADC countries] (Lijphart, 1971, cited by Seeliger, 1976).  
Further, the issue of cross-national convergence of biosafety systems falls into the regional 
cooperation and integration agenda being pursued on the continent within the framework of 
the AU treaty, and looking into this issue will shed light into the feasibility and extent of 
regional cooperation on technical and other issues.  
 
4.4 Limitations 
Critics of the case study method believe that the study of a small number of cases can offer 
no grounds for establishing reliability or generality of findings. Others feel that the intense 
exposure to study of the case biases the findings. Some dismiss case study research as useful 
only as an exploratory tool. Yet, like other researchers in the social sciences, this approach 
was found useful for this study because it allowed an in depth, carefully planned and crafted 
analysis of real-life situations, issues, and problems around biosafety within the three 
organisations and the region. The flexibility to use different data gathering methods also 
proved useful for this research as it allowed access to different stakeholders and data sources 
(Yin, 1994: 45). Furthermore, the pervasive and far-reaching political, economic and social 
influence of the selected organisations mean the results of an analysis of their activities are 
likely to have wide impact, putting paid to the limited generalisability which affects studies 
in which limited cases are used (cf. Silverman, 2005: 134; also Miller and Dingwall (1997: 
67). 
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4.5 Research population and sampling strategies 
Defining the target population for this study was no mean task because of the multi-level and 
multi-actor nature of the biotechnology policy arena. There are multiple individual, 
organisational, sectoral, national, regional and international interests, all varying in space and 
time, and which confound the task. The research population was therefore a heterogeneous 
one, comprising of policy makers and regulators, scientists/researchers, NGOs, policy 
consultants, actors in the three supranational organisations and allied institutions; and others 
with special interest in cross-national regulation of biotechnology.  
These multiple data sources were investigated by the research because of the different levels 
on which they have an impact, and at which the study issue has an impact. However, primary 
data sources were workers/staff in the three supranational organisations working on 
biotechnology/biosafety or allied issues, as well as documents and processes from these  
organisations on these same issues, and staff in national organisations tasked with regulation 
of biotechnology. In particular, national-level stakeholders were important as part of 
establishing the link between the three bodies and the national-level processes. Participants 
were also enrolled from other regional and international organisations, as well as policy 
makers and consultants and policy analysts or researchers or advisers working on these 
issues. While in all cases senior level policy makers or other personnel directly involved with 
policy making and decision making were the primary respondents, stakeholders at other 
levels were also engaged, as a way of triangulating issues, and also to broaden coverage of 
the policy area.  
 
The multiplicity of interests and stakeholders in the issue made it impossible for a sampling 
framing (exhaustive listing of all elements making up the research population) to be compiled 
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(cf. Worcester and Basanez, 2000). Probability sampling techniques could thus not be 
employed in coming up with the specific members of the study population to use as 
respondents in the study. A combination of two non-probability sampling techniques was 
used; encompassing convenience sampling and chain-referral (snowball) sampling (e.g 
Flyvbjerg, 2004: 427). Convenience samples are built on finding convenient or available 
individuals, and my familiarity with the research context facilitated this process. A list of 
contacts already available was the starting point, and this also led to Snowball sampling, 
where these individuals who were contacted were then asked for suggestions on who else 
could be included in the study. The processes were repeated on an on-going basis until a 
satisfactory sample in terms of size and representation of key issues was achieved. The 
approaches used proved handy in constructing the actor coalitions and linkages around 
stakeholders, aspects which are important in the information and knowledge flows around the 
study issue. The limitations of these sampling approaches, especially in cases of ‘lone’ or 
‘poorly networked’ individuals were recognised, and the researcher used his knowledge and 
that of the other respondents as much as possible to ‘fish out’ these ‘loners’. An emphasis on 
groupings of interests as opposed to specific individuals also helped in this regard.  
 
Table 5 below and the pie chart that follows give a full breakdown of the categories of 
stakeholders who participated in the research and their location. Full details which include 
coded identities of individual respondents and when they participated in the study are given 
in Appendix 3. 
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Table 5:  Categories of stakeholders who participated
46
 in the study and their 
geographical location 
LOCATION Stakeholder Category 
SNO Countries Outside 
region 
Totals 
Scientists 5 9 1 15 
Policymakers or 
regulators or 
government employees 
5 11 0 16 
Media 1 2 1 4 
NGO Staff 0 4 4 8 
Consultants/Researchers 1 4 8 13 
Totals 12 29 14 56
47
 
 
Categories of study respondents 
scientists
policy makers
NGOstaff
media
Consultants
 
Fig 1: A pictorial representation of the numbers of respondents by category 
Among some of the problems experienced (and detailed in the next chapter) were that some 
potential respondents did not respond, even after indicating they would respond. Familiarity 
                                                
46 Participation meaning responding to questionnaires 1 and 2 or giving input through formal or informal 
interactions (coded as 3) – see Appendix 3 for further details 
47 These 56 are out of a total of 68 individual participants contacted at one stage or another throughout the data 
collection period between March 2006 and August 2007. Other statistics: 20 respondents participated in the 
pilot study; and 25 of the 68 (36.8%) completed the second questionnaire, 11 interacted with the project 
throughout, while 47 of the 56 were interacted with formally and/or informally, i.e., beyond use of the 
questionnaires. Appendix 3 gives further details. 
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with the researcher seemed to make it difficult for some respondents to indicate 
unwillingness to participate in the research, though it would in some cases turn out that they 
were not able to participate.  
 
4.6 Research instrument  
Two sets of questionnaires were used as the main research instruments for this study. The 
questionnaire or checklist used at the beginning of the study consisted of broad, open-ended 
questions which were aimed at identifying and mapping the key issues around the research 
topic. Design of this questionnaire (included as Appendix 1) was based on my prior 
experience in the geographical and policy area targeted by the research, and guided by 
literature surveys within the area of biotechnology regulation broadly and cross-national 
policy convergence specifically. The second questionnaire (Appendix 2) raised questions and 
traced perspectives pursuant to issues emerging from the first round of the data gathering 
process and review of relevant literature.  The data gathered in the first exercise had brought 
out the policy and technology context within which the development of similar systems for 
cross-national regulation of biotechnology was taking place in southern Africa.  The second 
exercise had a particular emphasis on assessing the feasibility of convergence and 
understanding the roles being played by the AU, NEPAD and SADC within this context. The 
questionnaire was pre-coded and had multi-response questions in order to facilitate 
categorization and comparison of responses.  
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4.6.1 Data gathering, recording and storage 
Pilot interviews guided by the broad checklist of questions were conducted telephonically 
and through emails between March and June 2006. These were followed by face-to-face 
discussions with some stakeholders in Zimbabwe, South Africa and Botswana48 during a 
field study between mid-July and mid-August 2006. After these pilot studies, which helped 
identify, confirm and shape key issues around cross-national convergence of biosafety 
systems in the SADC, interviews guided by the semi-structured, open, and close-ended 
questionnaire and participant observation were the main techniques for gathering primary 
information from the targeted actors. This was done between October 2006 and August 2007.  
Secondary data review was also extensively used, covering documents such as strategic 
plans, programme proposals, policy statements/reviews/recommendations, agendas and 
reports of meetings and other relevant documents produced by the three organisations and the 
countries in the region.  
 
Direct interaction with stakeholders in the SADC region turned out to be one of the key steps 
towards gathering empirical evidence to address the key research question and the other 
questions that the study was pausing. Thus, an ethnographic/participant observation approach 
was adopted in the meetings and workshops that were attended during the data gathering 
period, and during the 3-month internship held at the NEPAD Office of Science and 
Technology in Pretoria, South Africa over the period April to August 2007. Full details on 
how participant observation was employed in this study are given in Box 5 below. 
 
                                                
48 The three were chosen for allowing access to a wide range of national and regional stakeholders; and also to 
capture a representative cross-section of status and opinion on biotech/biosafety 
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Box 5: In situ observation of processes  
It emerged as the research progressed that employing different methods of obtaining data 
would be more beneficial for the research given the different data sources available. The 
reliance on structured methodologies was also seen to have the limitation of failing to reveal 
some of the hidden discussions and meanings, and the best way was to observe these 
processes as they were happening (cf. Silverman, 2005: 26; Fife, 2005: 1).  The aim was to 
obtain data from the ‘natural setting’ of the phenomenon, through immersing myself in the 
social setting of the research as a way of obtaining knowledge. The approach used thus aimed 
to look beyond the formalistic and broad features of organisational structure, as this tends to 
screen out culture-related variation found in the way these broad features are operationalised 
day to day. The aim was thus to observe and understand the actions of policy actors as they 
went through their routines in workshops, meetings, daily office-to-office interactions and 
other platforms in which biosafety issues are discussed.   In addition to moving beyond the 
formalistic approach, participant observation was also considered following realisation of the 
tendency by respondents to ‘recycle’ the responses that they gave in other studies on these 
issues, even when they were not the best for the issue at hand. Some participants had pointed 
out their ‘exhaustion’ from the issue as a result of the high number of studies in the region 
covering the same or allied issues. To them, ‘biosafety was just biosafety’, and often they did 
not consider the differences in the aims of the different studies. It was also further observed 
during the pilot interaction that sometimes out of sheer ignorance due to the complexity of 
the issues at hand, and sometimes for other reasons (as will be discussed elsewhere in this 
thesis), there were incidences of misrepresentation of what was happening on the ground by 
some respondents. Getting reliable data in such situations was therefore seen to be more 
likely only through an observation of the on-going processes.  The participant observation 
happened in tandem with the other data-collection methods employed by this research 
The challenge was always going to be on the level of involvement in the context, in particular 
ensuring little interference with the research context. Some background work had to be done 
on how best to fit into the setting, without disturbing the naturalness of the setting. A 
participant-as-observer approach was adopted (Fife, 2005: 71), in which I was completely 
open about my research and got myself actively involved with activities in the NEPAD 
Office of Science and Technology. This was part of the requirements for the internship which 
provided the opportunity for the participant observations. My prior experience and familiarity 
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with the context helped in this blending, and also eased potential problems of accessing the 
setting. Obtaining prior participant consent was seen by most respondents as unnecessary 
because of the open approach, and also because of the prior interaction I had had with many 
of the respondents. However, due diligence was taken to ensure the research was conducted 
ethically, without occasioning any harm to individuals and organisations. One key approach 
was the maintenance of confidentiality, and where issues had been raised in plenary 
discussions, follow-up was made with concerned individuals seeking their consent to quote 
them.   
During the participant observation process and semi-structured interviews, field notes were 
lodged into a notebook, and audio recordings made. These were then transcribed into a data 
transcript with relevant details for each data set, e.g. date of interview, interviewee 
identification, location of interview, activity taking place and contact details of 
respondent/event organiser (where possible).   
 
A number of communication channels were employed in accessing the various data sources, 
and these included use of electronic mail, telephonic communication, visits and face-to-face 
discussions. The different communication channels were used as appropriate in initiating or 
maintaining contact or following up on specific issues.  
 
Interviews were on average one hour long, making a total of approximately 56 hours 
interview time for the total number of respondents engaged during the main data gathering 
phase of the project between May 2006 and August 2007. The longest interaction was a two-
and-a-half hour interview with a key actor in one of the SNOs [Pmk1 (S), Jul 2006], and the 
shortest was a 10-minute discussion with a science journalist [Med2 (R), Oct 2006], whose 
main message was that as gatherers and disseminators of information, their interest was to get 
the issues emerging from the study once they were ready for spreading.  
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In the data gathering activities, data was captured through note-taking during interviews, 
direct recordings on questionnaires by respondents, digital audio recording, and email 
responses that were saved in dedicated folders. On an ongoing basis, all materials were 
lodged into a research journal. 
  
4.6.2 Challenges and realities 
Among the challenges faced was the time-consuming exercise of making repeated follow-up 
to get responses from some of the respondents, and in some cases failing to get responses 
even after concerted follow-up. Policy makers were most difficult to get responses from; for 
some because of preoccupation with challenges in other policy areas, and for others, because 
of ‘fatigue’49 with the biosafety issues. On the other hand, responses were received at 
different times, and this presented a challenge on consistency and comparability of responses. 
The impact of these challenges was taken into consideration in the data analysis and 
interpretation of results. More details on the contextual challenges and realities are presented 
in Chapter 5.  
 
4.7 Data analysis methodology 
The aim of data analysis for this research, and indeed for any other research process, was to 
unlock as much value as possible from the data in a way that increased the plausibility of the 
findings. To this end, this research employed an analysis approach firmly embedded in the 
data. As indicated elsewhere in the document, though this study was designed to reveal both 
quantitative and qualitative aspects around this issue, it was largely a qualitative research 
process. There was thus more emphasis on opinions and perceptions, rather than the 
                                                
49Exhaustion and fatigue … referring to how they spend a lot of time talking to different researchers and 
stakeholders on these and allied issues 
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numerical differences between the responses from different respondents. However, because 
the results of the process are intended for consumption by readers of both qualitative and 
quantitative ‘persuasions’, a robust way of organizing and presenting the results had to be 
employed. The varied nature of the data in terms of perspectives, opinions and other 
dimensions meant that the analysis framework did not only need to be embedded in the data, 
but also had to be able to bridge and bring together many areas. Thematic analysis was thus 
chosen, for being able to allow and facilitate communication with a broad audience of other 
scholars and researchers, and for bringing the different data categories together.  
 
4.7.1 Thematic analysis   
Thematic analysis can be defined as the interpretation of qualitative data through organizing 
it into codes, categories and themes (Boyatzis, 1998: 18). Themes, which are patterns found 
in the data, may be generated inductively from the raw data, or deductively from theory and 
prior research. Thematic analysis is a systematic way of working with information that 
increases the accuracy and sensitivity in understanding and interpreting observations.  
According to Boyatzis (1998: 15), ‘thematic analysis can assist in communication between 
positivistic science and interpretive science, between testers of ideas and developers of ideas, 
between builders of theories and social constructionists’. This makes it an ideal approach for 
translating methods and results into forms accessible to others from different fields, 
orientations or traditions of inquiry, and for this research, this could not have been more 
appropriate given one of the underlying desires which was to bridge research and policy. In 
addition, biosafety is a cross-cutting undertaking, and the need for a robust analytic 
framework was therefore imperative. This approach was also useful in all stages of the 
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research; from the early stages of the inquiry where it helped organize thoughts and emerging 
issues, to the interpretation stages, where it served as a guide for the emerging research story.   
 
One of the issues that lead to effective thematic analysis is knowledge of the arena being 
examined (Boyatzis, 1998; 19). This facilitates perceiving and making sense of patterns in 
the study context, without getting overwhelmed by emerging issues or chasing cosmetic 
agendas. This was a unique strength of the researcher, being one with intimate knowledge of 
the region and the technology being studied.  
 
4.7.2 The coding and analysis process 
Extracting and analyzing emerging themes, categories and codes from the data was an on-
going process throughout the research. Notes from the various data gathering processes 
which included interviews, literature reviews and observations were typed out and compiled 
into a data transcript, which totalled 100 pages of double-spaced text in the end. In making 
sense of this mass of data, themes were extracted continuously from the data, guided mainly 
by the research question, and also by the theoretical framework used. Categories for the 
various themes started to emerge, with some being reinforced as more data was gathered, and 
others disappearing, or being merged with others as the process went on. Data inspection was 
used to identify the occurrence and frequency of issues from the interviews, observations or 
reviews of relevant literature. The emerging issues and themes were compiled in a 
spreadsheet to facilitate data sorting and to bring out any visual patterns that could be 
narrated from the data. The ensuing results analysis chapters are each built around the 
emerging themes. 
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Awareness/familiarity with the context was very helpful in coming up with the categories, 
and it was clear that some issues might have remained invisible with less knowledge of the 
context. Organizing the issues into working categories on an on-going basis also helped in 
enhancing my capacity to remember issues, and to make the necessary follow-up and seek 
clarifications from stakeholders on the emerging categories. In addition to the clarity, the 
organization also helped in the firming and/or disintegration of the categories. The on-going 
process was also used to bring similar ideas into close proximity, fostering further 
discrimination and bringing out patterns and minimizing interruption with unrelated 
information. Furthermore, the grouping was important in sparking recognition of hitherto 
unrecognized patterns. This data disambiguation was also crucial in ensuring that the correct 
perceptions are built from the data since ‘context influences perception’ (Kabay, 2003). For 
example, streamlining the data through categorization is also seen as a way of lightening the 
implementation load (Boyatzis, 1998: 17), as issues will have become clearer to the 
implementers. Relatedness among issues is brought out, helping in the formulation of joint 
solutions for related issues, for example helping in dealing with capacity shortages and other 
challenges.  
 
4.7.3 Data-driven coding 
Three distinct ways of developing a thematic code are recognized, viz; (a) theory-driven, (b) 
prior-data or prior-research drive, and (c) inductive (i.e. from the raw data) or data driven 
(Boyatzis, 1998: 17).  The approaches are considered to be on a continuum from theory-
driven, to data-driven approaches, each coming with its own benefits and challenges. The 
approaches all ultimately aim to arrive at theory development, but differ on the degree to 
which the analysis starts with theory or raw information. This study employed a data-driven 
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coding approach for many reasons, some of which emanated from the pilot interaction with 
respondents in the region. Some respondents had expressed reservation with what they called 
‘‘removed-from-context’’ [Mtg 2, Nov 2006] packaging and presentation of the policy 
challenges being faced by the region. While they appreciated value-addition from analysis 
and interpretation of the status on the ground, they bemoaned what they called ‘‘a lack of 
traceability, and disappearance of our circumstances into the preferred global context’’ 
[Mtg2, Nov 2006]. This was said to have a negative impact on the likelihood of policy 
recommendations from such analyses being adopted by the region. 
 
The research thus adopted a data-driven coding approach to address the concerns above, and 
also on realization of the ‘near stagnation’ [own emphasis] in the narratives around the issue 
within the region. It was therefore more than likely that different researchers, even when 
employing different methods, would emerge with more or less the same raw information. 
Developing codes from this raw information would thus yield consistent interpretations 
among many researchers. This results in increased interrater reliability, or consistency of 
judgment (Boyatzis, 1998: 19), a scenario which most policy makers prefer, especially in the 
resource-constrained region. The financial and time resources and technical capacities to 
pursue and reconcile different judgments are always scarce.  
 
Working directly with the raw information also enhances appreciation of the information, in 
addition to eliminating intermediaries that could potentially contaminate or misalign the 
information. Some of these contaminants which can arise from theory- or prior-research 
driven codes include that the researcher will have accepted the other researcher’s biases, 
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assumptions and projections. This research chose to avoid these contaminants by adopting an 
inductive approach, inspired by the data.  
 
4.8 Ethical issues 
Preliminary interaction with policy actors in the region at the beginning of the research 
revealed that, apart from requiring confidentiality in their contributions, most participants did 
not see the need for any further protection for their participation in the research. Interviewee 
consent forms were kept handy, but were hardly used. There were no further human subjects 
in the research, apart from the interviewees, and in the event of issues needing any special 
arrangements; a case-by-case approach was employed. Prior to embarking on the data 
gathering process, ethical approval and guidance was sought and obtained from the OU’s 
Human Participants and Materials Ethics Committee. All responses will be kept confidential, 
and in file according to the requirements of the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council.  
 
4.9 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has described the methodological approaches employed in obtaining and 
analysing data for this study, including the challenges and ethical issues faced by the 
researcher. The data gathering and analysis approaches employed all reflect a desire to adopt 
a holistic approach in dealing with this complex relationship between human actors, 
organisations and institutions within equally complex technological, regulatory and socio-
political settings. The researcher was also walking a ‘tight-rope’ between practitioner and 
researcher interests, and this all shaped the methodological approaches. Selection of research 
participants and the various data-gathering methodologies were all meant to enhance access 
to reliable data from the many policy arenas in which the SNOs were exerting an influence in 
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the push to assist countries towards convergence.  Following on from this presentation and 
discussion of methodological issues, the next chapter gives further details on the 
geographical, technological and organisational context surrounding the research, serving also 
as part of the results analysis for the research.  
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CHAPTER 5 STUDYING CROSS-NATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF BIOSAFETY  
  SYSTEMS IN THE SADC:  Regional and organisational contexts,  
  challenges and realities 
 
‘What one people will accept and another reject, the way one community will prefer 
local solutions and another central control, all speak to [this] issue of the historical 
embeddedness of institutions. Policies and the laws they create sit within a multi-
layered context of habits and bargains between rulers and the ruled, past and 
present’ (Considine, 2005: 3-4). 
 
5.0 Introduction 
The burgeoning technological and regulatory context of the SADC has been shown to have a 
potential impact not only on feasibility of cross-national policy convergence, but also on the 
methodological approaches for accessing empirical evidence on the policy processes. This 
chapter seeks to further contextualise the research theme within the multiple and ever-
changing policy, regulatory and technological realities of the study region, looking 
specifically at the three supranational organizations and the emerging institutional responses 
to the collective situation that the countries face. To achieve this, the chapter expands on 
some of the issues raised in all the previous chapters, focusing specifically on how the three 
organizations are positioning themselves to play a role in the governance challenge arising 
from a combination of the policy shock (the technology) and the receding regulatory 
response capacities of other players in the terrain, especially governments. The chapter 
begins with a general look at the political economy of Africa and the SADC region, zeroing 
in on the organizations and emerging institutions before then situating biotechnology and 
biosafety regulation issues within this burgeoning context. Reference will be made to broader 
science, technology and innovation issues and the attendant technological and regulatory 
challenges.  
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The methodological and theoretical challenges facing cross-national policy convergence 
studies were referred to in the first three chapters. Some principal causes of some of these 
challenges were presented, and these included the heterogeneity of researchers and their 
concentration on availing empirical evidence of convergence, as opposed to developing 
theoretical perspectives for this growing research area; and the lack of agreement on the 
preferred cross-national governance framework. In addition, there were other problems 
related, but not limited to the geographical and institutional terrain of Africa broadly and 
southern Africa specifically. Some of these are discussed in the second part of this chapter, 
both from the perspective of their impact on the results obtained, and equally importantly 
because in this research methodology was not only a means to obtaining results, but it was 
also one of the envisaged outputs of the study. This chapter draws on both empirical and 
published data, serving to bridge contextual, methodological and empirical issues.  
 
5.1 Africa – in perpetual pursuit of development? 
The continent of Africa lies largely in the southern hemisphere, and is home to about 922 
million people (2005 estimate); with the population expected to rise to 1 billion by 2010 
(United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2004)50. It stretches from 
Tunisia in the north to South Africa in the south, and also includes some islands in the 
Atlantic and Indian oceans. Africa is largely described as a poor continent, overall lagging 
behind the other continents with respect to gross-domestic product (GDP) and other 
economic development parameters (there are some exceptional countries within this 
characterization, and this brings contentions regarding the ‘true Africa’). The burden of 
disease, hunger, poverty and other developmental challenges is heavy on the continent, and 
                                                
50 "World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision" United Nations (Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs) Population Division. 
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despite many generations of development and interventions generated from within, and from 
outside the continent, the problems still appear to outweigh the successes. For instance, 
almost half of the continent’s population is said to live on less than 1US$ per day (NEPAD 
Framework Document, 2001). It is argued that among the key causes of this 
underdevelopment is the colonization of Africa by western powers in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, which led to resources being removed from the continent and used to develop other 
parts of the world. Political and scholarly debates still engage in these issues, including the 
impact of a development agenda in countries which is tied to former colonial masters 
(Shams, 2005; Economic Commission for Africa, 2006). The World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund-inspired structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and 1990s are also 
blamed for creating untenable market structures through paying little attention to provision of 
social services. Whatever the reasons and the processes, the general consensus is that the 
continent is lagging behind, and most development paradigms frame issues from this 
perspective. Both within and outside the continent, the desire for Africa to take charge of her 
development aspirations and direction is a major agenda item. Global resources through 
different programmes are thus being channelled towards realizing this self-sufficiency 
dream51.  
 
Meanwhile, southern Africa, the focus of this study, is the southern subcontinent of Africa, 
and the SADC region specifically consists of 14 countries, with a combined population of 
about 240 million (SADC, 2008)52. Twelve of these countries occupy a geographically 
contiguous expanse of land, while 2 are island states in the Indian Ocean (see map below).  
                                                
51 Commission for Africa report (2005), NEPAD framework document (2001) 
52 http://www.sadc.int/member_states/index.php (accessed 25 June 2008)  
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Figure 2:  Map of the SADC region (picture courtesy of www.sadc.int) 
 
In addition to facing the developmental challenges highlighted above for the mother 
continent and being part of some interventions that have been implemented at continental 
level, the SADC region has also had specific interventions spearheaded by the REC, clusters 
of countries or development partners with a special interest in the region (UNECA, 2006; 
SADC, 2001). With respect to biotechnology/biosafety, some of these were presented in the 
timeline (table 3) and other sections in the introductory chapter.  
 
Cross-national collaboration efforts in agricultural research, science, technology and allied 
areas have happened in the SADC region for a number of years covering different issues and 
with different levels of success; for example the Southern African Centre for Cooperation in 
Agricultural Research and Training (SACCAR), the germplasm conservation efforts of the 
SADC Plant Genetic Resources Centre (SPGRC), the cross national cooperation in policy 
analysis through the Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network 
(FANRPAN), the existence of trans-frontier national parks among some of the countries; and 
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many more (Ushewokunze-Obatolu, 2005; SADC, 2004). There are also a number of 
NGOs53 operational in the region focusing on different aspects of science and technology, 
agriculture or biotech/biosafety activities specifically. With respect to biotechnology and 
biosafety, the region has had a number of initiatives since the 1990s (see Tables 1 and 3). As 
mentioned earlier, the impact of these interventions is varied across the countries and the 
reasons for this form part of stakeholders’ arguments for or against cross-national 
convergence of regulatory systems for biosafety. The overall result is that these successes 
and failures are imprinted in the individual and institutional memories of the stakeholders in 
the region, and they play a big part in shaping the present-day responses. More empirical 
evidence and comments on this is given in Chapter 5.  
 
5.1.1 Africa and the quest for regional integration 
Since the early 1960s, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) has 
encouraged African states to combine their economies into sub-regional markets that would 
ultimately form one Africa-wide economic union (ECA, 2006). Within the OAU, predecessor 
to the AU, various resolutions and declarations adopted by specifically the Summits in 
Algiers in September 1968, in Addis Ababa in August 1970 and May 1973, identified the 
need for the economic integration of the Continent as a pre-requisite for the realization of the 
objectives of the Organization (Shams, 2005). The quest for collaboration has thus been alive 
on the continent for many decades, and collective action dilemmas such as those presented by 
new technologies are seen as potential opportunities to push the regional integration 
momentum (De Waal, 2002).  There are many challenges bedeviling the integration agenda 
from which lessons can be drawn for the cross-national convergence of biosafety systems. 
                                                
53 e.g. AfricaBio, African Centre for Biosafety, RAEIN-Africa, among others 
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One such challenge is that there are more than 14 regional economic communities (RECs) of 
varying scope and design on the continent (Shams, 2005). The majority of the 53 countries 
on the continent belong to more than one of these RECs, some of which overlap 
geographically, yet may be pursuing different agendas, or the same agendas, but at different 
times (ECA, 2006). This creates multiple allegiances in the countries that are in such 
situations, putting further strain on the countries’ already-constrained financial and human 
resource bases. Looking at the SADC for example, five of the 14 countries belong to the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU); 9 belong to the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), with 2 of these 9 countries being among the 5 SACU member 
states. One SADC and COMESA member also belongs to the East African Community 
(EAC). There are more such overlaps, further complicating the maze of allegiances and 
obligations. Meanwhile, another challenge for the continental integration objective is that 
most of the RECs were formed before the AU, and established their systems without any 
working reference to the continental integration (Mkwezalamba and Chinyama, 2007). How 
easily they can realign their aspirations and development trajectories towards the continental 
direction is an intriguing empirical and theoretical contest (Shams, 2005, Ilorah, 2004). 
Similar issues also awaited the cross-national policy convergence agenda. 
5.1.2 Cooperation in science and technology 
A number of programmes and processes have been put in place on the continent to strengthen 
Africa’s position with respect to harnessing and deploying science and technology broadly 
and biotechnology specifically, as explained elsewhere in this thesis. This has been inspired 
by challenges and also by the increasing global trend towards international cooperation in 
science and technology. Globalization and the increasing recognition of the benefits of 
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cooperation in science and technology are seen as some of the factors behind this increased 
cooperation (Mugabe, 2003). International agreements such as the Montreal Protocol (1987), 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs); and many other recent agreements and treaties in environment, energy and 
regional integration all emphasise the importance of cooperation in science and technology. 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted at the turn of the century also 
emphasise use of, and cooperation in science and technology.  
 
On the continent, the Constitution of the African Union and the NEPAD Framework 
Document54 both have similar provisions on cooperation, and further develop institutional 
arrangements and programmes to operationalise these provisions. For example, in the AU 
Commission, which is the Secretariat of the Union, one of the key departments is that of 
Human Resources, Science and Technology (HRST)55. It is the HRST unit which houses the 
AU Biosafety Project56, in addition to handling other science and technology matters. 
Meanwhile Article 21 of the treaty establishing the SADC notes the importance of 
cooperation in science and technology, and as of 2007, the SADC was developing a Protocol 
on Science, Technology and Innovation (STI). One of the objectives of this protocol is to 
‘promote the development and harmonisation of science, technology and innovation policies 
in the Region (i.e. SADC)’ (Draft 2, SADC Protocol on Science, Technology and Innovation, 
July 2007).  Within the SADC Secretariat, one of the four departments or units is that of 
Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR), and among other duties, it is tasked with 
‘coordination and harmonization of policies and programmes’ in agriculture, natural 
                                                
54 Ref: AU Constitutive Act (2000) and the NEPAD Framework Document (2001) 
55 Ref www.africa-union.org  
56See table 3 
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resources, environment and allied areas. The FANR unit also oversees the activities of the 
SACBB57 and other biotechnology/biosafety activities within the REC.  
 
The NEPAD Framework Document states ‘promotion of cross-border cooperation and 
connectivity’ as one of its objectives in the Science and Technology Platforms sectoral 
priorities (NEPAD Framework Document, 2001). Operationalisation of this objective was 
realized through establishment of the NEPAD Office of Science and Technology (OST), the 
African Ministerial Council on Science and Technology (AMCOST) and the various 
technology development programmes and policy processes58 implemented under these 
arrangements59.  
Provisions for cross-national cooperation in science and technology are also enshrined in 
national policy documents and agreements, for example in weather early-warning systems, 
health research (Chataway et al, 2007), agricultural research, information and communication 
technologies and other areas. Agreements and alliances to these ends exist with partners and 
countries in the region, elsewhere on the continent, and internationally (Mugabe, 2003, Juma 
and Serageldin, 2007, Clark et al, 2005). However, having the policy documents and 
agreements in place is one thing, and having operational cooperation is quite another 
(Sampson III, 1982), and cross-national convergence of biosafety systems is seen as one way 
of operationalising these cooperation desires; at least at the regulatory level.  In this study, 
some respondents bemoaned what they termed the politicization of science, while others saw 
this as an opportunity for pushing towards the bigger regional integration. It may well be true 
that the politicization is unavoidable, as … according to Ernst Haas (cited by Ruggie, 
                                                
57 See table 4 
58 See table 4  
59 www.nepad.org also, www.nepadst.org  
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1975)… ‘when it comes to the international management of technology, there is a hole in the 
technology whole, one which can be filled only by introducing political purposes’. Overall, 
what these examples of programmes within the wider science and technology agenda show is 
that the desire for convergence of biosafety systems is a response embedded in existing 
practices in the region, and this was expected to have a bearing on the efforts around 
biosafety.  
5.2 The biotechnology debate 
As highlighted in the first two chapters, the biotechnology and biosafety debate on the 
African continent is alive, both in relation to the bigger global debate shaped around the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, and as influenced by Africa’s geographical and socio-
economic peculiarities. Key among these issues are: the economic and social importance of 
agriculture in Africa; the degree of food insecurity and poverty on the continent; the 
pressures exerted on natural resources by the continent’s population with a view to satisfying 
food and nutritional needs; the vulnerable nature Africa’s agriculture due to climate change, 
diseases and predators; the need to explore new ways of developing agriculture with a view 
to injecting a new lease of life into agricultural production in order to overcome food 
insecurity and alleviate poverty; the stake and importance of biotechnology in the 
development of Africa’s agriculture to set in motion a growth and economic development 
process in countries; and all this while needing to protect biodiversity, the environment and 
human and animal health (Mnyulwa and Mugwagwa, 2005; NEPAD Framework Document, 
2001, SADC Review, 2001). 
 
These challenges form part of the context within which Africa’s interest in the technology 
lies; and from an external point of view, multinational companies and developers of the 
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technology see Africa as a potential food market, and her largely underdeveloped agricultural 
systems as a testing ground for some of the nascent technologies; while the continent has 
obligations to meet MDGs on food security, poverty and others, and the technology is seen as 
having a great potential to contribute to this. The interplay between these issues results in 
biotechnology, and indeed any technology meant to address some of these challenges ceasing 
to be purely a technical issue, but one with added tensions as a result of the political and 
social dimensions (cf. Ruggie, 1975). The political dimension not only brings challenges; it is 
also seen as a necessary force in galvanizing the different interests in the practice, and in 
pushing the issue towards the appropriate decision-making levels.  
 
This study focused more on regulation of biotechnology in the backdrop of its applications in 
agriculture and thus the examples cited both for interventions and challenges will draw 
mainly from this sector. This is because agriculture is the mainstay of economic activity in 
nearly all SADC member countries.  Agriculture is a major source of foreign currency 
earnings and supplies food, thereby reducing hunger, ensuring social and political stability 
(Ushewokunze-Obatolu, 2005). Cross-reference will be made to other sectors, mainly to 
bring out the complexities and the intercalations between the different areas. Biotechnology 
has also been touted as a technology with a functional cross-cutting potential to bring 
different sectoral interests together (Bandelow, 2006) thus this context analysis, and the 
research broadly also looked at how far this had been feasible in the SADC region. Overall, it 
was within this context that the convergence agenda was being pursued, and among the many 
interests of this research was the search for an understanding of how the convergence would 
address or circumvent the context, and how the context facilitated or hindered convergence.  
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5.3 Abstracting the role of the SNOs 
As presented earlier, the study of policy convergence is an area of extensive research in many 
fields, including, but not limited to international relations, sociology and political studies 
(Heichel et al, 2005). The main interest is to understand the mechanisms through which 
convergence happens, and the factors facilitating the action of these mechanisms. 
Convergence is about the growth in similarity of policies over time, and the assumption 
underlying convergence is that countries respond to the different modernizing forces by 
developing similar systems for managing the pressures. Various mechanisms, institutions and 
policy processes play different roles in the emergence of convergence, and this study looked 
at how three supranational organisations operating in Africa were influencing processes 
towards convergence of systems for cross-national management of biotechnology in the 
SADC region. As admitted earlier, the look at the roles of the three supranational bodies was 
an attempt to isolate just one component from a context littered with a multiplicity of players 
exerting different pressures, singly or in various combinations on the policy issue under 
focus. This abstraction attempt was thus a daunting one because of the intricate links and 
overlaps between the different players and the policy process they were trying to influence. 
On the other hand, the abstraction was crucial, because as Andrew Sayer notes on 
knowledge; 
 … ‘to be practically-adequate, knowledge must capture the differentiations of the world, and 
[to this end] … we need a way of individuating objects … even where we are interested in 
wholes, we must select and abstract their constituents’ [page 19] 
Biotechnology and biosafety are inherently multi-level and multi-actor technology processes, 
and an attempt to abstract the role of SNOs faced many challenges from both conceptual and 
practical perspectives. The SNOs have multiple and complex actor coalitions around them, 
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and these not only make the process of distilling the individual impacts of the SNOs difficult, 
but may also lead to a misalignment of their positions and the mechanisms through which 
they exert their influence on the countries (cf. Beach, 2005: 45). However, it is also true that 
these complications reflect the realities and challenges, not only for the organisations and the 
policy actors with whom they interact, but for the policy processes in general and the 
convergence agenda in particular. The study thus had to be conducted with these insights in 
mind. 
 
The research interest in cross-national convergence of biosafety systems, as highlighted in 
the first chapter, was driven by a realization of the growth and persistence of discussions 
around harmonisation of biosafety systems in the SADC region, and on the African continent 
broadly since the late 1990s. These discussions were underpinned by the desire for regional 
cooperation and interaction, with biotechnology being seen as one avenue in which countries 
needed to cooperate in order to deal with the challenges and opportunities brought by the 
technology at a ‘collective action’ level. However, while these discussions were underway, 
there was no unanimity on the need for convergence and what form it should take, and the 
supranational organizations were said to have tried to elicit appropriate responses to deal with 
the situation. Their responses were not only about dealing with the immediate challenges, but 
strengthening their own responses to similar challenges and minimizing risks that may be 
occasioned to them (the organisations) as a result of engaging in efforts to deal with the 
policy challenge (cf. Rothstein, 2005 on institutional risk). 
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5.4 Organisational responses 
This context and the national aspirations for convergence have elicited various responses, or 
institutional imaginings among many organisations, including the three supranational-
organisations. They have positioned and portrayed themselves in ways they deem best to deal 
with the situation facing the countries and the region vis-a-vis the technology. This was all 
taking place within the context of the bigger mandates that these organisations had for 
regional integration, in addition to other areas of focus. The organisations claimed to embody 
institutionalisms that were best suited to dealing with the policy challenge and the context. 
According to institutional theorists (e.g. Scott, 2004), institutions emerge from coercive, 
mimetic or normative pressures which push them towards ‘improved efficiency or a status of 
higher legitimacy’. Looking at the organisations and policy processes, some of the emerging 
institutional ‘myths’ towards these efficiency and legitimacy ‘trappings’ include being; 
responsive to needs, evidence-based, consultative, champions of an African agenda, learning 
organisations and humbling themselves as being ‘only but part of networks of many equals’. 
They did not see themselves as being more important than the other players. However, these 
trappings were seen by others, especially those in NGOs as ways of wanting to portray a 
sense of belonging and relevance, while for the organisations, this reflected the best way to 
deal with the apparently inexorable and complex social and geopolitical context in which the 
technological and policy issues were being dealt with. 
 
While all this was happening, there was a general feeling among some respondents from the 
civil society that not much had been done to endear the three bodies with the ordinary 
citizenry. For example, it was felt there was a glaring gap around explaining NEPAD’s basic 
principles to citizens in the countries. According to respondents from the two other SNOs, 
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the NEPAD programme was designed to circumvent the purportedly unwieldy process of the 
African Union. These realities and tensions between the organizations painted a complex 
picture with respect to how they could work together without antagonizing each other in the 
policy space. Already, within the biosafety arena, it was clear that the organizations had 
contempt for each other’s capacity to deliver. The following reflection from one key player in 
one of the SNOs summed up this mood 
 
‘Yes, I am on the technical committee for their Biosafety Project, but I do not bother 
myself to attend all the meetings because there is no progress there. There are too 
many anti-biotech activists in that group, and a lot of time is spent debating the pros 
and cons of biotechnology, an issue which we think is not core to the mission of the 
project’ [Pmk2 (S), October 2006]. 
 
However, the other SNO sounded more optimistic and diplomatic about the relationship, as 
supported by the following statement made by a key player from this other SNO, when asked 
about the link between their Biosafety project and the biotechnology/biosafety activities in 
the other SNO:  
 
‘There is representation on our committee from the other SNO, and this is supposed 
to form the link between our two initiatives. However the problem we experience is 
that their representative does not attend meetings, and some of the obligations on 
which they are supposed to deliver are not met. However, we feel this is an 
adjustment phase, and things will normalize as the project progresses’ [Pmk8 (S), 
Oct 2006) 
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The problem from the researcher’s perspective was that there did not appear to be much time 
for the gelling expected to make things better for the project because at the time these 
reflections were made, the project was already halfway through its three-year mandate. The 
policy actors seemed confident an extension phase would be granted, but at this rate, there 
was no guarantee that in the extension things would work better. One factor supporting this 
was the entrenchment of this expression of contempt and tension within the institutions, 
which was only being manifested through the individuals. There may thus be no guarantee 
that things would change even in the event of individuals managing the programmes 
changing. It was clear from these exchanges that, ‘while officials cannot be decomposed to 
the organizations they represent’ (Chataway, 1992: 35), there were institutional factors that 
shaped the officials’ perceptions and attitudes on policy processes and outcomes (Rothstein, 
2002). There was thus need to look beyond the institutional setting to explore and understand 
the patterns brought about by the officials’ interests and issue framings. In addition, it was 
evident that as much as they had positioned themselves to avail solutions to the collective-
action dilemmas facing the countries, the SNOs were also bringing potentially diversionary 
attributes to the policy arena. For example, like the countries they were trying to assist, the 
SNOs also faced problems with respect to adequacy of financial, technological and policy 
resources to make sustainable and autonomous policy decisions.  
 
5.5 Similarities, differences and clashes between the three organisations 
Among some policy makers, there was a lot of excitement about the prospects NEPAD 
brought to the agenda for transforming Africa, and at the same time, there was a recognition 
in many other quarters that NEPAD was still very much work-in-progress, and the 
expectations needed to be lowered, especially given the daunting context within which the 
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framework was expected to work (Ilorah, 2004). Calls had thus been made for it to scale back 
and focus on issues from the realism dictated by the context. On the other hand, the big idea 
concept was seen as important for keeping NEPAD firmly on the agendas of international 
funders such as G8 and OECD countries. However, apart from the high expectations placed 
on NEPAD because of its high placing, there were also problems and potential conflicts with 
everything worthwhile going on in Africa being given the NEPAD label. This was for both 
success stories, and for drawbacks such as fraudulent elections which NEPAD was expected 
to make a comment on (De Waal, 2002). All this put undue pressure on the organization 
which was still very much in its infancy.  And for biosafety, this put NEPAD on a collision 
course with some of the SNOs in the undeclared battle for recognition within the policy 
space. 
 
Meanwhile, proponents consistently underscored that the only new thing about NEPAD was 
the political will behind the initiative. This was an important stance to take, especially if it 
could be reflected and if it could permeate the vertical and horizontal structures of the 
programme. However, on the ground, there was a huge focus on newness, and how NEPAD 
was divorced and removed from all that had been there before (contrast with Considine, 
2005: 3-4). If it was political will only that was new, why was it not used to push or 
reinvigorate the existing programmes – a respondent from one of the SNOs asked [Pmk8 (S) 
Oct 2006].  From a theoretical point of view, this underscored again the need to look beyond 
structures, because actors learnt new patterns and interests, and these were reflected in the 
institutions and policy processes (Haas, 2002). The challenges brought about by the newness 
perspective emanated from the expectations that rode on the new institution and the balance 
between these and the memories of stakeholders who had seen new stakeholders come into 
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the fray and leave with minimal impact. The promissory and future-oriented properties of 
NEPAD as an innovation network raised stakeholders’ expectations, and a failure to live up 
to these would leave both the organisation and the target groups disappointed (cf. Borup et al, 
2006). Equally importantly, this exposed the organisation to the risks of delivery failure, 
liabilities and loss of reputation within the policy community. 
 
On the whole, NEPAD seemed to have gained capacity to have programmes, especially 
government-led programmes, emulating its approaches in anticipation of greater recognition 
of the programmes because of the currency and relevance of NEPAD within the African 
development terrain. This led to diffusion of practices, and some form of coercion as the 
organisation had the newness, knowledge and perceived financial resources to be able to 
serve as a reference point (cf. Busch and Jorgens 2005; Lehtonen, 2006) 
 
5.5.1 NEPAD and AU
60
 
The relationship between NEPAD and AU has been described as ‘important yet still unclear’ 
(Waal, 2002). As alluded to earlier, the drivers of NEPAD were keen right from the start to 
keep it disentangled from the cumbersome procedures of the AU decision-making process. 
NEPAD aims for efficiency, and its emphasis on best practice and peer review means that 
countries are not on an equal setting within this setting, unlike in the AU, where all member 
states have an equal voice regardless of their size, economic status or level of democracy. 
Sources within NEPAD indicated that the organization had managed to make steady progress 
in the backdrop of ‘minimized political baggage’, and that some of the tensions which existed 
when NEPAD was formed may be the reasons behind the current uneasiness between the two 
                                                
60 There is on-going work on integration of NEPAD into the AU structures (this is beyond the scope of this 
thesis) 
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bodies61. The clash over resources and attention in the policy space were also some of the 
persistent challenges. The reality was that these interactions between the two organizations 
were part of the context and how this ‘fragmentation at the top’ (as referred to by some 
stakeholders) affected the cross-national convergence agenda was an issue of interest from 
academic and policy perspectives.  How they galvanised or disintegrated the region remained 
to be seen. Amid all this bickering, the two organizations shared one similarity – that of 
beginnings that were rapid and marked by over-optimistic assumptions and ‘little 
consultation’ (De Waal, 2002). One respondent from a university in Namibia was quick to 
point out that; 
 
‘…given the success of NEPAD, maybe this is how processes should happen in Africa 
… rapidly and with decisive seizures of key moments. Biosafety is one area where 
there has just been too much consultation, and as yet, there is nothing much to show 
from all the consultation’ [Res3 (R), Oct, 2006] 
 
The point about unending consultations was also echoed by many other respondents, 
especially scientists and officials from international organizations. Others blamed this on lack 
of political impetus to take the processes forward. Hence the entry of the three SNOs into the 
arena was seen as positive for both national and regional processes. One lesson from these 
exchanges and the overall perception of the policy processes was that stakeholders looked at 
the processes from short-term rather than a strategic view-point. To most, success in policy 
processes meant achievement of the set policy objectives rather than the tactical and 
                                                
61 For example, it was noted that in the formation of NEPAD, there were also concerted efforts to avert the 
Libyan influence which was coming in through efforts to establish a United States of Africa, and this would 
have had an adverse impact on the relationship between NEPAD and donors such as G8 and OECD (De Waal, 
2002). 
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functional adjustments which the countries and the region had made along the way since the 
GM challenge surfaced. In his analysis of the Denver Water Politics using the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework, Ellison (1998) traces these perceptions to the issue framing within the 
policy arena. For the SADC region this also rang true, and was compounded by the 
multiplicity of the actors in the fray, resource constraints and the competition for attention 
that biosafety faces from other issues in the policy arena.  
 
The AU is an umbrella organisation under which the other two should fall, and the AU 
should thus have influence over these organisations (ECA, 2006). However, with respect to 
biosafety regulation in the SADC, the other two had more contact with the countries, and had 
processes which the policy actors in the countries were relatively more familiar with. The AU 
was bigger, and was said to have bigger ‘bureaucratic drag’ and was thus generally slower in 
responding to issues. It was a bigger bureaucracy and its processes were more involving and 
decisions took longer to be arrived at and to implement. The absence of an AU office closer 
to the region to handle issues was said to make its reaction to issues slower. SADC and 
NEPAD both have offices within the SADC region and this was said to impact positively on 
their visibility.  
 
The AU was seen to be more reactive to issues than the other organisations, and a look at the 
Biosafety Strategy for Africa developed by the AU in 2006 showed that indeed the AU was 
trailing behind. Some of the proposed measures, for example; 
 
‘…encouraging the promotion of biosafety through other existing national and 
regional initiatives’ … and that … ‘Much as the RECs are primarily for economic 
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purposes, they may still play a role … to keep biosafety issues on their agendas ….’ 
(emphasis added).  
 
A SADC official was quick to point out that this was what they had been doing since the 
early 2000s, and bemoaned what he called a ‘new beginnings syndrome’ within the AU. 
There was need for progress in the issue to be reflected, and to serve as a platform for going 
forward [Res6 (R), Aug 2006].  
 
Meanwhile, all the three organisations were also under different levels of pressure as a result 
of limited delivery on promises of their programmes. The SADC was said to suffer more 
from the negative effect of delayed delivery because of close and constant touch with the 
countries, while the other two were relatively far removed. External pressures also had their 
influence on the three organisations, and each of them seemed to have set(s) of traditional 
donors, all coming with different agendas, and therefore having different impacts on the 
dynamics within the policy arena in the region. Capacities to deal with the different donor 
pressures also differed, and this was also related to the resource endowments in the different 
organisations.  NEPAD was fairly better resource-endowed than the other two with respect to 
science and technology agendas, and could in some cases choose to avoid donor dictates, a 
luxury that the other two did not have. There was thus a clear need for the different 
endowments and influence levels of the three bodies to be synergised in order to get the best 
out of the presence of all three organisations within the SADC policy space. Also, looking 
closely at the three organisations vis-à-vis the convergence agenda, it emerged clearly that 
they all had different influence levels, and neither of them could claim to have a holistic 
packaging or total-factor-endowment to deal with the issues (see chapter 6). They all brought 
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in different perspectives, which one respondent from an environmental agency in one of the 
smaller countries noted;  
 
“…need to be harmonised before the agenda on the ground can be harmonised. The 
organisations should not only see themselves as champions (or potential champions) 
of convergence, but as targets of convergence as well. The convergence should start 
with them before they take it out to the region and the countries” [Pmk5 (R), Apr, 
2007]. 
  
However, the feasibility of all this was a daunting order given the perennial fight for 
resources and the need for each organisation to remain visible and not appear to be fanning 
other people’s agendas. But as Sayer (1992: 18) notes, an acceptance of such realities may 
help deal with some fallacies. Complete and uncontested convergence may not be feasible 
given the multiple and fluctuating pressures around the issue, and the existence of 
contestations among the organisations championing the process themselves.  
 
5.6 Accessing research data in this context 
Having presented a characterisation of the organisations and their responses to the challenge, 
this chapter now proceeds with a closer look at how the context described above facilitated or 
hindered data collection for an understanding of how the SNOs influenced the convergence 
processes.  
 
 
 
 125 
5.6.1 Geographical, economic and institutional context 
Accessing and producing comparative regional data from the varied geographic and 
economic terrain of southern Africa was an acknowledged challenge right from the start. 
Communication and accessibility capacities differ among the countries, and among the 
institutions within the countries. This had an effect on the number and type of respondents 
that could be reached, and hence on the amount and quality of accessible data. The general 
trend was that it was easier to access a broader base of stakeholders in the smaller countries 
such as Lesotho and Swaziland, while for the larger countries it was more difficult. The 
correlation was not only between the size of the country and the reachable stakeholder base, 
but between the stakeholder base and the size of the biotechnology sector. The smaller 
economies have, as largely expected, a smaller group of biosafety policy actors and experts, 
and once reached, they were able to give views and responses representative of the country 
more easily than their counterparts in the bigger countries in which there was a broader range 
of biotechnology/biosafety activities and actors. For these smaller countries, it was also much 
easier to triangulate issues, especially the relatively ‘small and obscure’ issues (e.g. the 
impact of staff movements across organisations for employment purposes) because, as it 
turned out, the likelihood of the stakeholders interviewed speaking to similar issues was 
higher in the smaller countries than in larger ones (cf. Buchs, 2003). For example, in South 
Africa, some laboratory scientists, despite being recognised as active players in biosafety 
discussions and procedure-setting within the country, expressed ignorance on the existence of 
SADC Guidelines on Biotechnology and Biosafety. Apparently, the regional issues were 
being handled at higher levels, and the overlaps between these higher levels and other levels 
such as laboratory-level practices were low. On the other hand, laboratory scientists 
interviewed in Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Namibia were vividly more aware of not 
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only the regional issues, but the international issues as well. These differences taken at face 
value would indicate a difference in opinion among identical stakeholders and across 
countries, and thus brought comparability challenges in the results. The results analysis thus 
bore in mind that data available reflected easily accessible parts of the policy communities 
and that these communities differed from country to country with respect to their level of 
exposure to the issue, among other differences. The SNOs would thus be expected to face the 
same challenges in interacting with national policy actors in the convergence agenda. 
 
One problem encountered in the smaller policy communities was that the policy actors were 
generally not as enthusiastic about the research issue, as those in the bigger economies. 
According to one senior officer in an environmental agency in one of the smaller countries; 
 
‘‘… we talk about these issues to different people almost on a daily basis, and 
seriously, we are getting tired. Of course, I know you, and we can talk, but you can 
imagine what my attitude would be if it was just another researcher from somewhere 
coming here to talk about this issue with which we are really saturated (if I can use 
those words)’’ [Pmk5 (R), Sept. 2006] 
 
On being challenged that this research was not looking at biosafety in the everyday sense, but 
from the lens of regional cooperation, the respondent was quick to say; 
 
‘‘To me, the issues being discussed around biosafety have remained largely the same. 
We are talking about capacity and preparedness issues. Whether it’s from a regional 
 127 
standpoint or any other, the issues are the same, and what needs to be addressed are 
the capacity challenges’’.  
 
Judging from the consolidated responses on the bigger research questions, these sentiments 
may well be true, but the point to note here was that this display of fatigue and lack of 
interest by policy actors in the smaller economies may have had an impact on the opinions 
given and the quality of data accessed, let alone the impact on moving the policy processes 
forward. On the other hand, because the policy communities here were small, the researcher 
was able to triangulate issues more easily, and also to employ the repeat contact strategy to 
seek clarifications and check data consistency.  
 
The various sizes and locations of policy communities also necessitated use of a 
heterogeneous array of techniques to reach the stakeholders. In some of the countries, for 
example, Tanzania and Namibia, most of the key respondents accessed were located in 
universities, while in the majority of the other countries, they were in government 
departments, quasi-government bodies or civil society organisations. A marked difference 
was observed in communication cultures between stakeholders in these different 
organisational settings. For example, with a few exceptions, it was easier and quicker to get 
responses from actors located in universities than those located in government departments. 
As a result of the delays experienced in getting responses from some of the actors, data came 
in at different times, and this had an effect on the comparability of results because of possible 
changes in the macro- and micro-circumstances in the intervening period (see also section 
4.6.2). In cases where it was possible, follow up was made with the earlier respondents to 
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assess change of opinion.  These time differences in collection of responses were taken into 
consideration in the results analysis. 
  
Drawing up a sampling frame for the research was also affected to a large extent by the 
differences in the sizes of biosafety policy communities in the targeted countries, as 
highlighted in section 4.5. As a result, whether or not to do random or quota sampling of 
respondents could not be applicable in some countries because of the small numbers of 
potential respondents. Even in the bigger countries, issues of accessing the chosen 
respondents, was a major constraint. In the end, non-probability sampling techniques 
underpinned by convenience and Snowball sampling had to be employed. What emerged was 
that most of the people who were accessed to participate in the research were by and large the 
same people who participated in these issues on a continuous basis. They brought with them 
some ‘fatigue and cemented opinions’ in some cases, and a feeling that this was another ‘of 
the many studies on biosafety’ (e.g. Res4 (R), Sept 2006). However, it was also a fact that 
these actors had become opinion shapers and leaders on this issue because of their sustained 
participation, and it was opinions such as theirs which had a huge bearing on the policy 
processes in the countries and the region (cf. NEPAD and IFPRI, 2004). A researcher within 
a technology studies organisation in Africa remarked; 
 
‘‘We rely a lot on seasoned policymakers because governments and stakeholders 
know them and trust them. New players are viewed with suspicion, maybe because 
most of them only enter the fray when a historic event has occurred … but (of course) 
we also value the importance of fresh ideas and opinions, so we slowly bring new 
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players on board as well. That’s how we broaden the policy community’’ [Res12 
(OR), Oct 2006) 
 
The research and data analysis worked within these practical realities, essentially trying to 
derive maximum meaning from data and opinions generated from this ‘non-perfect world’.  
The inability to reach all countries physically for practical reasons meant that in situ, in-depth 
face-to-face discussions were possible only for three countries, Botswana, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. Luckily, some respondents from other countries were met and interviewed in 
regional and international fora, for example at the November 2006 Congress of African 
Scientists and Policy-Makers (CASP) in Egypt and the NEPAD regional meeting on health 
innovations held in Uganda, July 2007. In all cases, more emphasis was placed on accessing 
information about the regional picture as opposed to national perspectives. This was seen as a 
way of removing the possible bias from having more information on some countries than 
others. Still, the problem could not be entirely avoided because for come countries, for 
example DRC, Mauritius and Madagascar, very little information could be accessed.  
 
5.6.2 Timing and culture issues 
Another set of critical challenges for this research revolved around timing and culture issues, 
particularly with regard to the extent to which stakeholders in different countries remembered 
and attached value to key episodes in the policy processes. This had a bearing on how they 
interpreted the various questions raised by the research, and the amount of time taken to 
respond to issues. Regarding timing of the research, there were mixed feelings among the 
respondents, some holding the opinion that biosafety activities in the region followed an 
episodic pattern, moving in sync with global and regional developments and challenges. 
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While the discussions and activities under the Biosafety Protocol were on-going, and 
countries were implementing various biosafety activities with assistance from UNEP/GEF 
for example, the real impact, as one official in the SADC observed, was from the major 
events that jolted the governments into wanting to invest in policy development. 
 
‘‘Our governments work best under pressure, and there are many reasons for this. In 
this case, the best time to assess the seriousness and commitment of the governments 
to the regional agenda would have been around the time of the 2002/2003 food aid 
crisis. The issue of biosafety caught the attention of leaders then, and this in many 
ways gives a measure of what is achievable and what is not. Organisations generally 
align their capacities and machinery with the prevailing leadership opinions, and for 
all it is worth, the desired convergence probably came and served its purpose, and 
beyond that, countries have since moved on separately’’ [Res6 (S), Aug 2006] 
 
This was quite a thought-provoking opinion, and it reinforced the researcher’s decision to use 
the 2002/03 food aid debacle as a departure point. While the point about how long the 
anticipated convergence could hold was taken, why the research was felt relevant still, a 
point which was discussed with the above respondent, was that convergence/harmonisation 
was being talked about and championed post-2002/03. This showed that there was a cause 
and underlying need for the convergence. In addition, measuring or assessing the 
convergence beyond the excitement of the political rhetoric was important in revealing to 
what extent the agenda had been institutionalised and how prepared countries were to deal 
with a repeat of such challenges in future. One key theoretical and policy issue that emerged 
clearly from the discussion with this official, and from discussions with others, was that in 
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some of the countries and organisations, responses are guided by a ‘surviving-for-the-
moment’ mentality. Beyond current survival, things were expected to fall into place 
‘somehow’.  
 
Different institutional and social cultures across the countries also brought some issues to the 
fore. For example, respondents from some countries such as Botswana had a fairly ‘laid-
back’ approach to issues, and some respondents attributed this to the per-capita economic 
self-sufficiency of the country in comparison with the other countries in the region. A typical 
‘no-hurry’ attitude was apparent among the respondents from this country, not only with 
respect to rate of responding to research queries, but even to when and how the convergence 
should be achieved. A senior regulator and active representative of the country in regional 
and international biosafety fora had this to say on the sidelines of an international meeting; 
 
‘‘ … why should there be a hurry to achieve convergence when individual countries 
are still developing their own systems? We all need to go through the same learning 
curve, without hurrying and worrying about who is at what stage. We can share and 
exchange experiences with other countries, no problem, but each country needs to go 
back and work according to its own capacity and requirements’’ [Mtg3, Nov 2006]. 
 
These sentiments underscored the challenges emanating from the different economic status of 
the countries, and the accompanying institutional and social cultures. Some countries and 
institutions could afford not to hurry, while for others, the biosafety challenges could only be 
surmounted from a collective action perspective. Still even for the resource-endowed 
countries and institutions, the benefits of collective action were indicated to outweigh the 
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advantages brought about by having resources because, as one respondent from a regional 
biotechnology and biosafety advisory committee aptly put it;  
 
‘‘The challenges from this technology are too numerous, and I do not see any single 
country being able to deal with all of them on its own. If European countries, with all 
their resource endowments and technological advancements saw it worthwhile to 
combine forces with their neighbours, what can be expected of our own poor and 
technologically vulnerable countries?’’ [Pmk9 (R), March 2007]. 
 
The issue of countries seeing themselves as capable of ‘going it alone’ also manifested itself 
in the emphasis on strengths and national achievements observed when countries took part in 
experience-sharing fora. There appeared to be some competition among the countries, and a 
desire to show that ‘within our borders, we are making progress’, and there were specific 
groups of countries that were known to exhibit this competitive rivalry between each other62. 
This scenario not only brought a challenge to the quality and authenticity of data supplied by 
respondents, but also ‘threw spanners’ in the convergence works, especially with respect to 
how the convergence could take place. One way of trying to deal with this challenge was 
through looking beyond the formal space, and this was vindicated by the remarks from one 
EU-based respondent who has interacted extensively with science and technology policy 
(including biosafety) experts in the SADC region; 
 
‘‘The true picture of what is feasible and how it can be done cannot emerge entirely 
from the formal meetings and fora where government departments and other agents 
                                                
62 SA and Botswana are known for exhibiting this stance against each other; Lesotho and Swaziland also 
bemoaned what they termed a ‘big-brother attitude’ from SA 
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of research institutions are engaging in discussions. There are tendencies to want to 
outdo each other in these fora, and sometimes the reality on the ground is 
compromised. Venture into the informal space, or catch these same practitioners after 
their formal meetings and hear if they consistently ‘sing the same song’’ [Res15 
(OR), Mar, 2007). 
 
Different cultures in countries and institutions and these competition dimensions also resulted 
in some issues being ‘black boxed’ by some respondents. For example, in some countries 
respondents were able to openly name individuals or institutions whom they thought were 
negative forces in the biosafety arena and the convergence agenda specifically, while in other 
countries this openness was not possible. This ‘black boxing’ and issue-avoidance or skirting 
varied among countries, institutions and respondents, and had an effect on the data that was 
accessed, and subsequently the comparison of this data. Risk perception also differed among 
countries (cf. Hofstede’s model on dimensions of national culture)63, while the rating of 
issues on different scales provided in the questionnaire-mediated part of the research also 
showed that respondents had different opinions on what is ‘low, moderate or high’ for 
example64. There was a general trend showing countries with less experience with the 
technology being more preoccupied with putting in place measures to predict and manage the 
uncertainty from the technology than countries with a longer association with the technology 
who focused more on reaping benefits from it. These differences in uncertainty avoidance 
have a strong bearing on the feasibility of cross-national convergence of systems, further 
supporting the path and legacy-dependency nature of policy processes (Considine, 2005: 
                                                
63 Hofstede, Geert (1991) Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. New York, NY, McGraw-Hill 
64Particularly on responses relating to feasibility of convergence; whether or not convergence should happen 
voluntarily or through imposition of models by policy-donors; and to what extent each of the three SNOs had 
contributed to increase in similarity of systems across countries.  
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127). Respondents from some countries, for example Zambia, Mozambique and Malawi 
seemed to be consistently moderate in their ratings, while those from others, notably 
Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe tended to rate on the high side. This was the case for 
both national and regional level issues. These responses were postulated to reflect either 
confidence in the national systems or some desire to achieve more. On the other hand it also 
reflected the existence of national and institutional factors that shape regulatory officials’ 
perceptions of risk, and the process to regulate the risk (Rothstein, 2002).  
 
5.6.3 Issue framing and terminology 
As mentioned in section 4.5, the attempt to design a questionnaire that would adequately 
capture the views of the highly heterogeneous mix of different stakeholders targeted by the 
research was a major challenge. The multi-level and multi-actor nature of biosafety was the 
source of this challenge. The way regulators and policy makers understand biosafety was not 
the same as that for workers in NGOs, for example, or scientists practising the science in the 
laboratories. Among policy makers and regulators, biosafety was about policies and 
regulatory measures, and this was what came to their minds when the issue was raised. 
Respondents from NGOs and lobby groups said to them biosafety immediately raised issues 
around food and environmental safety. On the other hand, scientists in the laboratories were 
not only worried about the safety of the products of their research, but their ‘human safety’ 
while they carried out their research procedures. Biosafety thus elicited different 
interpretations, and the research was conceived and it proceeded with these variations in 
mind. Indeed, the aim of the research was to capture these different views and perspectives, 
using as uniform an approach and research instrument as possible in order to ensure 
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comparability of results. The research thus had to achieve a fine balance between following 
research traditions and being innovative.  
 
Apart from the challenge of same words or terms eliciting different meanings, the research 
also faced the challenge of different words which policy actors used in their daily discourses 
to mean one and the same thing. For example, there were many terms used to denote or imply 
the desire by countries to work collectively in dealing with the challenges posed by 
biotechnology. Terms such as collaboration, cooperation, integration, rationalisation, 
coordination, levelling-the-field and harmonisation, among many others, were used 
frequently and often interchangeably (Chapter 7 takes a closer look at these issues). The 
challenge for this research was to try and capture these terms in the questionnaire and in the 
discussions, and at the same time appreciate and understand the practical meanings and 
implications of each of these terminologies. It was also quite sobering to realise that some of 
the terms were used by stakeholders to maintain currency with prevailing ‘buzzwords’ 
especially among the donor communities. One respondent from a regional biodiversity 
programme cautioned;  
 
‘‘You have to be very careful and to be sure that people mean and do what they say. 
You can be sent on a wild goose chase! There are people and organisations who use 
certain terms just to please donors while on the ground they have a different work 
ethic altogether. How many organisations have you heard claiming to be stakeholder-
driven, bottom-up and so forth? Even these desires about harmonisation or 
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convergence … one needs to see how they are reflected in national documents in 
order to judge the commitment of countries to the ideal’
65
[Ngo1 (R), July, 2007]. 
 
An analysis of major national and regional documents on biosafety revealed that indeed the 
desire for cooperation or collaboration was expressed66. However, different terminology was 
used to refer to the same aspirations, and whether or not this was again the result of an 
influence from the ‘donor’ community, was unclear in many cases. The researcher took the 
presence of these terms to mean that countries and the region were indeed pursuing the 
convergence agenda (or however this desire may be denoted!), and the challenge still 
remained how this was being facilitated by the three supranational organisations. 
Convergence on terminology was probably one of the many pieces that needed to come 
together in the quest for convergence in regulatory practices. A leading figure in one of the 
supranational organisations even suggested a study to trace the evolution of some of the 
current terminology, and how they had impacted on delivery of processes on the ground. The 
term ‘biosafety’ itself was suggested as one whose development needed to be unbundled.  
What was clear from these encounters and descriptions was that issue framing had an impact 
on the delivery of programmes on the ground, with some framings serving as more effective 
rallying points than others. The research and the results analysis took cognisance of these 
realities, and also the variations of these realities across countries and organisations. 
 
 
                                                
65 The challenge of some approaches being reduced to mere rhetoric, and in some cases being even used for 
manipulative purposes has been written about by many authors. For example Samuel Hickey and Giles Mohan 
in their book ‘Participation: From Tyranny to Transformation? - Exploring New Approaches to Participation in 
Development’ analyse these issues, and also propose how participation can be used to result in genuinely 
transformative processes and outcomes.   
66 For example in missions and mandates for AU, SADC, NEPAD and other regional bodies 
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5.7 Concluding remarks 
This chapter started the process of unveiling empirical data on the multiple contexts of the 
regional setting in which the results presented in the ensuing sections were generated. Some 
of the key issues presented in the earlier chapters and confirmed in this chapter are the 
presence of relentless micro- and macro-contexts which have both direct and indirect bearing 
on policy making broadly, and policy convergence specifically; contexts made up of 
individual, organisational and national actors all with different interests, knowledge, power 
and values among other dimensions. The importance of recognising and understanding these 
multiple contextual realities is that it brings a closer understanding of the bounded rationality 
surrounding the policy choices made by individuals, organisations and countries in the 
region, and the uneven terrain in which the SNOs are trying to encourage similar cross-
national policy responses. In other words, the context determines both feasibility and extent 
of accomplishment of what is feasible, through dictating resources needed, among other 
dimensions. With respect to the conceptual framework for this study, the context determines 
the feasibility and extent to which the SNOs can deploy various mechanisms for moving 
policy innovations across different boundaries. The thesis proceeds now with a data-driven 
presentation and analysis of stakeholders’ narrations on the roles of the SNOs and the extent 
to which convergence has happened. This presentation is very much rooted in the stakeholder 
accounts as the researcher avoided ‘globalising the regional story too much’, as cautioned by 
the respondents. Further elucidation of the narrations and interpretation from established 
theoretical perspectives will be accomplished in the last three chapters.  
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CHAPTER 6: STAKEHOLDER VOICES ON THE EMERGING CONVERGENCE  
  AND MECHANISMS  
 
‘For every member of a given political community, that is, in any collective where 
people participate in decisions, some kind of story is told about the role of actors and 
of collective action in shaping how important things get done’ (Considine, 2005: 10). 
 
6.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the context in which the efforts towards convergence were 
studied, discussing and emphasising that this context determines the ways in which the SNOs 
impact on the spread of policy innovations within the region. Proceeding from there, the 
focus of this current chapter is to present stakeholder narrations on various aspects of 
convergence. Availing empirical evidence has been admitted by various authors as 
highlighted in previous chapters to be not easy, particularly because convergence is vexed 
and muddled with various normative connotations. The limited attempts to operationalise this 
concept in the mainstream literature make the concept more complicated, making the availing 
of evidence of convergence a difficult process. This chapter will look at the emerging 
processes towards convergence of biosafety systems in the region and the convergence 
realised, mainly based on the accounts of the various policy actors interacted with during the 
course of the research and observation of the policy processes in the region67. The 
components that will be looked at in establishing the status of policy convergence include 
policy scope, policy objectives and institutional arrangements, and a number of other aspects 
that emerged from the research. The relationship between the emerging convergence and the 
national systems and regional goals will also be investigated and discussed. Most 
importantly, and in line with the desire to avoid a ‘disappearance of the circumstances [of the 
                                                
67 Chapter 7, focuses on the motivations behind these stakeholder narrations  
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region] within the preferred global context’ as bemoaned by stakeholders, this chapter adopts 
a narrative approach built upon responses to questions and themes developed throughout the 
study. The empirical evidence presented in this chapter will be analysed in subsequent 
chapters with guidance from the Busch and Jorgens typology, bringing out how the three 
supranational organisations have influenced the policy processes. 
 
6.1 The Stakeholders 
The majority of respondents to both the semi-structured and the questionnaire-led interviews 
were scientists from within the region, followed by staff from the three SNOs, and other 
regional organisations. The other respondents were as presented earlier, and as detailed in 
Appendix 3.  Figure 3 below shows the distribution of respondents who responded to the 
second questionnaire (Appendix 2).  
 
Fig. 3: Distribution of questionnaire respondents to questionnaire #2 
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In addition, there was a more or less equal distribution with respect to which of the three 
SNOs they worked most closely with, as shown in fig 4 below:   
 
Further, and as shown above, a roughly equal proportion of respondents did not have close 
working links with any of the three organisations, and this was envisaged to give a fairly 
representative sample of views around the collective situation facing the countries and the 
perspective on the organisations under focus.  
 
6.2 Feasibility of convergence 
The investigation into the feasibility of convergence looked at different levels of institutional 
arrangements, policy and other dimensions, and observed as well as sought stakeholder input 
on their assessment of the cross-national convergence agenda. The look at different levels of 
institutional and policy dimensions was motivated by the definition of convergence as agreed 
on by many scholars, which looks at convergence as ‘increasing similarity in structures, 
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processes and performances’ (e.g. Bennett, 1991). While this study was interested in 
increased similarity of policies and regulatory systems at cross-national level, the sub-
national levels were seen, and confirmed by respondents to be crucial if convergence was to 
happen at the cross-national level. The level of convergence or coherence (or their direction 
towards such) within the sub-national policy and regulatory structures was argued to have a 
huge bearing on the feasibility of convergence at the higher level. One respondent from a 
regional technology and policy studies institute in East Africa underscored this need for 
convergence at the sub-national level, especially looking at different government sectors that 
have a stake in the technology and its regulation, and had suggestions on how this could be 
done: 
 
‘It is important for regulatory agencies or sector ministries to work towards 
convergence of biotechnology/ biosafety policies at the national level. Convergence 
or harmonization at the national level would enhance opportunities for cooperation 
and convergence on matters of biosafety at the sub-regional level. Countries should 
establish inter-ministerial (Agriculture, Science and Technology, Environment, Trade 
etc) task forces to coordinate and ensure coherence in biotechnology/biosafety 
policies’ [Res12 (OR), Mar 2007).  
 
This ‘charity begins at home’ thrust [quoting Res21 (S)] was supported by many other 
respondents, with staff in the supranational organizations and other regional bodies pointing 
out how difficult it was to work with countries that were having coordination problems in 
their own national systems. This was said to result in a magnification of the coordination 
costs at regional level (cf. Jordan and Halpin, 2006), since the problems within the national 
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systems ‘would not suddenly disappear when the discussion is elevated to regional level’ 
[quoting Res21 (S)].  
 
Some respondents even chose to look beyond the sub-national coherence/convergence. While 
admitting that this was a threat to the desired cross-national convergence, an even bigger 
threat was highlighted to be the different levels of development and implementation at which 
the national systems were. These national systems were the direct inputs for the regional 
process, and while they may be underpinned by fragmented national systems, it was better to 
have them in all countries, than not to have them at all in some countries, yet still expecting a 
regional regulation platform to emerge. As one consultant with a regional biosafety 
programme observed: 
 
‘‘At cross-national level, attaining convergence will be more difficult as countries are 
at different levels of development and reform of their national systems.  For example, 
while SADC guidelines exist and were developed through a collective multi-country 
effort, there is still a lot of individualism … meaning, countries still focus on their 
national weaknesses … and this has a direct effect on convergence in the truest 
sense” [Res8 (R), Jul 2006]. 
  
Still others were of the opinion that through epistemic influence, convergence at the sub-
national level could follow convergence at the higher level. This assumption of rational 
action is however disputed by some stakeholders who feel that ‘nothing can be taken for 
granted or expected to just follow’ [e.g. Res12 (OR), Mar 2007]… and they attribute this to 
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the complexity of the policy arena. Yet others underscored the importance of convergence at 
all levels, since, as a system ‘the structures put in place in the vertical continuum from 
individuals and organisations all the way to the regional level would only be as strong as the 
weakest link’ [Res2 (S), Oct 2006] in line with general systems theory. However, the 
unavailability of adequate human and final resources to deal with all levels adequately and 
effectively remained a hindrance to the holistic approach, which would be ideal, all things 
being equal. Figure 5 is a graphical representation of the stakeholder opinions on the 
feasibility of convergence at the different levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Stakeholder opinions on feasibility of convergence at different levels 
   
Taking together the opinions indicating high and medium feasibility (although these results 
were not subjected to statistical analyses to measure the significance of the differences) the 
weighted responses (in brackets) show that each level was considered important as a 
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According to one international consultant [Res24 (OR)] who has worked extensively on 
biosafety issues in Africa tackling policy issues at these different levels concurrently was 
feasible provided ‘the right approach is employed’ . He proposed one of the right approaches 
to be ‘ensuring an even spread of resources and stakeholders in the policy arena, so that 
there is no concentration of all efforts at some preferred policy targets’, notably the target on 
different sectors within government departments. He further suggested that this could be one 
role that the SNOs could take up in the region. 
 
6.3 How should convergence take place? 
Another cluster of questions solicited stakeholder views on how convergence should happen 
or had taken place within the burgeoning regional context. Based on prior literature search 
and results of the pilot study, a number of convergence mechanisms were given to the 
respondents as options, while they also had the leeway to give different responses from the 
options given.  
 
By far the greatest number of respondents indicated that convergence should take place 
voluntarily. Countries should be free to adopt policy models or other practices according to 
how they saw these fitting into their own systems. It was underscored that sovereignty was a 
key consideration among countries, and having the choice to decide on the suitable policy 
innovations would also ensure that the emerging systems were owned by the stakeholders, 
and therefore more likely to be sustainable. A respondent from a regional technology and 
policy studies organisation had this to say on this issue: 
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‘‘For political reasons and concerns to do with national sovereignty, convergence 
should be based on voluntary adoption of models. Issues to do with biosafety are 
complex and sensitive. While countries can agree on common guidelines or 
procedures for a region or a sub-region, the ultimate decision to enforce the same 
rests with national governments on a case-by-case basis. Some countries may decide 
to adopt and enforce minimum agreed guidelines for convergence while others may 
decide to exceed what has been agreed upon. For instance, the biosafety guidelines 
and regulations of Tanzania on LMOs for food, feed or processing exceed the 
minimum standards stipulated by the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety’’ [Res12 (OR), 
Mar 2007]. 
 
This leeway to exceed or operate at set minimum standards would certainly present a 
challenge to the convergence agenda, according to those who preferred imposition of models 
[e.g. Res5 (R), Apr 2007] further arguing this would circumvent the task of balancing 
between ensuring national choice and sovereignty, and the attainment of the desired regional 
goals. They also further argued that countries had different learning capabilities, and what 
they would learn and adopt from the available options would inevitably be different 
especially if there was no guidance (cf. Stone, 2000). Still some respondents argued that the 
similarity in systems that had been realised so far had been a result of voluntary adoption of 
different models among the different countries, and that, given the largely uniform policy 
challenges that the countries faced, there was a high chance that the countries even on a 
voluntary basis would adopt good and effective models uniformly [Pmk5 (R), Sep 2006]. 
This was in line with the conventional convergence thesis which states that through a process 
of increased growth among the lagging countries, and the converse for leading countries, 
 146
problem pressures will result in similarity (Tinbergen, 1961). Thus, instead of pointing out 
voluntary learning as the reason behind persistent policy differences, some pro-voluntary 
convergence policy makers mentioned imposition of models would still not work as long 
there were no suitable policy models to impose.  
 
Fig 6 below summarises the stakeholder responses on how convergence should take place. 
 
   
Clearly, voluntary adoption of models was the preferred approach, and there was virtually no 
one in favour of uncoordinated responses to the policy pressure. The different learning 
capacities at national and sub-national levels were again cited as a major hindrance to the 
effectiveness of such an approach. This challenged the assumption of rational-learning which 
seemed to dominate most of the thinking behind feasibility of cross-national regulatory 
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and the adoption mechanism being the critical issue. It was also interesting to observe that 
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while generally there was no marked variation based on respondents’ professions or 
organisational affiliation with respect to the preferred mechanism, one scientist had a 
different opinion, emphatically pointing out that: 
 
‘‘Convergence of biosafety/biotechnology policies can only happen through 
imposition of models by those who have resources. It is almost impossible for leaders 
of two sovereign countries to bring about cross-national convergence when they are 
left to choose what they want, because they will each revert to their original 
positions. And, looking at it from another angle, this voluntary learning has been 
happening all these years, and nothing tangible has been achieved. So, why not 
change approaches, especially for this technology where the polarisation may mean 
that learning points continue to differ’’ [Res5 (R), Apr 2007].   
 
The need for new approaches was echoed by many respondents throughout the study, 
particularly scientists who felt policy makers were using the same old approaches when 
rationality called for new approaches given the dynamism of the technology and the various 
levels where it had an impact. The researcher noted that policy actors might also have 
reached saturation levels in their learning especially given that in most of the countries, there 
were only a handful of the policy actors working on these issues, in addition to the many 
other issues that they also had to deal with on a continuous basis (cf. Court and Maxwell, 
2005; on bridging research and policy). One lesson from these responses, and an issue that 
was reiterated by many respondents, was the importance of getting the process right, i.e. 
owned and/or supported by the affected policy constituencies, if convergence was to be 
achieved.  
 148
6.4 From process to output 
The inquiry on the preferred convergence mechanisms addressed above was investigating 
how the convergence had been or would be achieved, and it was closely linked to another 
cluster of questions which was investigating the preferred end product of these processes. 
Three options were provided, i.e., whether the resultant converged position/systems should 
be voluntary standards, legally-binding standards, or a mixture of the two. Surprisingly, 
while with regard to the process there was a preference for voluntary adoption, the majority 
of the respondents preferred legally-binding standards at the end of the processes. A lot of 
questions arise with respect to how this then would become feasible given the importance of 
choice as underscored in the responses to preferred mechanisms. The main arguments were, 
however, that when countries had attained the similar systems through the voluntary route, 
they fully owned the results of the process and were committed to the implementation. 
Making the results legally-binding would help in making countries stick to their 
commitments, and in safeguarding the regional agenda from the expected fluctuations at 
national level.  
 
However, there were proponents too for voluntary standards, and for a mixture of the two, 
and these both sought to accommodate the choice and sovereignty that countries were 
entitled to. Those in favour of voluntary standards also pointed out the absence of regulatory 
authority within the three SNOs, and how this had to be taken into consideration in 
developing the systems. Derek Beach (2005: 17) refers to this lack of regulatory authority as 
‘providing informal leadership or informal entrepreneurship’ in his argument that EU 
institutions matter in the European integration process.  The leadership provided by the 
institutions helped parties collectively deal with impediments to achieving common gains, 
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and the same sentiments were shared in this study by those who saw space for voluntary 
standard-setting championed by the SNOs. In addition, they further argued that once 
countries had voluntarily become part of the converged systems, there was no need to then 
compel them to adhere to the results of the process. The following responses capture the 
divided argumentations on the three positions: 
 
For voluntary standards (from a researcher in a regional technology and policy studies 
centre) 
 
“It is unlikely that legally binding standards would permit convergence. Anything to 
do with harmonizing laws has to go through the legislative arm (parliament) of 
national governments. The process of enacting new laws or revising existing ones can 
be slow or rigid in most cases.  In this regard, agreeing on legally binding standards 
among countries in the SADC region would be elusive and challenging” [Res12 
(OR), Oct 2006]. 
 
For legally-binding standards (an environmental lawyer with a regional coalition of 
environmentalists) 
 
“Legally-binding standards on biosafety and biotech create legitimacy and 
predictability rather than loose policy documents that only reflect statements of 
interest. This means creating a legal framework that establishes institutional 
arrangements, legal remedies or creates legal duties and obligations at both national 
and regional levels” [Ngo8 (OR), Jul 2007].  
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For a mixture of the two (international consultant on biosafety based in the EU) 
 
“A combination of the two would probably work best. Experience in biosafety and 
other sectors in the EU (e.g. regional seed or pesticide policies) tells us that 
standards will need legal enforcement, in addition to relying on the goodwill of the 
countries” [Res24 (OR), Jul 2007]. 
 
These different opinions only served to highlight the various levels of tension around this 
issue, and how crucial flexibility would be in the processes towards attaining convergence, 
and in the implementation of the emerging systems. A continuous review of the systems 
would also be necessary to ensure that the systems remained relevant (cf. Young, 2005). 
Meanwhile, Chapter 7 will trace some of the understandings on these processes and outputs, 
making reflections on their likely impact on mechanisms towards convergence.  
 
6.5 Who is best placed to steer the convergence process? 
Stakeholders’ opinions were also sought regarding who was bringing what to the 
convergence agenda, and in the final analysis seeking an indication of who was best placed to 
champion the convergence process. Options of different actors were given based on the 
stakeholders identified in the policy arena and the various roles they were playing. The 
importance of embedding the policy processes within the countries of the region was 
underscored, bringing out again the importance of having countries owning the process and 
the products from the process. The majority of the respondents indicated that government 
departments in the various countries should play a leading role within their countries, and in 
taking the issues to the regional agenda table. This would give the processes the much needed 
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political and legal backing which would take the processes forward. It was underscored that 
the collective dilemma facing the countries needed the political backing of the national 
governments for a feasible solution to be found. Therefore, while scientific institutions, 
NGOs and other knowledge bodies were needed, the legitimacy that government institutions 
brought was seen as paramount, confirming what Court and Maxwell (2005) found in their 
analysis of the gap between policy and research in developing countries, where a weakness in 
one of the components affected the entire process. On the other hand, the bureaucratic 
processes of government departments were bemoaned, and the need for a holistic approach 
was underscored. The fact also that most of the cross-national learning and experience-
sharing had been spearheaded by these same government departments with little results was 
seen as an indication that new approaches were needed [Res5 (R) April 2007]. Also, in terms 
of capacity, government departments were invariably weak, and their perennial tensions with 
other players were also seen not to be helping the situation (cf. Court and Maxwell, 2005).  
How best to move this agenda forward seemed therefore to be another of those many 
different levels where a negotiated approach needed to be arrived at, and reviewed 
continuously to keep all interests amply covered. Maxwell Taylor (2005) talks about ‘the 
need to balance persistence and opportunism, sticking to an issue long enough to make a 
difference … and being prepared to present the issue in new ways’. Two researchers from 
regional NGOs had the following to say: 
One … 
“The national governmental institutions, including biotechnology and science 
research centres should be at the forefront in steering the linkages. This is because 
they will be expected to implement the legal and policy provisions once they are in 
place. Civil society and the other partners should only play a supportive role in 
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achieving the convergence of these policies. The private sector is part of the equation, 
but in most cases, it brings a negative value”
68
 [Ngo8 (OR), Jul 2007]. 
 
The other … 
“The reason why national governmental institutions are best placed is because of the 
adoption and implementation.  If the convergence is brought about by donors or civil 
society organisations, it will be an uphill task to get it adopted and implemented into 
anything legally binding” [Ngo2 (OR), Oct 2006]. 
 
The supranational bodies were also said to have a special role right from the start because of 
the political clout that they wielded which should help in bringing the different stakeholder 
interests together, as one scientist at a university indicated.  
 
“Sub-regional organizations such as SADC are well placed to steer convergence 
because of political clout and the confidence that member states have in them. The 
potential for such organizations to mobilize both financial and technical resources is 
also relatively high”  [Res14 (R ), Oct 2006].     
 
On this question, it was interesting to observe the near-consensus with regard to who was 
preferred for steering the process. There was very little of the pulling-towards-my-
institution69 mentality. Most stakeholders emphasised the important role played by politics in 
getting the policy processes to move, and for their outputs to be effective. The politics, it was 
                                                
68 Referring to the negatively-viewed profit motive of companies, especially multinational companies 
69 My own emphasis 
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underscored, needed to be informed by the various constituencies around the issue, so that an 
informed and trusted leadership emerged to spearhead the process.  
 
6.6 What has converged so far? 
The study further sought stakeholders’ opinions on the level and type of convergence that 
had been attained to date within the given context and realities. As with the other clusters of 
questions, a number of options were presented to the respondents, based on the composition 
of a biosafety system, and an analysis of stakeholder responses in the pilot studies and the on-
going study. The extent of convergence within the following structures was investigated; 
entire systems, entire policies, regulations only, policy scope and objectives only or 
institutional arrangements only. Respondents also had the option to indicate if none of these 
had converged, and to indicate alternative levels where they felt convergence had occurred.  
 
The respondents were almost in complete agreement that there had not been any convergence 
in the entire systems, or in entire policies. Policy scopes and objectives and institutional 
arrangements, and to some extent regulations were said to have converged. The trend seemed 
to reflect increasing complexity of the structures, and the level of use within the countries. 
Most countries were preoccupied with putting in place regulations and institutional 
arrangements in which these would operate, and then policies and entire systems later. This 
paid credence to the observation by some respondents that the practice had to be in place to 
influence what was achievable in the convergence dimension [Res8 (R) Jul, 2006; Pmk7 (R), 
Jul 2006 and Mtg2, Oct 2006]. The active engagement by most countries in setting up 
institutional arrangements and developing regulations was thus seen as one reason why there 
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had been some appreciable level of similarity in the emerging structures. Figure 7 below is a 
pictorial summation of the stakeholder responses on what had converged so far: 
 
As shown above, there were no positive opinions on entire systems having converged, and 
this also correlated with the envisaged feasibility of attaining this as discussed earlier. The 
amount of resources needed to attain this, vis-à-vis the sovereignty and choice dimensions 
from countries made this level difficult to attain and sustain. The development trajectory 
followed by most of the countries seemed to put having entire systems at the end of the 
continuum, and convergence of the same would thus only start getting visible when activity 
intensified at that level. The fragmented approach by the different bodies trying to help 
countries develop their systems was also blamed for the limited holistic approach and impact. 
A respondent from a regional NGO had the following to say on this scenario, emphasising 
the importance of the bigger socio-economic context in each jurisdiction;  
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“Arguments have been presented on the complexity of converging entire policies. 
Whilst convergence of regulations and some methodological processes is possible at 
different levels, converging policies across sectors and across countries is 
complicated mainly by the fact that policies are set to address the socio-economic 
agendas/needs of the specific entity” [Ngo4 (R), Mar 2007]. 
 
Even the guidelines on transboundary movement of GMOs developed by the SADC after the 
2002/03 food aid crisis in the region also addressed only specific components of the system 
(how to handle GM-food imports), and this reflected a realisation of the complexities of 
dictating policies from a regional position; as one researcher with a regional policy studies 
institute in East Africa pointed out: 
 
“In 2002, the SADC Council of Ministers of Agriculture directed the SADC 
Secretariat to establish a SADC Advisory Committee on Biotechnology and Biosafety 
(SACBB). The Committee produced “SADC Guidelines on GMOs, Biotechnology and 
Biosafety”, covering specific areas of convergence for handling of food aid, including 
regulations, capacity building and public awareness & participation” [Res12 (OR), 
Mar 2007]. 
This realistic approach was said to be crucial if attainment of convergence was to be feasible.   
 
6.7 How has the convergence happened? 
The next set of questions investigated how the convergence described above had happened, 
looking specifically at the mechanisms that were operational and the facilitating factors. As 
with the other questions, a number of options were given to the respondents, based on earlier 
 156
analysis of the forces and mechanisms at play in the context. Respondents’ views were 
sought on the operation of the following mechanisms; imposition of practices by 
organisations, experience-sharing and linkages among countries, training and workshopping, 
resource-provision by donors & development partners, provision of models, leadership and 
influence by leading countries, uncoordinated learning; and any other mechanisms. The 
following graph captures the stakeholder responses on this issue: 
 
Training and workshopping, experience-sharing and linkages among countries and resource 
provision by donors and development partners were the three mechanisms that were rated 
highly with respect to their influence on the convergence agenda. What these three factors 
have in common is that they were availing resources for policy processes to take place, 
leading to an alleviation of one of the biggest challenges facing the region; i.e. lack of 
financial and technical capacity to deal with the issues. Leadership and influence by leading 
countries was also said to have played a significant role, and this reflected the trust that 
countries and organisations had in players from the region, as opposed to leadership and 
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influence from outside the region. There were, however, some fluctuations in this trust, and 
some respondents (mainly those from government departments) attributed this to what they 
termed ‘pursuit of borrowed agendas’ [Pmk4 (R), Oct 2006] by some of the leading countries 
and organisations. South Africa was specifically mentioned for having a ‘commercial thrust’ 
[Res8 (R), Jul 2006], which was not at the same pace with that of other countries in the 
region. In particular, the active involvement of the private sector in the development of the 
SA regulatory system was mentioned, with one respondent from a regional coalition of 
environmental advocates alluding to this in his wide-ranging response: 
 
“Many workshops and experience-sharing forums have taken place since the biotech 
debate started and this has resulted in exchange of experiences towards adopting 
common strategies, practices and regulatory frameworks in the SADC and AU. These 
processes have also been driven by resources from donors. The private sector, 
especially some companies in South Africa have also played a significant role in that 
country, though civil society viewed this from a negative perspective” [Ngo8 (OR), 
Jul 2007].  
 
Meanwhile, the different learning capabilities of the countries in the face of the different 
knowledge sources on the issue were reflected by the low points scored by factors such as 
uncoordinated learning and provision of models. Imposition of practices by powerful 
organisations was also rated lowly, but in the final analysis, it was clear that every 
factor/mechanism had made or had potential to make a contribution towards the attaining 
convergence. While countries preferred voluntarism, there was room for operation of all the 
other mechanisms and factors, pointing to the complexity of the context and the challenge of 
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attaining the desired convergence. Further reference to the motivations behind this and more 
is given in Chapter 8. Meanwhile, it was reiterated by one policy analyst based at a UK 
university that overlaps and blurring of boundaries between activities of different 
organisations also needed to be taken into account in trying to parcel out the contribution of 
the different mechanisms and factors [Res20 (OR), Apr 2007]. It was also true that a single 
organisation or policy player could be associated with different mechanisms in space and 
time, with some fluctuations happening as a result of efforts by these organisations to 
position themselves strategically to make the best contribution to the processes.  
 
6.8 Assessing the organisations 
With the emerging convergence having been assessed, the next level was to try and pick out 
the contribution of the three supranational organisations in bringing about the convergence. 
Respondents were asked to assess which of the three organisations was best-placed to steer 
the countries of SADC towards convergence, based on criteria encompassing factors such as 
relevance of mandate, resource endowment, technical and human capacity to deliver and 
clarity of procedures. From these assessments, respondents were then asked to give an overall 
picture of who had contributed the most, while the researcher also used results of the ratings 
on the different issues to develop a clearer picture of the contribution of the different 
organisations in the issue. The following three graphs depict how the three bodies were rated 
on the issues indicated: 
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The African Union was rated highly on reach and influence and this was not surprising given 
the political legacy and mandate of the organisation. However, there were questions on the 
AU’s flexibility and clarity of operational procedures with many respondents claiming 
ignorance on how the organisation functioned, and bemoaning its reliance on donor 
assistance, especially for its technical programmes, of which biosafety was one. There was a 
feeling that this left the organisation vulnerable to external influences, the same which would 
then be passed on to countries of the continent.  Not surprisingly, the organisation rated 
relatively lower on resource endowment and capacity to deliver. 
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NEPAD was rated proportionally higher on all the issues, especially resource-endowment 
which respondents felt the organisation could exploit both to enhance its influence on the 
region and to help countries mobilise resources for their programmes. NEPAD programmes 
were implemented mainly through regional economic communities (RECs), and respondents 
argued this would endear the organisation to the SADC countries only to some extent. The 
persistent and potentially negative effect of the nationalistic perspective would be countered 
effectively only by dealing directly with the national aspirations. On the other hand, the 
newness of the organisation was seen as a positive factor in the policy arena by some 
respondents, while some felt the organisation was getting more publicity than what its impact 
on the ground merited. The following comments by two respondents from regional NGOs 
capture this dichotomy: 
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One …  
“As a new initiative, NEPAD can tackle the new challenges related to biotechnology 
and ensuring harmonization of the policy frameworks without running into the 
bureaucracies of the established organisations” [Ngo8 (OR), Jul 2007]. 
 
The other … 
 
“At international level this organisation (NEPAD) is considered as the most active 
and appropriate one for steering the process (because, for example, most resources 
from international donors are channelled through NEPAD) and yet on the ground 
there are only a few activities and even these are at what I would call very academic 
research levels. The channels of communication with the stakeholders are not clear 
hence they are not visible at regional level” [Ngo4 (R), Mar 2007]. 
 
The need for the organisation and its programmes to be understood clearly and to be more 
visible to the stakeholders was clear from the latter statement. NEPAD also had greater links 
with the former respondent’s organisation hence the respondent appeared to have a clearer 
picture of how it (NEPAD) operated. These differences were taken as realities that happen in 
any policy arena, and that such realities could affect efforts by different actors in the policy 
arena to develop effective synergies. They will be discussed in more detail in chapter 8.  
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Fig 11: Views on SADC 
SADC is the regional economic community for the 14 countries of southern Africa whose 
systems the three SNOs were trying to converge. The organisation was rated very highly with 
respect to relevance of mandate and reach & influence, and this was in no way surprising 
given the organisation’s closer and more specific focus on the region, when compared with 
the other organisations whose mandates are continental. The following responses from a 
researcher in a regional policy analysis network, and a director for a regional NGO 
respectively capture this sentiment: 
First … 
“The mandate of SADC is cross-cutting and therefore issues to do with convergence 
of biotechnology/biosafety policies should be seen as part and parcel of the SADC 
activities and interventions. The human and technical capacity of SADC to deliver 
might be low but experts can be drawn from various scientific and policy institutions 
in the member states. SADC as a sub-regional body made up of several Member 
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States enjoys significant political clout and influence. Various policy organs of 
SADC, for instance, the Council of Ministers or the Heads of State Summit are 
powerful decision making bodies. The flexibility to make decisions or adjust to 
changes swiftly might be lacking because a common understanding and in some cases 
consensus among Member States has to be reached” [Res12 (OR), Mar 2007]. 
 
Second … 
 
“In southern Africa, SADC is the most appropriate institution to steer the process, 
although there is no specific mandated office to deal with biosafety issues and no 
resources specifically allocated to the process and hence the issue seems confined to 
peripheral levels”.70 [Ngo4 (R), Mar 2007]. 
 
However, in contrast to the high ratings on mandate and influence, and as mentioned in the 
responses cited above, there were some question marks over the organisation’s resource 
endowment, capacity to deliver and flexibility.  The three were all said to revolve around the 
issue of resources, especially the limited commitment of resources to technical programmes 
by the organisation. As with the AU, there was a heavy reliance on external funding, to the 
extent that the much-touted Advisory Committee on Biotechnology and Biosafety, and the 
multi-country fact-finding mission which preceded it only happened through donor funding, 
and had to end prematurely when the funding ended71. This notwithstanding, looking at the 
broader developmental issues on the continent, championing of the convergence agenda by 
SADC falls in line with the RECs-led development paradigm being talked about in the two 
                                                
70 Highlights the need to fill this gap in regulatory capacity with ‘leadership and influence’ … see Beach, 2005 
71 The SACBB activities were rekindled in November 2007 
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other SNOs and other bodies on the continent. And as one scientist from a scientific and 
industrial research body echoed “the SADC should do this (steering the convergence) with 
help and support from the other two bodies” [Res18 (R)]. However, getting the three bodies 
and the whole multiplicity of players to work together was a tall challenge given the different 
competition dimensions overarching their relations, not least the struggle for financial 
resources and the quest for recognition. 
   
On the question of who had contributed the most to the convergence, an aggregation of the 
responses yielded the following 
picture:
 
Fig 12: Opinions on which SNO has contributed the most to policy convergence in the  
 SADC 
 
Most respondents indicated that SADC had contributed the most to the convergence of 
biosafety systems in the region. This was mainly through the guidelines developed by the 
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SACBB, and various workshops and experience-sharing platforms that were held under the 
auspices of the SADC since discussions on regulation of modern biotechnology started in the 
1990s. These were more suited to the needs of the region, compared to the activities 
organised by the other two SNOs, which were not only few, but were more generic and 
designed to address continent-wide challenges. However, while this was the overall picture, 
there was recognition that there were many confounding factors, for example, the RECs-led 
development agenda which had meant that some discussions on biosafety initiated by the 
other two bodies were taken to southern Africa through SADC structures. An example was 
given of some discussions of the African Model Law on Safety in Biotechnology, an AU 
initiative, which were held in SADC-led workshops [Res1 (S) Jul 2007]. There were also 
some NGOs which had done some work in the region, and whose contribution some 
respondents could not separate from that of the three SNOs. However, all issues taken 
together, the need for a coordinated and consistent convergence agenda was said to be more 
important for the region; as one respondent, an international consultant on biosafety summed 
up; 
 
“All three have done significant work in the area of biosafety and biotechnology. 
However, a consistent, continuous effort does not seem to emerge yet. In addition, 
convergence among regional and subregional organizations will be required to 
ensure that efforts are not scattered and uncoordinated (as at present)” [Res24 (OR), 
Jul 2007].  
 
The need to recognise and take stock of the various convergence efforts was also 
underscored, and was seen as one way towards getting more stakeholder commitment to the 
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agenda through recognition and institutionalisation of their efforts. A respondent from one of 
the SNOs recognised the many other players and the need to pool all efforts together; 
 
“Many organisations have proposed convergence of biosafety/biotech policies. 
However in my opinion the issue at hand is how far these proposals have been 
implemented in national systems. Africa has yet to benefit from the various models, 
guidelines and strategies developed. Harmonization of efforts should be prioritized 
also considering the strong common positions that already exist on biosafety and 
biotechnology” [Pmk13 (S) May 2007]. 
 
The contribution of the many other actors was recognised by this research as a confounding 
factor from the start of the research. The importance of abstracting and quantifying the 
contribution of the three SNOs remained important in light of their increasing contribution to 
national and cross-national policy processes. What this research did was to unearth the 
realities and challenges facing the SNOs in the policy-making efforts, and brought to the fore 
the extra tensions they bring to the policy field, over and above the bargaining and 
knowledge-sharing power they brought to the collective situation the countries were facing.  
 
6.9 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has provided stakeholder accounts on the research theme and various aspects of 
the efforts by the three SNOs towards attaining cross-national convergence of biosafety 
systems in the SADC. Unsurprisingly, the narrations differed along many lines, for example 
along the lines of a respondent’s profession, institutional affiliation, level of technology use 
in their country among others, and predictably the levels of difference varied with the 
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different aspects of the policy issue. The different opinion shapers and the attendant 
responses form part of the context in which the convergence is envisaged to happen. It was 
important therefore that these be presented as done in this chapter to bring out and lay bare 
the issues as confronted by the SNOs and other policy champions in their endeavour to 
influence processes in the region. Among the issues that emerged from the stakeholder 
accounts, and confirming observations from the earlier contextual analyses, were the 
importance of ownership of the policy process by the stakeholders. There were however, 
multiple perspectives on how these processes should emerge and proceed, and even more 
contention on what the outputs of the processes should be. By and large, stakeholders saw a 
role in both processes and outputs for voluntary, uncoordinated and legally-binding 
approaches. The narrations also confirmed that the three SNOs had different capabilities and 
factor endowments, which they could deploy singly and/or collectively to navigate around 
the policy challenge. This thesis now proceeds with a closer look at the different 
understandings of convergence as obtained from stakeholders and from the various policy 
documents that were consulted in the data gathering process. This serves to further 
contextualize the convergence agenda, and to move towards consolidation and discussion of 
the emerging mechanisms towards bridging the various knowledge, power and interests 
boundaries with the guidance of the research framework.  
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CHAPTER 7  UNBUNDLING THE VOICES 1: Multiple understandings of  
   biotechnology policy convergence in southern Africa  
 
‘One can endeavour to show whether definitions ‘homogenise’ a problem, that is to 
say make the problem understandable within a reified perception of the wider 
problem field, or whether definitions suggest a ‘heterogenisation’ that requires an 
opening up of established discursive categories’ (Hajer, 1995: 54). 
 
7.0 Introduction 
The importance of a common understanding or definition of a problem serves as one of the 
key initial steps in the development of appropriate responses to collective-action problems 
(Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988). Yet, as revealed in the previous chapter, biosafety stakeholders 
in the SADC region had different views and opinions on various aspects of the convergence 
process, including different understandings of what convergence is. The objective of this 
chapter is to discuss the conceptual and practical meanings of policy convergence in southern 
Africa within the context of cross-national biotechnology regulation. In line with the 
overarching research question for the study which is seeking an understanding of the roles of 
three SNOs in emergence of cross-national policy similarity, this chapter presents and 
discusses, as underpinned by the context presented in earlier chapters, the possibilities of the 
different understandings giving way to a common regional understanding and transnational 
governance structure.  
 
As already alluded to, the analysis of the ways through which the three supranational 
organizations, NEPAD, AU and SADC were influencing the cross-national biotechnology 
policy convergence process in the SADC, among other issues revealed that there were 
different understandings of policy convergence within the various actor groups, and that 
these were likely to have varying impacts on the progress towards convergence. This chapter 
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advances and discusses the implications of these multiple and fluctuating understandings on 
the progress towards the potentially converged systems and on established theoretical 
perspectives within realms pertinent to policy studies such as systems, institutions, regimes, 
actor coalitions and networks.  
 
7.1 Why a look at the multiple understandings is important  
A look at the reasons for, and implications of existence of multiple interpretations of 
convergence was seen as an important component of the quest to understand the convergence 
processes given the different ways in which this issue was presented by stakeholders and in 
policy documents. This was also because from the onset, the divergent understandings and 
perspectives were seen to represent essentially why there was need for convergence in the 
first place. This is akin to the rationalist notion that ‘problems create the incentives for their 
solution’ (Haas, 2004). Like many other policy arenas, the biotechnology or biosafety arena 
has a wide range of issues and it was hardly conceivable for there to be an organization with 
the mission and resources to be able to tackle all the pertinent issues [Pmk9 (R), Mar 2007]. 
As Haas (2004) explains ‘the efficiency gains from relying on one single source of policy 
advice are more than offset by the loss of legitimacy, analytic blinders imposed by relying on 
just one institutional source … and the political doubts of bias …’. The divergent views were 
thus inevitable and represented the reality on the ground. The purpose of this analysis is to 
situate the theory and the practice within these realities in order to enable an evidence-based 
decision formulation process. One main interest was to understand how achievable the 
convergence agenda was in the backdrop of these divergent understandings, at what cost to 
the holders of the different perspectives; recognising that stakeholder pressures influence 
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policies (c.f. Chataway et al, 2006), and more pertinently for this study, what role the three 
SNOs played in navigating around these different and fluctuating understandings.   
 
7.2 Identifying the different understandings 
The different meanings associated with convergence were identified based on an analysis of 
documents from various institutions taking part in efforts towards development of converged 
systems and from the narrations by stakeholders given in Chapter 6. Analysis and 
interpretation of responses from policy makers, researchers and other stakeholders in the 
SADC region and beyond were also done. An evaluation of both the formal and informal 
discourses on biosafety and in the broader science and technology arena was carried out in 
order to gain a wider understanding of the issue. One of the main difficulties with this task 
was that in their day-to-day work on biosafety issues, stakeholders hardly referred to their 
work in convergence terms, and in some cases biosafety was not a prominent issue on the 
day-to-day policy agendas (see section 2.6). However, it was for these reasons that an 
understanding of the various conceptual and practical meanings of convergence was sought. 
As explained elsewhere, it had emerged from earlier interactions with the various 
stakeholders and operatives in the policy arena that the process employed in the drive for 
convergence was more important than the envisaged convergence itself. Issue framing, in this 
case interpretation/definition/understanding of convergence, was part of the process towards 
the desired end.   
 
7.3 The understandings emerging 
Using discussion and interview results and observations from the interactions with 
stakeholders, a compilation of different meanings or accounts of convergence was developed. 
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The understandings have been classified according to a number of factors (see Table 6) 
before a further elaboration on the issues is given. 
 
Table 6: The different understandings of convergence as observed from stakeholders  
Description Scope Main stakeholders 
behind 
understanding 
Categorization 
(Broad or 
Narrow focus) 
Organization 
where particular 
focus is 
dominant  
Output-focused
72
     
Convergence on 
biosafety and allied 
issues 
Risk 
regulation and 
technology 
development 
Scientific R&D 
institutions 
Broad focus NEPAD 
Convergence on 
biosafety only 
Risk 
regulation 
Policymakers, food 
relief agencies/civil 
society 
organizations  
Narrow focus AU, SADC 
Convergence with 
respect to risk 
assessment only 
Risk 
regulation 
Policymakers, food 
relief 
agencies/CSOs 
Narrow focus AU, SADC 
Implementation at 
regional level 
Collaboration 
with 
neighbouring 
countries 
Regional bodies, 
scientific R&D 
institutions 
Broad focus AU, NEPAD 
Implementation at 
national level 
Focusing on 
serving 
national 
interests 
Relevant 
government 
departments 
Narrow focus SADC 
 
Process-
focused
73
 
    
Co-evolution of 
technology and 
regulations 
Risk 
regulation 
Technology 
development 
Regional bodies, 
scientific R&D 
institutions, 
relevant 
government 
departments 
Broad focus NEPAD 
Convergence on 
regulations only 
Risk 
regulation 
Policymakers, food 
relief 
agencies/CSOs 
Narrow focus AU, SADC 
Involve policy 
makers only 
Focus on the 
top 
Policy makers, 
food relief 
Narrow focus SADC 
                                                
72 Referring to the policies/regulatory systems  
73 Referring to the path being followed to come up with the policies or regulatory systems  
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agencies 
Involve all key 
stakeholders 
Broad 
stakeholder 
consultation  
CSOs, some 
government 
departments 
Broad focus NEPAD 
Stepwise in 
terms of 
geographical and 
institutional 
coverage 
Structured and 
bottom-up 
focus 
Regional bodies, 
R&D institutions, 
policy advisers  
Narrow focus All three reflect this 
at certain stages 
Holistic and all-
encompassing 
approach 
through and 
through 
Combinations 
of approaches 
Regional bodies, 
R&D institutions, 
policy advisers 
Broad focus As above 
 
 The different understandings above represent various dimensions of issues around 
convergence; among them being what should converge, who should be involved in the 
processes towards convergence, where should convergence take place, how should 
convergence take place, why should convergence take place? The characterization as broad 
versus narrow or process-based versus output-based perspectives of convergence was based 
on the different opinions or responses to these clusters of questions (see chapter 6). Narrow-
focused understandings are defined as those looking at convergence of regulations only or the 
practice within the technology only, while the broader understandings cover both the 
technology, the regulations and pertinent issues in allied areas such as seed laws and 
intellectual property rights. Narrow-focused understandings also propose limited time scales 
and geographical scope with respect to feasibility of convergence. Process and output-based 
accounts, on the other hand relate to the different ways of achieving convergence (the 
process) and the resultant policy or regulatory arrangements (the outputs). Many issues 
emerge from this typology and also from the perspectives behind this representation, and 
these will be looked at more closely.  
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7.4 Further analysis of the emerging understandings 
The distinctions between the broad against narrow (or process versus output-based) accounts 
with respect to the responses to the clusters of issues above were not as clear-cut as shown 
here, and this was due to a number of reasons (cf. Carr, 2006). The following were some of 
the reasons behind the different and fluctuating framings: 
 
• Unclear understanding of terms 
On one extreme, there were policy actors who did not seem to fully understand the meanings 
of the terminologies they used and the differences between them and other related terms. One 
researcher from a scientific and industrial research and development institution in Zambia 
indicated that he ‘was confused as to whether what is required is consensus, unanimity or 
coherence …’, though he ‘felt the desired end is to have regulatory systems that speak to and 
understand each other’ [Pmk3 (R), Oct 2006].  He also bemoaned the lack of arrangements to 
introduce and equip policy actors adequately to deal with challenges in the policy innovation 
arena. This was a serious problem in some cases and one of the reasons could be what Alvin 
Weiberg observed in 1972 about scientists ‘[that] often they were asked to provide advice 
that exceeded their formal disciplinary training’ (cited by Haas, 2004). There was thus an 
issue of actors facing the challenge of moving, for example, from being policy implementers 
to being policy developers, without the necessary exposure and experience. This was 
particularly so in countries with fewer numbers of policy actors, especially smaller countries 
such as Lesotho and Swaziland. 
 
On the other extreme, there were some policy actors who got locked into certain framings 
and understandings, mainly for legitimacy reasons. This was particularly the case with 
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process-based accounts. For example, multistakeholder or participatory processes seemed to 
be the mantra for civil society-driven processes, and whether or not this brought the required 
efficiency might be quite another issue. Mark Considine (2005: 67) characterised some of 
these as ‘accepted rhetoric … or ideas in good currency’. The following observation in 
August 2006 from one coordinator of a regional biodiversity programme in the SADC 
typified this dilemma: 
 
‘‘Let’s not forget that there are two key issues here; the problems exist here, but they are 
identified (from) elsewhere, and the agenda to address them is set elsewhere too. So we 
have to comply … with the problem-packaging and the solution-packaging’’ [Ngo1 (R), 
Jul 2006]. 
 
• Rivalries and alliances 
Contested power, competence and legitimacy issues between and among institutions also led 
to some institutions and/or individuals wanting or adopting certain framings at the expense of 
others. The same was also true where institutions wanted to identify with the practices in 
another institution, to the extent of adopting similar practices. For example, NEPAD is one 
organisation whose issue framing some national organisations wanted to emulate because 
they associated this organisation with resource-endowment, ‘which enabled things to happen 
on the ground’ [e.g. Res5 (R), Apr 2007]. 
 
• Mandates and missions 
The mandates and missions of different institutions also had a major influence on how they 
framed the convergence issue, and this in turn depended on the actor coalitions around each 
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institution and the issue at hand. Fluctuations within the actor coalitions sometimes resulted 
in fluctuations in framings, and this was exacerbated by the constant movement of policy 
actors among institutions for employment purposes. Further complications on this emanated 
from the fact that the different actors were at various vertical and horizontal levels, ranging 
from institutional, sectoral and national to international levels.  
 
• Varying demands on convergence of ideas 
The level of interdependence among institutions varied considerably in space and in time, 
and this led to constant shifts in the understandings. For example, in international fora (e.g. 
negotiations and discussions under the Biosafety Protocol) institutions that were ordinarily 
rivals within the region were often compelled to present a unified agenda, and this caused a 
temporary, though sometimes permanent shift in the understanding. On the other hand, allied 
institutions could present divergent faces as a way of trying to develop some unique selling 
points for their programmes. One respondent from a biodiversity support programme in the 
SADC region indicated that; 
 
‘‘when all factors have been taken together, our agendas and the way we discern and 
implement processes is influenced more by providers of funding, than by the local policy 
communities we intend to serve … our own visions vary with those of the providers of 
funding’’ [Ngo1 (R), July 2006].  
 
• Resources 
Linked to the issue of mandates and mission, was the issue of resources for implementing 
programmes. Many institutions and programmes had to contend with a narrow remit of issues 
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because of restricted resources. Resource availability thus dictated how stakeholders or 
clusters of stakeholders should understand an issue, in the process influencing what was 
deemed feasible. On the other hand, some authors have argued that availability of resources 
could propel development towards a common pattern despite disparate politics, ideology and 
culture (McGaughey and Cieri, 1999).  
 
• Mobility of policy actors 
Then there was the issue of policy actors moving from one policy arena to another, either in 
pursuit of new employment opportunities, or as part of the routine ‘surfing’ to fill capacity 
gaps (cf. Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988). This not only led to a continual fluctuation of the 
understandings of the issue among groups of actors, but further blurred the distinctions 
between the different categorizations of understandings.  
 
• Linking back to the technology 
The scope of issue framing within the technology arena also influenced how policy 
convergence was framed. Schattschneider (1960) talked about policy entrepreneurs engaging 
in ‘venue shopping’, i.e. searching for arenas from which to frame policy problems, and that 
the policy entrepreneurs might themselves ‘limit the venues in which they set their feet’. 
Different actors might seek access to different types of venues (Pralle, 2003), and this 
illuminates how public problems are a result successful imposition of problem definitions by 
one group on others (Hajer, 1995: 54). In the SADC region, for many policy actors, biosafety 
was about safe application/use of products of modern biotechnology, while to others, it was 
about ensuring safety of all ‘biological’ products (Kelemu et al, 2003; see also section 5.6.3). 
Science and scientific knowledge were key venues in both cases, but the extent to which 
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these were explored and incorporated in the science-policy nexus differed because of the 
different levels of focus on the science. These different framings resulted in what 
Schattschneider referred to as issues being ‘organized into or out’ of politics. In the final 
analysis, this had a bearing on both the process-based and the output-based accounts of 
convergence. 
 
• Intermittent links 
For the different conceptualizations advanced, there was an intermittent relationship between 
the conceptualizations and the different stakeholder clusters and also with the respective 
regulatory systems in the different countries. This was primarily because the challenges being 
faced were introducing new shocks to the existing national systems and no stability had as 
yet been achieved.  
 
However, while the above fluctuations were acknowledged, it was clear that certain 
institution- and country-specific conditions influenced understandings towards certain policy 
positions/conceptualizations. Appreciation of these drivers was crucial for shaping 
interventions within the multi-actor arena. For example, there were institutions and countries 
which had a long tradition of being risk-averse, and always waiting for technologies to 
mature before they could take them on board, for example Zambia and Namibia [Mtg3, Nov 
2006; see also section 5.6.2]. Such countries and institutions were not surprisingly more 
towards the narrow, country- and biosafety-centric measures. From this scenario it emerged 
that a country or an institution’s capacity to create, acquire, accumulate, diffuse and utilize 
scientific knowledge also had a strong correlation with the breadth of their understanding of 
the issue, although the leadership influence of some countries and institutions may conceal 
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these shortcomings, leading to countries adopting certain policy innovations even in the 
backdrop of weak national systems (cf. Considine, 2005: 55). 
 
7.5 Impact of the multiple understandings on practice and theory 
As mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, this issue of cross-national policy convergence, 
looking specifically at biosafety in the SADC region, locks into a number of practical and 
theoretical perspectives around convergence. These include international relations, 
organizational and institutional theories, coordination theories (for example the game 
theoretic model) and systems theory, among many others. For example, taking science only 
as a policy venue, the leeway for venue shopping was likely to vary across countries, across 
other sub-national arrangements, and among policy actors (Renn, 1995), and as a result, 
many theoretical perspectives were seen to have explanatory power.  This essentially 
reflected the broad, all-encompassing and integrative nature of biotechnology/biosafety 
issues, and the various forces pitted against each other in the social construction of public 
problems. However, this analysis was narrowed down to a few perspectives given the main 
force behind these multiple understandings, i.e. the movement of actors within the policy 
arena. The understandings were also being influenced by the issue of capacity, and the 
expectations of resource inflows as well as speedy implementation of activities which were 
stimulated by how the issue was framed, and this also had a bearing on how the convergence 
mechanisms.  
7.5.1 Much room for multiple interpretations 
The definition of policy convergence as the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the 
form of increasing similarity in structures, processes and performances is in itself broad and 
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leaves room for multiple interpretations (Drezner, 2001). It is also possible that a growth in 
similarity of structures, processes and performances may not necessarily be a result of 
increasing similarity in policies, and a mere look at the superficial level may not reveal this. 
There were many terms used particularly in policy documents in the expression of the desire 
for, or explanation of, how countries or institutions were working together, which at face 
value could be interpreted to imply existence of, or desire for convergence. However, without 
impacting on the policies underpinning the processes, these understandings could not denote 
policy convergence, although they could serve as precursors for policy convergence. 
Examples here included cooperation, which is defined as the antithesis of competition, and 
where people or greater entities work in common with commonly agreed upon goals and 
possibly methods, instead of working separately in competition. Policy convergence is not a 
necessity for cooperation to happen, but in turn, cooperation may eventually lead to policy 
convergence (White, 1996: 45). Coordination is the process wherein units work together to 
achieve outcomes for shared stakeholders, quicker and more cost effectively than if they 
worked on their own, without having to change the "how" codes of any of the participating 
units. Again, this entails that policy convergence is not necessarily a precondition for this to 
happen, but it would certainly enhance the coordination (White, 1996:56).  
Other terminologies that were used by policy actors in policy discussion fora and in policy 
documents included ‘integration’, ‘joint action’, ‘rationalization’ and ‘policy coherence’. All 
these have different conceptual and practical meanings. This implies that there was a likely 
danger of stakeholders using them synonymously with desires for similar policies, which 
might lead to inappropriate methodologies being adopted towards the desired end. This 
consequently might curtail new impetus in cases where these terminologies were used in 
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conjunction with new technologies or new challenges from established technology 
(Tumushabe, 2005, AATF, 2006). 
7.5.2 Limited overlap and blind spots 
Another issue that seemed to emerge among the stakeholders as a result of these multiple 
understandings was the proverbial ‘too many cooks … spoiling the broth’74. This manifested 
itself in a number of ways, for example, some aspects within the full integrative range of 
issues around biosafety were left unattended as actors jostled to occupy arenas that attracted 
funding, and from which they could easily make an impact. One respondent was convinced 
‘this was why, for example, many organizations tended to occupy the biotech/biosafety 
information dissemination arena where it was easier to leave a mark’ [Res27 (S), Jul 2007). 
Concurrently, the same organisations would be looking around and believing that someone 
among the many players would take up the remaining issues. A number of gaps also existed 
within both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of the issue (Shaffer and Pollack, 2004). 
Often this was not because the information or other attributes to fill those gaps were not 
there, but because of a lack of obligation among the various players to take forward what the 
player at the other level (lower or higher) has done. This issue is best explained within the 
social arena of problems (cf. Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988), where multiple perspectives may 
not overlap enough to cover the issue area adequately.  
While talking about the teaching of the so-called new and ‘authentic science’ (as opposed to 
traditional science), Roth (2001) alludes to enculturation that might lead to the acquisition of 
conceptual blind spots and prejudices as a result of trying to get students ‘to do the real stuff’. 
The desire to want to ‘move with the time’ with respect to issues within the discourse on a 
                                                
74 Own emphasis 
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given issue sometimes leads to an exclusion of other key considerations, leading to poor 
delivery at the end of the day. Ray Dart75 (2006) also talks about such blinds spots in the non-
profit strategy process, where emphasis is placed on organizational and programme strategy, 
leaving out change models and intervention strategies. It is crucial that when the different 
understandings of convergence are brought together, such blind spots are minimized.  
The public arenas model on the rise and fall of social problems (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988) 
looks at the issue of stakeholders ‘jumping’ from one policy domain to another, and also how 
dramatization is crucial in getting a policy issue to attract the necessary attention in the midst 
of competing interests. These perspectives are crucial in explaining and understanding what 
is happening in the issue at hand, and in devising an appropriate way forward. In this case the 
particular challenge was on how the issues came together at regional level, bearing in mind 
that the dynamics were different from those at national level. There was what Hilgartner and 
Bosk term ‘problem amplification beyond predictable levels’. Issue novelty and policy arena 
saturation dynamics also vary as different jurisdictions are brought together. This inevitably 
leads to different understandings of the issue at hand. The public arenas model of looking at 
the rise and fall of social problems thus provides useful insights in the dynamics of framing 
the biosafety policy convergence problem. One of the key questions therefore remains how 
one dramatizes an issue which is at different agenda levels in space and time, ensuring 
consistency of meaning at the different levels.  
 
There is also a wave of expectations created around the different issue framings, for example 
those around NEPAD as mentioned earlier. A combination of the framings and the new 
technology created an even higher sense of expectation amongst the intended beneficiaries of 
                                                
75 Ray Dart, Paper Number PA061238, Trent University, Peterborough, Canada  
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the planned interventions. Expectations play a crucial role in resource mobilization and 
galvanizing actor groups (Borup et al, 2006). It was therefore important that these different 
understandings, and the expectations they elicited among stakeholders were understood, so 
that the envisaged purpose of bridging or mediating across different knowledge, power and 
interests boundaries and levels could be better managed. It was also important to note that 
some kind of a prisoner’s dilemma existed amongst the different stakeholders and the 
interpretations that they held. Stakeholders were not sure what impact their independent 
pursuit of self-interest (i.e. their framing of the issue and the attendant implementation 
mechanisms) would have on the bigger policy community of the region of which they were 
only a part (cf. section 3.2). As a result, actor communities were finding themselves 
undecided on what route to take given the various and fluctuating forces around the issue. 
Consultation among the different stakeholders and feedback on their interpretations of the 
policy process were therefore crucial in building synergies.   
 
7.5.3 Coming together  
This chapter has highlighted that what might appear to be mere differences in semantics, or 
different expressions of the same desire, may in the long run have telling impacts on how 
‘visions’ or ‘imaginings’ could be translated into tangible outputs at the policy level. In the 
final analysis, therefore the challenge was to try and understand the ways in which these 
fragmented perspectives may eventually come together towards the envisaged collective 
action. In other words, was it possible for convergence to occur in the backdrop of multiple 
understandings of convergence? This has an implication on how the convergence can be 
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achieved, and how sustainable the converged systems would be. Did the different 
understandings at some stage have to pave way for a consensus76 position?  
 
Social constructivists have shown that ‘various actors are likely to hold different perceptions 
of what the problem really is’. However, as Hajer (1995: 44) alludes to in analysis of 
discourse around environmental dilemmas, it is important to ‘understand why a particular 
understanding of the environmental problem at some point gains dominance and is seen as 
authoritative, while other understandings are discredited’. This chapter has presented and 
analysed the different ways in which the biotechnology policy convergence problem was 
presented, and the emergence of social coalitions around specific understandings. The three 
SNOs had to deal with these in influencing the emergence of a cross-national regulatory 
framework.  
 
7.6 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has argued that knowledge of the different understandings of convergence is 
crucial, and this is not for the sake of eliminating differences between these understandings, 
but in order to avail evidence of the existing realities to the policy making process in order to 
inform the responses. The prevailing understandings of policy convergence in biotechnology 
or biosafety in the SADC region hinged on a number of issues ranging from institutional 
missions and mandates, institutional and individual capacity issues, resource-related issues, 
and the ever-present challenge of legitimacy which faces institutions, processes and 
                                                
76 Consensus is a term widely used by policymakers and other actors in the region; and largely denotes being in 
complete harmony or agreement, but the difficulties of attaining this are clear from the tensions around the 
whole cross-national convergence agenda described in this thesis (e.g. the Prisoners’ Dilemma and Fallacy of 
Composition explained section 3.2).  Further work will be done to understand this concept, which Marxists 
criticize as ‘perpetuating class rule, and attempting to disguise the extent of conflict in society’. Alternative 
concepts such as accommodation, collaboration, compromise and others will be explored.    
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programmes. This discussion has looked at how these issues were at play in the SADC 
region, and how it was in the best interests of both policy actors and researchers, not least the 
SNOs, to understand the context as a way towards ensuring a better link between research 
and policy. The next chapter looks at and discusses further the motivations behind these 
understandings and the narrations on convergence as given in Chapter 6, before chapter 9 
brings all the emerging issues around ‘the whether, to what extent and how’ of convergence 
together through the lens of the Busch and Jorgen typology.  
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Chapter 8 UNBUNDLING THE VOICES 2: Motivations for and against  
  convergence of biosafety systems in the SADC 
 
‘Instead of thinking about policy as a routine engagement between certain public 
officials and a settled retinue of established interests, we are now forced to consider 
how a single system is constructed from semi-independent institutions and actors 
linked by resource agreements, joint agreements, joint projects and cross-border 
engagements  … it is really composed of pads of unequal size, each contributing to a 
characteristic policy ‘footprint’ (Considine, 2005:127). 
 
8.0 Introduction 
In the backdrop of the stakeholder accounts and understandings of convergence given in the 
last two chapters, which reveal the various practical and conceptual boundaries the SNOs had 
to deal with in influencing the cross-national policy convergence agenda, this chapter 
explores and analyses the actors’ motivations and fears around the drive towards 
convergence. These fears and motivations represent the different cognitions creating or 
emanating from the context as represented by the narrations and the understandings given in 
the last two chapters. As presented in the earlier chapters, and further argued in this chapter 
based on emerging empirical evidence, there are contending views in the region on whether 
convergence is a positive, zero or negative sum game. By analyzing who expects what from 
the convergence, how long each representation has persisted in the policy arena, among other 
aspects, this chapter sheds more light into this quandary, and further illuminates the various 
opinions captured in the last two chapters. Apart from looking at the representation of the 
issues by the different actors, this section will also look into the agreement and/or variance 
between belief and action, the responsibility dimension for the different views held, and for 
the actions needed to move processes forward. Other issues to be looked at include the 
changes in the motivations and fears as fluctuations occur within the bigger policy arena and 
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how this affects the attainment of convergence. With respect to the SNOs, categorization of 
which organization has a particular inclination will be done as a way towards uncovering the 
similarities and differences between the different players, and capturing how all these 
different motivations and fears facilitate or hinder different mechanisms for the spread of 
policies across different boundaries. 
  
8.1 Theoretical perspectives 
As given earlier, cross-national policy convergence is defined as the increase in policy 
similarity between countries over time (e.g. Bennett, 1991). Policy convergence thus 
constitutes results of a process in which countries are assumed to have moved from varying 
positions towards some common point. While knowledge that national policies have 
converged is useful, it remains silent about the motivations behind the convergence, and the 
mechanisms through which the convergence has been achieved. Therefore, among the many 
interests of this research was the illumination of the motivations for or against convergence 
among the countries of the SADC region. This chapter links the empirical evidence presented 
in previous chapters to key theoretical perspectives in highlighting and discussing these 
motivations, which emerged in discussions with stakeholders and observation of policy 
processes in the region.  
 
A number of theoretical perspectives come to the fore in this chapter in the effort to bring out 
an understanding of the different argumentations around the issue, and more importantly how 
they impact on the convergence agenda. From the onset, it emerged that the framing of issues 
in the discussions around cross-national convergence of biosafety systems mirrored the same 
hopes and fears as seen in the debates around the science of biotechnology itself. There was a 
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prominent cluster of issues around the newness of the technology, and the expectation that it 
had built across societies (see also section 3.1). Negative impacts of some of the ‘failed’ 
[Ngo6 (R), Mar 2007] promises of the technology (for example promises of increasing 
agricultural productivity and reducing hunger and poverty) were said to await its regulation. 
Past failures of the organizations being studied, and their programmes, including even other 
unrelated science and technology programmes, were all lumped together as sure-bet 
impediments to the convergence agenda. On the other hand, pro-convergence respondents 
also highlighted success scored by the technology (e.g. GM cotton in South Africa, disease 
diagnosis and therapeutic remedies, among others) and by the organizations as pointers to 
potential success of the convergence agenda. All these framings and argumentations are 
presented and analysed from a sociology of expectations in science and technology 
perspective (Borup et al, 2006). The risk colonization theory is also used, among many other 
perspectives, to illuminate the different motivations shaping the convergence discourse.  
 
8.1.1 Sociology of expectations  
Societal views on new technological developments are shaped by events and experiences that 
they have gone through in the past (Borup et al, 2006). These embedded images create 
favorable expectations or negative perceptions about development, resulting in significant 
impacts in the institutional and policy process to receive and accommodate the new 
developments. As was mentioned in section 5.2, in this research, the close link between 
framings around the technology, and those around its regulation made a look at how 
expectations around science and technology shape people’s understandings and framings of 
policy change worthwhile. Expectations are defined as wishful enactments of the desired 
future (Borup et al, 2006). They are both positive and negative and the way an intervention is 
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framed defines the expectations around it. Expectations and visions are not constant; they 
vary in space and time, and they span as well as bring together different groups within a 
society (Considine, 2005: 23). These groups and the linkages that they form may vary say 
from country to country, making it difficult to predict how given groups of stakeholders 
would perceive certain technologies. However, with the rise of the knowledge society, 
knowledge has become a central driving element and there is also an increase in the amount 
of communication across institutional and epistemic borders (Borup et al, 2006; Evans and 
Davies, 1999). This is expected not only to result in an increase in shared visions and 
meanings across frontiers, but across disciplinary boundaries and knowledge networks as 
well (Stone, 2000). Professionals in different disciplines have been seen to reach beyond the 
borders of their own specific fields of expertise and establish relationships with wider and 
more heterogeneous networks of potential collaborators. For this study, these dynamics were 
seen as factors with a potential to facilitate the coalescing of motivations in the cross-national 
convergence agenda. The presentation of empirical findings which follows looks at the 
complications around the issue, and how the different and fluctuating expectations come 
together towards the desired convergence.  
  
Among the factors known to facilitate cross-national policy convergence, is the existence of a 
unified policy community, gearing towards the envisaged output (Gertler, 2001; Drezner, 
2001). Members of this community all recognize the problems occasioned by the existing 
fragmentation, and are all prepared to set aside conceptual differences for the greater good of 
the region through a consensual transnational governance framework. In the SADC, one 
challenge to the existence of such a unified policy community was that in the countries 
themselves, there was no organizational, sectoral or national consensus on the issue and 
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expecting these differences to suddenly disappear at the regional level was labeled by one 
respondent as ‘a heroic dream’ [Res21 (S), Apr 2007]. The tensions and contentions would 
only be elevated. The fact that the policy communities and policy networks in countries 
differed also affected the knowledge exchange that should happen between these 
stakeholders across countries, prior to the convergence process (cf. Levy, 1997). The absence 
of uniformity results in discordant communication across countries, a situation that can 
potentially hamper an already fragile policy agenda.  
 
8.1.2 Risk colonization theory 
Continuing with the look at the organisation of the technology and policy debates around 
risk, another key theoretical perspective around the hopes and fears for convergence is the 
risk colonization theory. This theory is used here to build on to some of the issues illuminated 
by the sociology of expectations; but looking specifically at the distinction between societal 
risk and institutional risks. Risk colonization theory contends that ‘risk has become an 
increasingly key organising concept’ or has 'colonised' debates about regulatory regimes and extended 
governance systems, so that we can also talk broadly of a 'risk society', where we have become 
concerned with ‘risk management of everything’ (Power, 2004). According to Rothstein et 
al, 2006, institutional risk refers to ‘threats to regulatory organisations, and/or the legitimacy 
of rules and methods of regulation’. As mentioned in the previous two chapters, one key 
issue that was mentioned by almost all the respondents throughout this study was the 
importance of the process of obtaining convergence, as opposed to the actual convergence 
itself. Stakeholders were keen on owning and understanding the processes, and seeing that 
they were addressing their needs, and those of the region. There were thus pressures towards 
transparency, and accountability of the processes. By stepping onto the podium to champion 
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the convergence agenda, the three SNOs were exposing themselves to these pressures from 
the stakeholders both inside and outside the region. In their own accounts of issues around 
the convergence process, some operatives from the SNOs also acknowledged this double 
focus on their systems and the technology itself, and the net result it had of raising 
stakeholder expectations on the issue [Res27 (S), May 2007]. Some respondents also felt that 
there was too much fragility at the regional policy making level, including the continuous 
shift by governments to new and more pressing policy agendas. This further heightened the 
risks that champions of this agenda faced of losing their reputation as a result of failed 
deliveries, e.g. from lack of resources, and lack of general stakeholder as well as political 
commitment to see through the processes.  
 
The objective of illuminating the different motivations with the above perspectives is to 
enrich the assessment of their impact on the convergence, and to develop an understanding 
on how the SNOs and other players might be dealing with these issues. A number of 
facilitating factors for policy convergence have been advanced by some authors, e.g. cultural 
similarity, institutional similarity and socio-economic similarity (Lenschow, 2005), and the 
existence of a unified policy community (Bennett, 1991). This chapter takes a look at these 
factors, with a special focus on the three SNOs, and draws up conclusions on the hopes 
(facilitating factors) and fears (inhibitory factors) around cross-national policy convergence 
in the SADC.  
 
8.2 Reasons for desiring convergence 
The reasons why convergence was desirable were invariably highlighted in the same vein 
with the reasons why general or broader cross-national cooperation or collaboration was 
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desirable (cf. ECA, 2006). There was an underlying belief that having similar policy and 
regulatory systems would improve cooperation and collaboration across various sectors of 
the national economies (cf. Mugabe, 2001; SADC Review, 2001). In other words, barring 
different interpretation of similar policies, chances for policy and regulatory conflicts would 
be greatly minimized if countries had similar policies. With respect to biotechnology, this 
was largely seen as being even more fundamental because of the high attendant costs for 
setting up and running sustainable technological and policy systems (Ushewokunze-Obatolu, 
2005; Birner and Linacre, 2008). Therefore, while the cooperation agenda had been a key 
issue in the region for decades, biotechnology was seen as bringing a functional impetus to 
the agenda (cf. Radaelli, 2000). Pro-convergence stakeholders pointed to some costs which 
the region had had to bear already because of the fragmented approach to the development 
and regulation of biotechnology. The political, economic, ethical and social costs of the 
2002/03 food aid debacle (Clark et al, 2005: 75) were one frequently cited example. The 
tensions and loss of credibility brought to the scientific fraternity were also another cost 
highlighted, the former of which resulted in scientists spending most of their time in fora 
debating biotechnology instead of delivering the science on the bench. The credibility77 of 
the science fraternity was highly shaken, especially because of the differences that arose 
among scientists in some of the countries, notably Zambia (Panos Report, 2005; Omamo and 
von Grebmer, 2005: 7) and all this was largely attributed to the policy vacuum78 
(Ushewokunze-Obatolu, 2005). The vacuum resulted in many operatives in some of the 
smaller countries being called upon to make decisions beyond their capabilities (cf. Haas, 
1992), stretching and compromising their already fragile positions. 
 
                                                
77 E.g. meaning power to elicit belief or confidence among different stakeholder groups .  
78 Lack of policy direction or leadership  
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In the backdrop of the challenges and opportunities brought by the technology, countries had 
sought to collaborate at different levels in order to bring synergies that would benefit all of 
them. As mentioned elsewhere, the countries of the region were at different levels of 
technology utilization and development of the policies and regulatory measures to govern it. 
This was seen as one ingredient that could give positive impetus towards coordinated 
development and management of the technology through experience-sharing among the 
countries. In a world in which developmental disparities are a major driver for economic and 
technological cooperation (ECA, 2006; Newmark, 2002; also Wilson, 2007 on why 
knowledge differentials should be a resource not a problem), stakeholders in the region also 
saw geographical contiguity among the regional countries as a major plus in the quest for 
cooperation. There was thus a set of imperatives for cooperation driven by this geographical 
contiguity, where it not only became easier for the cooperation to happen, but the spill-over 
effects of what happened within the confines of another country also made it mandatory for 
countries to work together. National borders were porous, and national cultures spanned 
these borders and shared policy arrangements were seen as one way of adequately preparing 
national institutions to deal with this reality. This view was in sync with Article 26 of the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety which requires countries to take into account socio-
economic considerations such as impact of living modified organisms on their neighbours 
before they made their decisions. Converged policy and regulatory systems would thus not 
only help countries deal with their internal challenges, but would also help them build 
regulatory and administrative capacity to deal with external challenges and opportunities and 
meeting their obligations within the regional or global terrain. 
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The technology also came with many competitive forces, especially from a market point of 
view where multinational corporations have a strong push (cf. Botcheva and Martin, 2001). 
Fragmented efforts by countries of the region would not put them in a good position to deal 
with the forces, argued some respondents from science and technology research organisations 
[e.g. Res18 (R), Mar 2007]. Cooperation and synergies would help to build the necessary 
scale economies to position the region not only as a strong force to resist technology and 
product dumping and other malpractices, but also as an attractive region for favourable 
technologies and products. Even in the face of countries enjoying different bilateral and 
multilateral partnerships, many argued that those separate partnerships would benefit from 
the backdrop of a united and coherent region [e.g. Res6 (R), Aug 2006].  
 
Most of the national economies in the region were too small and too constrained to afford to 
develop, let alone support the various structures needed for effective harnessing and 
management of the technology (Ushewokunze-Obatolu, 2005). Cooperation with other 
countries would enable responsibility-sharing in some of the aspects. One aspect that was 
mentioned consistently is risk assessment and management, where, because of the 
geographical and environmental similarities among the countries, it was said to be largely 
feasible for assessments or measures made in one country within the region to be applicable 
to other countries. In principle, therefore, capabilities for various technological and 
regulatory aspects around biotechnology could spread across the region, or clusters of 
countries within the region and be made available for the benefit of the entire region, and 
having similar regulatory systems was expected to facilitate this spread. This development 
mode had been tried successfully in some areas (for example in the customs and excise under 
the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) where some goods do not need individual 
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country approvals), and pro-convergence respondents called for the same concept to be tried 
for biotechnology management. A number of benefits would accrue to the countries and the 
region as a result of this cooperation and streamlining of procedures, including reducing 
procedure turnaround time and experience-sharing, among others, which would result in 
overall cutting of the regulatory costs.  
 
Also, from technology transfer and trade perspectives, converged systems were said to have 
the potential to help countries streamline their approval processes, lowering transaction costs, 
leading to favourable arrangements for the region, the countries and the partners they were 
dealing with. Convergence would also build scale economies to enable countries to have 
higher bargaining power for technologies and products. From a risk management perspective, 
the bigger scale would enable the region to have a bigger voice when calling for enforcement 
of regulations meant to preserve the environment, e.g. as provided for under the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety, as one proponent from one of the SNOs argued:  
 
‘‘For all intents and purposes, convergence of biosafety systems is about getting the best 
from the systems for the countries, for the region and for our technological and economic 
partners. It is not about giving the region unfair advantage, because at the end of the day, 
the region needs those same partners in the walk towards the envisaged development, 
and the benefits will accrue to everyone in the end. People talk about resistance to 
change, and this is a typical case where extra-regional forces are resisting change being 
motivated by the region, and our challenge is thus on how to make them see our vision in 
the same way as us’’ [Res21 (S), Oct 2007]. 
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A further and related dimension to the ‘discomfort’ among extra-regional forces was the 
strong feeling among some proponents of convergence that the region’s commitment to 
working together, including the convergence agenda could be derailed by some powerful 
external forces who were sceptical about the region’s intentions and ability to achieve them. 
Examples were given of supposedly negative reporting of issues before, during and after the 
AU summit of January 2007 regarding Africa’s preparedness to take SnT seriously. It was 
felt that such negative perspectives, especially from ‘respected’ opinion shapers served as a 
hindrance to positive progress79. Stakeholders indicated, almost pleaded, that while they 
welcomed and expected criticism, it was also prudent at times for the efforts being made to 
‘at least receive some appreciation’ [Pmk1 (S), Apr 2007] as a way of encouraging the 
continent. It was clear from this encounter that practitioners were keen to defend their 
programmes, with some even claiming that they spent a better part of their working time 
justifying and defending their programmes, further dissipating institutional resources. Why 
this could not be done by dedicated PR offices could not be ascertained, but the end result 
was that negative feelings were brought to the policy terrain, and the tension created could be 
felt for several months after the encounter. However, as Rothstein et al (2006) indicate, 
‘blame-avoidance behaviour at the expense of delivering core business is a well-documented 
organisational rationality’.  
 
Meanwhile, the other main reason why countries desired convergence was the envisaged 
cooperation in dealing with challenges being faced in developing and implementing national 
systems. The convergence agenda was thus largely related to how a country felt weak or 
vulnerable on its own, triggering the desire to collaborate with others. The areas of weakness, 
                                                
79 Ref: Pmk1 (S) v SciDev.Net 
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needing strengthening through cooperation, e.g. technical and regulatory capacity varied 
from country to country, and they depended also on a country’s capacities, aspirations and 
targets with respect to biotechnology and biosafety. Variations also occurred within different 
policy communities in a given country. There were also different policy communities in each 
country, and multiple pressures on the convergence discourse both on, and from individual, 
institutional, sectoral, national, regional and international perspectives. 
 
From the above, it was clear that the compelling factors for convergence varied from shared 
histories and cultural values, to the need for synergistic and strategic cooperation in 
technology development and the need to have a unified front as a regional economic market. 
Admittedly, some factors were stronger than others. As one policy maker from a 
supranational organization noted; 
 
‘‘Biosafety largely brings countries together or pits them against each other in the 
realms of trade and environmental safety. What then comes to the fore is how the two 
opposing forces balance each other out, bearing in mind that some countries pay 
more attention to one or the other set of issues’’ [Pmk2 (S), Aug, 2007]  
 
One observation that was made was the inconsistency and the varied emphasis around the 
issues that were brought to the agenda table. Some fora would emphasise the shared histories 
agenda, while others would dwell on the culture dimension, yet others would focus on the 
economic and technological benefits that could accrue to the region as a result of shared 
policy positions. Still it was not uncommon for all these issues to be debated in one forum, 
the sticking point always being how to bring them all together given the existing disciplinary 
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boundaries, and in some cases the lack of representation in these fora from government 
agencies mandated to deal with those issues. The challenges encompassed both the framing 
and the operational dimensions, and this raised the barriers for the convergence agenda. Also, 
as mentioned earlier, the desire for convergence of the regulatory systems followed closely 
the debates in the technology itself, and the biggest forces around the issue related to the 
operational context for the regulations and the technology. The catch 22 for the technology 
and the regulations was that each was mentioned as being well placed to create opportunities 
for the other, and how this would unfold in reality remained to be seen.  
 
8.3 Fears around convergence 
This buoyancy about convergence was however not shared among all policy makers, with 
some seeing it as another policy fad that would just disappear with time. It was interesting to 
observe that those who were skeptical were mainly those who had been in the policy arena 
for a long time, who therefore probably knew what was feasible and what was not, but who 
may also be just fatigued, and believing that nothing will ever change.  The newer players 
were quick to point fingers at the long-stayers, with one of them, a senior official in the 
ministry of science and technology in one of the countries saying; 
 
‘‘The biggest fear I have on this issue is that there are too many people who are tired, 
and who will never see things happening beyond what they deem feasible. These 
people have established themselves to such an extent that they cannot separate 
themselves from the issue, and any challenge to the status quo is perceived as a direct 
challenge to them as individuals and their wisdom. We have to start with such people 
if things are to change’’ [Pmk4 (R), July 2007]. 
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It was very clear from the statement above and from the other realities observed in the region 
that the hopes and fears around the technology, its regulation and the convergence agenda 
had to look beyond the technology itself. The bigger regulatory and institutional context had 
a major impact on what was feasible, to what extent and the sustainability of the 
interventions. For example, as revealed above, the fact that part of the policy community also 
consisted of members who had championed the processes that were being targeted by the 
changes pointed to a source of internal resistance that could not be overlooked (cf. Considine, 
2005:55), and also revealed the complexity of knowledge flows within policy communities.  
 
8.3.1 National and sub-national interests 
The drive towards cross-national convergence was seen to be a balancing game between 
national interests (including sovereignty and right to auto-interpretation of international law) 
and regional aspirations, as much it was a balancing game for the various sub-national 
interests. The process and the output that would best serve these multiple and fluctuating 
interests would then more than likely lead to an attainment of convergence, stakeholders 
argued. However, given the multiplicity and the internal as well as external location of the 
forces behind these interests, the attainment of convergence was admitted to be challenging, 
‘and might not be worth the attention and resources it was getting’, according to one 
respondent from an NGO [Ngo5 (R), Mar 2007]. This was also the main reason, as the same 
respondent pointed out, why the galvanizing factors were always changing, in reality or in 
framing only; reflecting an elusive search for a set of factors which were appropriately 
framed and shared by the region to enable a sustained regional focus towards convergence. 
Hilgartner and Bosk (1988) in their ‘arenas model’ refer to the importance of promoters of 
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policy issues in sustaining it within the policy space in which there are other issues 
competing for attention. Many questions therefore arise regarding the way learning takes 
place, and how it can be sustained within such a dynamic policy space. From a functionalistic 
point of view, the three SNOs were endeavoring to level the playing field so that more 
predictable learning and boundary crossing could take place (cf. Stone 2000). 
 
It also emerged that there were unfulfilled technological and regulatory expectations at sub-
national and national levels, and stakeholders were keen to have these addressed before 
moving to the regional level (e.g. the limited successes of the RBFP, the AU Model Law on 
Safety in Biotechnology; among others). It was observed that in this case the fears were 
directed more at the context, as opposed to the organizations championing the convergence 
agenda. In other instances, the fears centered on the delivery capacity of the organizations 
championing the process. In the final analysis this duality represents the practical challenges 
of reconciling the various tensions around the issue.  This issue could also be interpreted 
from a motivation perspective, e.g. using the hierarchy of needs developed by Abraham 
Maslow (1943) where lower level needs have to be addressed before aspirations for higher 
needs become more important. Learning would be inhibited in a scenario where needs are not 
being address sequentially.  
 
8.3.2 International goals 
The dominant presence of international regulatory and technological targets in this issue and 
in the wider socio-political arena was said to be compelling the regional grouping and the 
member states to rush towards convergence, when they would be better off achieving 
incremental sub-national or national goals. A lot of pressure was being put on countries as 
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they did not want to be seen as failing to comply with standards that other countries were 
adhering to, and sometimes this compromised a firm of underpinning of processes in national 
goals and imperatives80. The envisaged convergence was seen as having this potential of 
diverting countries’ focus and resources from their own processes towards the regional 
desires. It was therefore argued that given the slow pace at which conclusion of international 
policy processes took place; the desired convergence would also slow down the rate at which 
national processes took place. Generally, the international goals were not only slow in 
concretizing, but they also fluctuated a lot as a result of the often-conflicting national and 
corporate forces around them. This put the goal-setting and decision-making process beyond 
the influence of the weak countries in the region and other parts of the developing world (cf. 
ECA, 2006). Countries have however tried to form international negotiation coalitions (for 
example during the negotiations of the CPB) to try and counter some of these challenges.  
 
The desire for regional convergence of biosafety systems was seen by some sections of 
policy makers as one way of trying to institutionalize the positive lessons from the 
negotiations around the CPB. On the other hand, this was viewed as an external motivator, 
and given the lack of unanimity within the Protocol negotiation process, some opponents saw 
this as ‘inheriting a weakness which will come back to haunt the regional convergence 
process’ [Ngo5 (R), Mar 2007]. They further argued that the push for convergence should 
not be modeled around rich versus poor, or as pitting environment and trade interests against 
each other as what happened in the Protocol negotiations because the region could ill-afford 
these divisions. The need for consensus on why convergence was desirable was highlighted, 
although some were quick to point out that this (consensus attainment) would mark another 
                                                
80 This was the opinion of most respondents who have taken part in international negotiations, notably the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources (ITPGRC) and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
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complex and protracted policy struggle which would unnecessarily divert the region’s focus. 
It was underscored that the consensus-building and the move towards the convergence should 
be attempted at the same time. It was also highlighted that trying to evade the different 
sectoral tensions (e.g. trade v environment etc) would only serve to create fallacies that 
would result in improper policy outputs. On the whole, it was abundantly evident that the 
interaction between the domestic and external forces for and against convergence seemed to 
have a bigger influence than what met the eye, especially when one took into view their link 
with the bigger macro-setting of the countries and the region.  
 
8.3.3 Turning a blind eye to the costs 
While the motivators for convergence were highlighted, an analysis of the costs of 
divergence seemed to be only an implied converse of the positives. Some respondents argued 
that as long as this un-quantified cost remained ‘not so huge a deterrent’, then the necessary 
impetus could remain weak. One respondent from a scientific research institution in Namibia 
was very emphatic: 
 
‘Sometimes it’s not about what stands to be gained, but what stands to be lost 
…typical a bird in hand is worth two in the bush attitude maybe …but I think it is true 
that African countries have tended to be stronger in staking their claim in situations 
where there is much to be lost; and in this case, we need to know what it is we stand 
to lose by continuing to develop and implement our systems independently. Also, it’s 
not as if there is no cooperation already. It is there as and when necessary, and 
maybe that’s all we require’’ [Res22 (R), Mar 2007]. 
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The same respondent indicated that countries of the region seemed to have a lot of inertia as 
far as ‘going for gains’ was concerned. Maybe it had to do with the pressures, competition 
and other variables at play where there was room for a gain, because the bigger and stronger 
countries and other players would also be clamouring to occupy that vantage point. There 
was divided opinion in the SADC on whether to go for gain or defend what was there. This 
was another level of the major emerging narratives for biosafety in particular and 
convergence in general in southern Africa; one school looking at ‘what do we stand to gain’ 
and another school looking at ‘what do we stand to lose’  (linked closely to level of use of the 
technology and development of regulatory systems) [Mtg3, Nov 2006]. All this had 
implications on institutional arrangements as well as human, technological and other 
arrangements that needed to be put in place to make convergence of systems at the cross-
national level feasible. South Africa for example, was looking at being a bio-economy, and 
saw Sub-Saharan Africa as a market for products, while the rest of the countries did not have 
the same confidence and preparedness to have these visions [Res8 (R), Jul 2006]. The other 
countries lay at different positions in the continuum from the protection intentions to the 
technology exploitation objectives. Not surprisingly, South Africa was said to look more 
outside the region for technological and policy lessons. This clash between the protective and 
forward-looking approaches was a challenge for the convergence, starting from whether it 
was feasible or not, to the nature of the achievable convergence once the initial hurdles had 
been cleared. Yet it was also appreciated by most of the respondents that it would not be 
possible for there to be permanent and uncontested agreement on convergence, given the 
realities transcending the technology and the SADC region. It was therefore up to the 
stakeholders to find the best way of packaging their similarities in a way that galvanised 
rather than kept them apart.  
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8.3.4 Resource diversion 
There were some fears based on resource diversion, for example, that once a regional 
technology management structure was in place, donors would prefer to put resources there at 
the expense of national programmes. This in many ways showed that stakeholders had no 
confidence in their own governments honouring their national obligations and making sure 
the national processes were kept going, feeding into the regional level arrangements. 
However, these fears of resource diversion and competition were real, and they exposed the 
fallacy of shared ideals around the regional cooperation. Some respondents were quick to 
point out the tensions that were there between national programmes and some NEPAD 
initiatives for example. Some donors, especially the ‘big donors’ preferred to channel their 
assistance through NEPAD for quicker spread of their visibility, among other reasons, than 
doing so through national programmes. Such donors therefore favoured cross-national 
convergence of regulatory systems. Meanwhile, apart from the attraction of financial 
resources, personnel, for example consultants, would also be more attracted to regional 
programmes than to national programmes, usually because of higher remuneration. There 
was the fear therefore that solving the regional level challenges could lead to escalation of the 
national problems, which were supposed to be the ingredients for viable regional 
programmes. In the final analysis, the truth of the matter was that any different policy and 
institutional arrangement brought with it a competition dimension because of resource and 
capacity constraints, and this diminished the enthusiasm towards it, as individuals and 
organizational actors alike felt threatened, eliciting some kind of negative feedback scenario 
(cf. Considine, 2005:43).  
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The resource diversion fear also manifested itself from the reality that as long as 
governments did not put resources in the regional arrangements, and waited upon donors to 
support them, then both the regional and national arrangements would suffer. In the end, not 
only would resources be diverted, but policy attention as well, with stakeholders, including 
governments, giving their attention where resources were.  
 
8.3.5 Dampening innovation 
Other fears were around how adoption of regional systems could curtail policy innovation in 
countries. Some respondents from government institutions argued that as much as there were 
both internal and external pressures necessitating urgency in coming up with functional 
systems, countries needed to go through the experience curve, in order to be able to own the 
policy instruments, as opposed to adopting and implementing lessons from elsewhere. This 
issue locks into many domains, for example sovereignty, and capacity building, where 
countries emphasized linking issues of biosafety at both national and regional levels to the 
broader national imperatives, and ensuring that capacities for related policy responses were 
built. This further brought out how deeply seated issues of sovereignty were. However, it was 
argued that on the ground sovereignty alone did not bring the needed impetus in development 
of programmes and processes, and there was need to balance the ‘freedom to innovate’ with 
avoiding ‘reinventing the wheel’. Others argued that countries of the region ought to 
appreciate that they had come a long way already through the experience curve, and maybe it 
was high time other measures, such as the regional convergence were put in place to 
stimulate further innovation.  
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8.3.6 Threats to established relationships 
Mention was made of the tensions between established relationships with partners outside the 
region (on the technology) and strength in numbers from a regional standpoint. Some 
countries felt they benefited more from their partnerships with technology-rich trading 
partners outside the region, and they felt that the region only brought strength in so far as 
managing technology risks was concerned, and this was by no means an unimportant 
component of the agenda. However, according to some respondents who chose to portray 
themselves as realistic81, for developing the technology, some of the countries in the region 
had nothing to offer, and even the risk management dimension in some cases needed to be 
looked at beyond the strength-in-numbers perspective.  
 
This was a significant tension area, and one where co-existence was needed, because it was 
not conceivable that existing relationships would have to end, while at the same time, having 
these and the new regionalism would in some cases be some kind of a ‘strange bedfellows’ 
arrangement. Pragmatic policy innovation and looking beyond narrow institutional and 
national interests may be needed to ensure a win-win scenario from this tension. The example 
of the UK-EU-US relations is a typical case in point for this tension, with the UK fully aware 
of the potential gains and losses of further integration into the EU given the long relationship 
with the US, which predates even the earliest roots of the EU82. However, some international 
crises have arisen of late, in which many have questioned the prudence of the continued close 
alliance with the US, when the EU seems to have come of age. This was the same scenario 
that some SADC countries faced, and the challenge was how to balance the positives from 
                                                
81 Mainly laboratory scientists from one of the leading scientific and industrial research centres in the region 
82 Robert Whelan, Sept 2007 Article on UK, EU and US relations: Foreign Policy Fears: the ‘special 
relationship’ versus strength in numbers 
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both intra and extra-regional alliances, especially in cases where they seemed to compromise 
each other. This seemed to throw weight to the notion of case-by-case cooperation 
arrangements, although it was a fact that cross-national relations were built over time, based 
on trust, and this might not happen as quickly as it should in times of crises. The bigger and 
more complex issues around convergence were thus more daunting than a simple cursory 
glance could reveal. 
 
One fallacy that countries would need to deal with, according to some respondents, was that 
of a permanent convergence, and one in which countries would be agreeing all the time. The 
differences amongst the countries in the pre-convergence era should be ample evidence that 
countries would always have differences. There was need to define the minimum differences 
that would not threaten the convergence or in whose presence the convergence would still 
subsist. This was a missing link, and as one respondent, a biosafety expert from the region 
now based in the UK pointed out: 
 
‘‘Proponents of convergence should not fool themselves that there will come a time 
when countries will look at themselves as having been unreasonable at some stage. 
Countries will always see the justification for whatever views they hold (or have 
held), and it is how these differences are addressed which matters. If one country is 
expected to make a fool of itself, then for that simple reason, they may resist even the 
best of ideas’’ [Res19 (OR), Mar 2007] 
 
This again lent support to the earlier assertion by most stakeholders that it was the process of 
obtaining convergence, as opposed to the convergence output, which was more important in 
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determining the feasibility of convergence. This was also in line with the convergence 
hypothesis, where different systems came together, with each one bringing its good attributes 
to the common agenda.  
 
8.4 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has illuminated the contending stakeholder views on the cross-national 
convergence agenda, leaving the SNOs with the daunting task of either creating a predictable 
environment for the cross-national learning; or ensuring effective learning even in this 
dynamic environment. Among the major reasons behind the different fears and motivations 
was the issue of resources and capacities for developing and implementing regulatory 
systems. The SNOs had different capacities to deal with these issues.  
 
Meanwhile, the lack of a sustained, shared and adequately framed convergence agenda, as a 
result of the fluctuations within the region spawned many questions at the higher level 
regarding how and why countries come together to cooperate on an issue. With respect to 
regimes, for example, some scholars argue that governments create or join regimes in order 
to make their commitments credible (Hasenclever et al, 2000). From the empirical results 
presented in this section there is some truth that some countries saw a regional approach to 
biotechnology management as a way of bolstering the credibility of the systems they were 
developing and employing in their domestic settings. In other words some individuals and 
countries were using participation in regional processes to read and/or see their places within 
the biotechnology/biosafety setting (cf. Miller and Dingwall, 1997). Some countries were 
also advocating for convergence as a way of demonstrating their commitment to regional 
integration (through functional cooperation) and demonstrating their commitment to having 
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the technology effectively regulated. There were also images of a way of trying to promote 
investment in the technology, or meeting obligations or expectations of other partners with 
which the countries had relationships. These issues of credibility and demonstrating 
commitment seemed to work both ways; in that they could also be used by some countries to 
push against convergence as a way of showing their allegiance to the bigger forces that might 
be dictating to them certain positions, e.g. donors and development partners who were 
against biotechnology.  
 
This chapter also showed that a government’s commitment to other governments through 
pushing for convergence may not only be at variance with their commitment to other external 
partners, but to domestic actors as well. Convergence was a balancing game where the 
government had to deal with many issues at vertical and horizontal levels within the broader 
socio-economic setting, at both national and regional levels. The question that remained, 
however, was if convergence was about demonstrating commitment, why did governments 
choose to demonstrate commitment through convergence? Why not demonstrate it through 
other means of cooperation. This was an argument presented by some neutrals who chose to 
call themselves realists … pointing to the inherent fragility of the converged position, given 
the different and fluctuating allegiances that the governments had to deal with [e.g. Res19 
(OR), Mar 2007]. They also said the overall policy decisions in this technology were not 
entirely in ‘the hands’ of the national governments in the region, making the whole agenda at 
the worst, ‘an exercise in futility’. It was also clear that policy convergence efforts were not 
separate policy endeavours, but were part of wider policy processes, especially within 
discussions around science and technology, agriculture, environment and trade (NEPAD 
OST, 2007). The wider processes therefore shaped these convergence efforts, as much as the 
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convergence efforts shaped the processes. In addition, there was recognition that in 
facilitating convergence, the SNOs were dependent on other actors and thus could not be 
viewed as isolated change agents (cf. Stone, 2000). There was thus a significant role for 
agency in these processes, particularly around choices in selection of policy ideas, which was 
likely to result in bounded rationality in the imitation, copying or modification of policy 
innovations by decision makers (Rose, 1991). New institutionalism theorists highlight the 
impact of agency and structure in the convergence process, emphasizing the role of rules, 
shared interpretations, schema and meanings in the decisions by policy makers (Di Maggio 
and Powell, 1983). All this was very evident in this study, and it pointed to many challenges 
that the SNOs had to deal with in steering the convergence processes. The limited access that 
the SNOs had to some of the policy actors, especially those at the sub-national level, meant 
that in some cases their impact could not reach all key stakeholders in the policy continuum. 
 
The constant reference to external forces when describing coercion was evident, and other 
researchers have found this too (e.g. Stone, 2000). On the other hand, a focus on voluntary 
mechanisms has been confirmed to direct analytical attention to the internal attributes and 
salient features of policy arenas, such as similar political ideologies, policy styles, culture, 
language, and institutional arrangements. This study also confirmed these trends, while also 
establishing that the various convergence mechanisms may not necessarily act uniformly in 
different polities, and that there were different sources of the policy lessons, ranging from 
internal to international sources. A closer look at how these different motivations influence 
the mechanisms through which the three SNOs facilitate spread of policy innovations across 
countries is made in the next chapter through the lens of the Busch and Jorgens typology. The 
chapter also further analyses and brings all emerging issues together, before advancing some 
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conclusions and recommendations on the roles played by the three SNOs in bringing about 
cross-national convergence of biosafety systems in the SADC.  
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CHAPTER 9  ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND  
   RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
9.0 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
This research was conceived and implemented from both inductive and deductive83 
perspectives, with the three-factor typology proposed by Busch and Jorgens (2005) as the 
organising framework. As discussed earlier, the typology proposes harmonisation, coercive 
imposition and diffusion of practices as the broad categories of mechanisms through which 
similarity of policies and regulatory systems across countries occurs. It is one of several 
conceptualisations advanced by policy researchers and other scholars as presented elsewhere 
in this thesis. Based on the region-specific realities discussed in the preceding chapters, this 
concluding chapter analyses the processes towards convergence and the emerging 
convergence in the SADC through the lens of this model, drawing similarities, differences 
and practical as well theoretical lessons for cross-national convergence of biosafety systems 
in the region and beyond.  
 
9.1 Looking at multiple mechanisms 
This study was about how policy innovations spread across individual countries and a group 
of countries with the facilitation of supranational organisations. A number of researchers 
have demonstrated that causes of domestic policy change do not come from national sources 
only, but they also quickly indicate that these causes are also not limited to isolated responses 
to global pressures either. With respect to the former, comparative policy studies and 
international relations scholars have since the 1970s shown the increasing impact of 
international actors, international institutions and policy processes on domestic policy (e.g. 
                                                
83 Simply put … arguing from observation (inductive reasoning) and from theory (deductive reasoning) 
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Gourevitch, 1978; Keohane and Milner, 1996; Yanacopulos, 2005). Domestic political 
processes are said to be increasingly interdependent, accounting for some share of cross-
national convergence. However, as presented in Chapter 2, many researchers have followed 
the effect of one mechanism only, and this has been blamed for emergence of some kind of 
mechanism-biased analysis, resulting in the mechanisms under focus being ‘found to exist 
and to explain scenarios’ even in cases where other mechanisms would be better placed 
(Busch and Jorgens, 2005; Lehtonen, 2006). This research looked at multiple causal 
mechanisms and the facilitating factors for these mechanisms, thereby allowing for a 
comparative analysis of the importance of the different mechanisms within the cross-national 
policy arena. The mechanisms looked at, and as detailed by Busch and Jorgens (2005) were; 
legal harmonization through supranational law of multilateral agreements; coercive 
imposition through political or financial conditionality, among others; or the non-obligatory 
diffusion of ideas, institutions or instruments through voluntary imitation and learning. 
However, unlike the approach taken by Busch and Jorgens of putting a bigger emphasis on 
one of the mechanisms (diffusion), this study traced the existence of the three mechanisms to 
the same extent. Their argument for the approach they adopted rested on what they called 
‘less coverage’ of this mechanism in the literature. If one mechanism were to be given more 
prominence in this study on biosafety systems in southern Africa, harmonization would have 
been chosen, the reason being that this represented the terminology most widely used by 
policy actors in the sub-region. This was avoided as the study sought to unravel broad-based 
empirical evidence from the region and also endeavoured to avoid falling into the trap of 
entrenched framings, or rhetoric in good currency (Considine 2005:89; Jordan and Haplin, 
2006) some of which have been reduced to ‘mere slogans’. The table below presents a 
summary of some of the factors inherent in the three SNOs (as revealed by the study) which 
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were envisaged to facilitate the operation of the different mechanisms within the research 
framework.  
 
Table 7: Mechanisms and key facilitating factors for organisations
84
  
Mechanism Facilitating factors for 
AU 
Facilitating factors for 
NEPAD 
Facilitators for 
SADC 
Diffusion Existence of the Model 
Law on Safety in 
Biotechnology. Also, 
presence of multi-country 
initiatives in other sectors 
removed many barriers to 
diffusion, e.g. mistrust 
among actors.  
On-going cross-national 
biotech R&D projects e.g. 
projects under the 
SANBio programme in 
the SADC region 
Existence of 
technical 
committees, sector 
units and 
programmes of 
action on S&T, 
biotech and allied 
issues 
Harmonisation Emerging regulatory 
authority through the Pan-
African Parliament 
(PAP)*, and enforcement 
of obligations through 
other policy domains 
No regulatory authority, 
but harmonisation likely 
through creation of 
technological and 
regulatory 
‘interdependence’ among 
countries 
Potential through 
Heads of State and 
Council of 
Ministers. Efforts 
towards this made 
specifically for 
biosafety but not 
observed (ref Dec 
2004 deadline for 
regulations set by 
the Heads of State) 
Imposition Political clout (however, it 
appears the technology 
has not raised the 
imperative to that level: 
also, efforts are 
fragmented and seem to 
move in response to 
global trends, especially 
around resources) 
Resource endowment and 
expertise; resulting in 
countries wanting to 
associate with the 
organisation, i.e., claims 
for legitimacy through 
knowledge and expertise. 
Use of power and 
opportunities from 
status as a regional 
economic block 
 
* The PAP was still relatively new and grappling to situate itself within the terrain, thus 
being effective in technology regulation issues could take time. The organisation was also 
                                                
84 These factors were in addition to the broader macro/regional context issues such as socio-economic and 
cultural similarity, and the existence of a problem pressure which all the countries were grappling with which 
were creating the need for convergence. 
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still in the process of establishing partnerships with more experienced bodies such as NEPAD 
and the RECs.  
Harmonisation in this case was largely underpinned by technological and policy 
interdependence85 and the three bodies had all made moves to illuminate or exploit the 
interdependence among countries. Some of these moves had been through initiation of cross-
national research programmes where each country participated and contributed according to 
its capability and resource-endowment (for example the SANBio project under NEPAD and 
the SACBB under SADC). These programmes had been initiated mainly by the SADC and 
NEPAD, and they also increased the visibility of these two bodies in the region, in addition 
to cementing relations and cooperation among countries. However, on a perennial collision 
course with this interdependence was the existence of competition for resources, which 
resulted in countries according more respect to bilateral obligations with resource-rich 
trading partners, than having firm allegiance to a regional arrangement. This was 
understandable given that in most cases the bilateral relations were allowing countries to 
attract investment in the technology and derive other benefits from technology-rich countries 
or partners (cf. Stone, 2003; Ruggie, 1975).  
 
The SNOs also seemed to be on a mission to be ‘everywhere in the policy arena’, a situation 
that brought diversionary overlaps and negative impacts on sustained interdependence among 
countries. For example, at Africa-level, there were questions on whether the processes 
mediated by the Ministers of Agriculture under the African Union [for example their 
endorsement of the African Seed and Biotechnology Programme in 2006] (African Union, 
2006a) were converging with the activities of the High Level African Panel on 
                                                
85 Which resulted in exchange of policy ideas, policy models and personnel in some cases 
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Biotechnology and those of the Science Ministers under AMCOST. These processes were 
also drawing on different national stakeholders, and the potentially negative impact that these 
divergences had on cross-national convergence of regulatory systems and cohesion of the 
national systems could not be underestimated. However, with a realistic appreciation that this 
multiplicity may not be avoidable given the different forces in the policy field, the challenge 
remained how to bring lessons from the different processes together, as echoed by 
Karagiannis and Radaelli (2007) in their analysis of public policy making in general. The 
SNOs thus had an obligation to minimise this duplicity or ensure policy processes were not 
constrained even while this happened. 
 
One further challenge to harmonisation was the diffuse nature of the SADC regional policy 
context and stakeholders, and hence multiple targets of the policy innovations (cf. Lehtonen, 
2006). For example, at the cross-national level, the multiple allegiances amongst countries 
with respect to regional economic communities (see Chapter 5) militated against 
harmonisation, and the other mechanisms as countries could shift their allegiances 
elsewhere86 in the event of conditions not being favourable for them in another setting 
(Shams, 2005). This is a phenomenon also observed in larger efforts towards regional 
integration on the continent (ECA, 2006), and while this was not observed during this study, 
the three SNOs had the potential to develop synergies among their various strengths to deal 
with this issue. 
 
The key observation of the study is that while harmonisation was talked about a great deal, 
there were limited regulatory and institutional mechanisms and political will for 
                                                
86 For example, Seychelles left the SADC grouping in 2004, but rejoined towards the end of 2007. The reasons 
for this were however not pursued by this study 
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operationalising it within the three supranational organisations. The ‘toothlessness’ of the 
region (as one CSO representative called it [Ngo1 (R) Jul 2006]) was evident from the lack 
of movement by the countries towards the deadline of December 2004 that was set by the 
SADC Heads of State for countries to develop their national biosafety legislation.  The 
collective dilemma which countries were intending to deal with collectively was there, but 
the mechanisms for seeing it through the regional and national structures were weak or did 
not exist (cf. Faria, 2002). 
 
9.1.1 Interplay between mechanisms 
As could be predicted from the crosscutting influence of biosafety, there was interplay 
between these different mechanisms in the envisaged transnational governance framework. 
The mechanisms acted on different levels of the biosafety systems, and looking specifically 
at policies, and further splitting this into policy processes, policy outputs and policy 
outcomes, various impact levels could be detected. The impact was dependent to a large 
extent on the regional context and on the realities around the organisations with respect to 
their regulatory status, resource-endowment, political clout; among other dimensions (as 
detailed elsewhere, especially in Chapter 5). The mechanism that would have the biggest 
influence on the national policies also depended on the lack of regulatory influence on the 
part of the three SNOs, and the subservience of biotechnology issues to other policy agendas 
(cf. Bandelow, 2007; Lethtonen, 2006). Further, the dominance of external sources of 
funding and expertise also meant that the ‘regulatory hand’ of the three organisations and 
other multi-state processes on the continent was limited (cf. Genschel and Plumber, 1997 on 
regulatory competition and international cooperation). The fact that institutionalisms around 
biotechnology and biosafety were only still developing also made the organisations weaker in 
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terms of stamping their influence because there was still a lot of fluctuation around the 
organisations themselves (Karagiannis and Radaelli, 2007). This was also manifested in the 
many and different initiatives and the ‘start-stop approach’, among other dimensions.  
 
One of the main determinants of the nature of mechanism in operation is the identity and 
composition of policy operatives within the given policy context (Bennett, 1991). As 
discussed throughout the thesis, and mainly in Chapter 7, the region was congested with 
different players, some being in the policy field continuously, while others entered and left 
the arena on a continuous basis. Most of these players included those who were part of the 
development of the systems now being targeted for change by the convergence agenda, and 
they introduced a resistance dimension to the processes (Matz and Ferenz, 2005). These 
operatives included elected officials, bureaucrats/civil servants and pressure groups. Policy 
entrepreneurs/experts also played an important role within the policy arena in the region, and 
these came in the form of prominent individuals, think tanks and consultants. They flagged 
knowledge legitimacy in their dealings, while other groups, for example elected officials 
brought political legitimacy, and bureaucrats/civil servants brought procedural legitimacy 
through their knowledge of how to assimilate and domesticate policy lessons in the national 
systems (cf. Stone, 2003). These different legitimacy and influence levels had a bearing on 
the possible mechanisms in operation for example through constraining or facilitating the 
knowledge that the policy actors could access and in turn be able to pass on.  
 
9.1.2 Main mechanism in operation 
Taking all the above into consideration, and focusing specifically on the regulatory capacities 
of the three organisations, the empirical evidence reveals that the main mechanism through 
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which they could influence processes in the region was through diffusion, as facilitated by 
learning, emulation and the epistemic influence of the three organisations. The various 
workshops organised by these bodies, in which different policy actors participated, the many 
policy documents produced and expert committees that were set up all served as 
opportunities for elite networking or voluntary and non-legally binding channels for 
spreading policy lessons across the region (cf. Stone, 2000). Largely, the adoption of lessons 
from these networking exercises and other processes could only be voluntary because of the 
lack of regulatory legitimacy on the part of the three SNOs (as discussed Chapter 5). 
However, further analysis also showed that in some cases the countries had no choice 
because of lack of capacity to initiate parallel responses to the pressures. In such cases, there 
was diminished voluntarism on the adoption pressures, but this emanating from the countries’ 
own lack of preparedness (which gave them no choice) as opposed to the SNOs unilaterally 
coercing the countries to adopt the policy innovations (cf. Beach 2005: 71). On the other 
hand the claim of superior knowledge on the part of the SNOs and their programmes was 
also seen to be coercing countries to adopt policy innovations, and to participate in 
programmes in the ‘fear’ of not wanting to be excluded from the development pathways (see 
especially Chapter 8). Coercion was thus coming in the form of ‘knowledge sanctions or 
conditionalities’ (own emphasis) unlike the political or economic conditionalities which 
other bodies or countries can exert, and is similar to the ideational influence referred to by 
Lehtonen (2006). This ‘soft coercion’ was very clear in some of the countries which felt they 
had been left behind in some NEPAD processes at the beginning because of their differences 
with the ideals in that organisation, but having found themselves competing with NEPAD for 
resources to implement similar programmes, they ended up having to compromise (Chapter 8 
gives more details on this). The same coercion was also highlighted with respect to the 
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regulatory systems that emerged from different processes. For example, some countries 
indicated that the status of their national systems never seemed to receive much recognition 
at regional and international levels because they had not participated in the UNEP/GEF 
programmes to the same level as others. Those countries which had participated seemed to 
receive more publicity on their programmes than others who had developed their systems 
through other efforts, and this attracted resources to such programmes. This way the excluded 
countries ended up being compelled to make every effort to meet the conditions for 
qualifying to receive resources from such programmes (cf. Comparative Analysis report for 
UNEP/GEF Projects, 2006).   There were also pressures from information availability, where 
countries felt they would not be able to keep abreast with new knowledge being generated in 
some research and policy efforts if they did not participate in certain programmes. There 
appeared to be some closed communication loops among the different policy actors (cf. 
Holzinger, 2006), creating some kind of ‘members only’ clubs.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the three bodies had, through their interaction with individuals and 
organisations in the region, promoted networking among scientists, policy makers and 
government officials, who in turn had acquired and transferred policy lessons to their 
countries. The biggest impact of this learning had been on policy output, specifically policy 
objectives, which in most countries recognised the potential that biotechnology could play. 
The policies were mainly designed to maximise the benefits and minimise the risks of the 
technology. Policy outcomes or impacts of the policy outputs did not seem to have been 
directly affected by the activities of these organisations, but by those of other transnational 
networks of civil society bodies, who included environmental conservationists and 
consumers’ unions (cf. Moola and Munnik, 2007). The CSOs interacted directly with the 
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public, leading to different interpretation and application of the policy outputs in the different 
countries. This scenario confirmed what Young (2005) observes as the increasing role of 
CSOs as ‘innovators in service provision’, buttressed by their resource endowment and their 
‘advocacy stance with and for the poor’. On the other hand, because of their limited contact 
with the generality of the population and the wider policy community, the three SNOs had 
limited impact on the fate of the policy innovations once they got into the public domain 
(Stone, 2000).  
 
Participation and representation in regional initiatives, apart from encouraging learning, also 
served as a way of validating national programmes, and proving national competencies at the 
regional level (cf. Beach, 2005: 17). There were thus nationalistic aspirations to prove 
competence and allegiance to the region which were compelling countries to participate in 
regional programmes and to support the convergence agenda. Serving in regional 
arrangements served to keep countries and stakeholders visible and recognised. There was 
pressure therefore from within countries which pushed this aspiration, and this was true for 
all the countries in the study region, although they had different reasons for this, based on the 
levels of pressure they experienced from the technology.  
 
9.1.3 Challenges for policy diffusion in the SADC 
The one challenge with diffusion of practices across countries in the SADC region that 
became evident was the notion of rationality, a crucial prerequisite for diffusion (Stone, 
2003). There is an assumption in diffusion that shocks from within the domestic system 
prompt policy actors to look beyond their borders for lessons on how to deal with the shocks 
(Seeliger, 1996; Bennett, 1991). From a rational learning perspective, policy actors are 
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assumed to look at all relevant policy experiences and deploy maximum analytical 
capabilities to update their policy beliefs (Meseguer, 2005). However, for the SADC region, 
given the pressures surrounding the policy actors, and the time, financial and other resource 
constraints they faced, the evidence from this study has shown limited leeway among policy 
actors with respect to learning and the choices they had among the different options. The 
constraints within the system entailed that the diffusion was directed and constrained, for 
example, by the nature, source and amount of resources availed to learn and hone the lessons. 
In the final analysis, countries appeared to be coerced into adopting particular policy options, 
even in spite of the lessons they would have learnt from the different programmes they had 
been exposed to. For example, some respondents bemoaned what they called ‘wasted 
learning’ [Res8 (R), Jul 2006] referring to their inability to transfer what they had learnt to 
national policies because of constraints within the context. There was reference to the fact 
that without resources to tap the desired lessons, interventions would always come based on 
who had provided resources for the activities.  Therefore, it was clear again here that the 
complexities of the context within the SADC region were making it difficult, not only for 
policy makers to have much leeway in championing the policy process, but also for policy 
innovations to move across boundaries. Unlike in convergence studies conducted in other 
geographical settings where the major focus could be on the policy constraint (cf. Busch and 
Jorgens, 2005; Bandelow, 2006), for the SADC the bigger context always came to the fore, 
constraining and complicating the identity and magnitude of mechanisms that could take 
effect. For example factors which might facilitate the action of one mechanism in other 
settings would not necessarily facilitate the same within the SADC because of the intricate 
links between the bigger, region-specific contextual constraints and the constraints within the 
policy area.  
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As discussed in Chapter 8, policy actors also generally exhibited fatigue from discussion of 
biosafety issues, and this, together with the multiplicity of players in the arena, meant that 
some mechanisms could fail to work largely because of this diminished willingness and 
capacity among policy actors to absorb more lessons. There were also limited choices with 
respect to the processes employed or attempted towards the convergence (cf. Holzinger, 
2006) because of resource constraints, which meant that in some cases the same approaches 
were continuously applied even when they had failed.  
 
9.1.4 Information challenges 
The study did not obtain from the respondents as much empirical data on how far the 
policies/systems had converged, as much as it did on the processes towards the convergence, 
and this was partly because of the difficulties in obtaining information from countries, in 
addition to the bigger focus on processes rather than outputs of the same. These difficulties 
also featured as a hindrance to the cross-national spread of policies, especially as it happened 
in some cases that some policy actors claimed to have policy documents in their countries, 
but were in some cases not able to produce the documents. This would have allowed further 
and more detailed scrutiny and comparison of the documents. At the broader level, 
information availability was a major challenge in the region, and some respondents 
confirmed that it had a negative impact on lesson-sharing among countries, resulting, among 
other problems, in countries remaining distant from each other instead of getting closer 
through sharing information. This was a void which respondents said the SNOs could fill.   
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The three supranational organisations also fell into the same predicament of having limited 
power, not only to effect convergence, but to make it lasting, and to drive it according to their 
own terms or the terms of the region. They did not have enough financial resources to do this. 
On the other hand, while they might not have resources to chart their own path, countries had 
latent capacity to resist programmes in which they felt they had not made a big contribution, 
and here again clashes with existing or envisaged bilateral arrangements came to the fore. 
Also, because of resources, the three efforts towards convergence by the SNOs on the 
continent during the study period were facing the fate of being short-lived; with the SACBB 
effort already having folded (and then revived but without a clear lifespan) after the 
termination of funding. By the time it was being revived in late 2007, following 3 years of 
acquiescence, significant momentum and focus had been lost, and with new members coming 
on board, a lot of reinvigoration was required.  The AU Biosafety Project had funding for a 
three-year period, up to the end of 2007, and continuation of its ideals was contingent (among 
other issues) on countries having taken up the measures developed and assimilated them in 
their own systems. If the experience with the AU model law was anything to go by, then the 
success rate would be difficult to guarantee. On the other hand, the work of the High Level 
African Panel on Modern Biotechnology championed by NEPAD faced relatively higher 
prospects of a longer survival because of the dual approach to the technology and the 
regulations. The spread of the Panel’s work into the continent through RECs was expected to 
keep the efforts visible for a while, but bearing in mind these were the same RECs grappling 
with other challenges already, the domestication might well prove to be a burden. A holistic 
approach to the cross-national programmes was needed, especially with a view to 
strengthening the country positions as necessary ingredients for the cross-national 
arrangements.   
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9.1.5 Summary 
In the final analysis, this thesis revealed the existence and interplay between the three 
mechanisms proposed by Busch and Jorgens, and that the requirement for government-led 
and highly-centralised joint decision-making processes made harmonisation the least 
significant of the three mechanisms. Therefore, and as observed by other researchers, the 
three mechanisms were not mutually exclusive, and their effect on spread of policies 
depended a lot on contextual factors within organisations, sectors, countries and regional 
levels.  
 
In particular, the following observations were conspicuous: 
• That, countries, organisations and individuals learnt from other countries through 
different ways, such as looking for outside examples as part of ideational debates; when 
seeking solutions to practical policy and institutional questions. Efficiency and legitimacy 
aspirations were some of the motivations behind the learning. Meanwhile, countries also 
looked at other countries and the SNOs as competitors – for financial and ideational 
resources. Key ‘policy learners’ were existing domestic actors, notably government 
officials, civil society operatives and researchers in government and quasi-government 
organisations.  
• That, by and large, cross-national ‘learning’ formed part of wider strategies to find new 
models of regulation to deal with pressing problems and to overcome strong opposition to 
change. Meanwhile, South Africa differed a lot from the other study countries over the 
sources from which it learnt. SA looked mainly beyond the region and beyond the 
continent for lessons, and this was understandable given its level of development and use 
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of the technology. The other countries meanwhile looked up to SA, although they did not 
do this willingly because of lack of reciprocity.  
• That, while in some cases over-shadowed by sovereignty and other contextual issues in 
countries, voluntary cross-national learning played an important role in overcoming the 
effects of these different national settings. The learning was able to assist in overcoming 
the effects of diverse national settings and hence contributed to significant institutional 
change occurring in the systems for biosafety across the countries.   
• That the three SNOs all clearly played some roles in imparting policy lessons, and 
facilitating cross-national policy convergence, and that there was potential for synergistic 
interactions among them, and this would lessen the potential for divisive impact on the 
limited stakeholder base in the countries and the region.  The organisations had different 
levels of reach, mandate, influence, resource endowment, experience with regulation of 
the technology, among other factors, and these could be leveraged in the quest to create 
an effective cross-national learning environment.  
Overall, with the guidance of this typology, the findings underlie the importance of using 
integrative frameworks if an understanding of sources and mechanisms of spread of policy 
innovations across boundaries is to be obtained.  
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9.2 CONCLUSIONS 
This study confirms the complexity of the cross-national regulation agenda; and further 
brings out the issues behind the complexities for the biotechnology regulation endeavour. 
What emerges is a set of diverse and fluctuating understandings, fears and motivations for the 
convergence agenda; underpinned by sub-national, national, regional and extra-regional 
forces. These forces shape the reality of what the SNOs and the countries have to deal with in 
the envisaged multi-country governance structure, laying bare the realities and fallacies that 
face the convergence aspirations which have been on the regulatory agenda table for a long 
time. 
 
The study, thus does not only confirm complexity, but informs that the complexity is 
underpinned by many forces that do not necessarily come to the fore if not unearthed by 
careful and multi-method study; as endeavoured by this research. For example, in the 
backdrop of a mixture of technology-inherent and technology-transcending challenges facing 
the policy agenda as revealed by the empirical evidence, it became clear that a purely techno-
centric approach to the convergence was less likely to be successful. This called for the three 
organisations and other SNOs to synergise their different capacities and strengths if 
successful boundary crossings at the various levels are to be achieved.  
 
With different motivations and levels of caution, countries of the SADC region appeared to 
be in agreement on the need for a transnational governance framework for biosafety. If the 
signals on this were not clear enough, what was undoubtedly clearer was that stakeholders 
were keener on owning the processes towards that transnational framework, before the 
framework itself was put in place. This resonates with what Stevens (1993) notes in an article 
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on harmonization, trade and the environment … that ‘for the most part, the purpose of these 
efforts is not so much to achieve identical regulations or standards, but to converge 
international methods for developing and administering standards’.  The different challenges 
surrounding participation in the standard-setting processes were discussed throughout this 
thesis. 
 
One of these was that biotechnology or biosafety policy was a policy measure in many policy 
fields, such as industry, science and technology, education, environment, agriculture, trade 
and others, and this elevated the challenge of cross-national comparison. In addition, there 
were many other policy measures which were closely related to and overlapped with 
biosafety, for example food safety, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, environmental 
safety etc. Assessing similarity of biosafety at the cross-jurisdictional level had to take all this 
into consideration, and depending on the location of policy actors from whom responses were 
sought, different levels of convergence were likely to be encountered. There were also 
continuous changes at the bureaucratic and institutional levels in most countries which 
resulted in government departments emerging or disappearing frequently, and this posed both 
conceptual and operational challenges to the policy processes. 
 
Issues of hype around the technology (inevitable as they were because of the quest by 
scientists to receive attention) added to the pressure on the technology and the regulatory 
processes. However, due to the newness of the technology in the region, extended timescales 
were also inevitable in the regulatory process, and pitting these together added to the 
complexity around the cross-national convergence aspirations.  
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One of the challenges for this research was that it entailed assessment of similarity of policies 
in some cases where no policy existed at some of the times for which the observation was 
being made. This was one reason why the research focused more on the process of getting 
convergence, as opposed to the convergence itself. Similarity in the policy processes and 
institutional responses at the different points in time could be assessed even in cases where 
no policy existed.  
 
The unrelenting national and regional socio-economic and political context hampered 
regional aspirations. As much as countries saw the benefits of cross-country cooperation, 
from their own realities and from experiences elsewhere, e.g. in the OECD and the EU 
countries, the historical and bilateral realities of the countries in the region limited the 
autonomy that they had in the international policy space. Most of the countries were too 
committed in other arrangements which pre-dated the convergence agenda, and which were 
in place to prop the countries’ waning economic fortunes. Extra-regional powers, in the form 
of individual countries or groups of countries, companies, private foundations and others had 
a divisive effect on the region through their resource partnerships with some countries. 
Meanwhile, in some countries the limited visualisation of immediate economic benefits from 
the convergence dampened its prospects as a long term socio-economic development target.  
 
There was a strong perception across the entire spectrum of stakeholders who participated in 
the study that regional policy aspirations and processes were easily reversible. This 
dampened the commitment and motivation of policy actors towards the regional ideals as 
they had to embark on new initiatives every now and then, with a majority of the initiatives 
being abandoned mid-stream. A number of such initiatives were cited and detailed elsewhere 
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in this thesis. These changes were seen to reflect the continuous effort by the governments in 
the region to position themselves adequately to deal with the policy challenges in the 
backdrop of a national and regional policy space that was congested and contentious.  
 
Some respondents pointed out that convergence of systems would not necessarily address the 
implementation challenges faced by countries and the region. Examples were cited of how 
difficult it was for partners to access facilities set up in other countries. Thus, in the event of 
countries having to share resources as part of implementing the regional system, such issues 
would have to be taken into consideration. As emphasised throughout the thesis, the countries 
were at very different levels of technological and regulatory development, affecting the 
impetus with which they addressed science and technology issues.  This led to insecurity 
among some countries emanating from fears of losing revenue and job opportunities as well 
as fears by more fragile economies, of being dominated and marginalized by stronger ones. 
This again underscored the importance of the process of achieving convergence, as opposed 
to the result of the process. It was clear that a regional system would emerge and would be 
effective only if local specificities were taken into account in the development process. 
However, the local specificities around biosafety remained fluid and elusive because they 
were under bigger external and internal forces, and this further complicated the convergence 
agenda.   
 
It appeared that while the technology had a modernising effect on the countries and the 
regulations, it did not seem to carry enough weight to overcome the broader contextual 
barriers in the region. There was a feeling among respondents that until the countries were in 
a position to make their own decisions on the technology, then the threat of the external 
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forces would remain strong and decisive regarding where individual countries or the region 
could go. Respondents also felt the effectiveness of the regional system for biosafety would 
always be subordinated to other issues, such as trade, politics and food security and there 
might be need to think about and explore a more holistic convergence agenda in these wider 
policy fields. 
 
9.2.1 Multi-layered convergence 
From the daunting contextual realities highlighted above and throughout the study, this thesis 
advances that for biosafety systems in the SADC region, achieving and implementing a 
cross-national framework where all countries face the same obligations would not only be 
difficult, but would spawn divisive tensions at other levels. For example, respondents from 
countries that were well advanced in the technology and the regulatory systems indicated 
their unwillingness to climb down to some regional-outlook-mandated-framework87 which 
might not best serve their interests, while lagging countries indicated the increased challenge 
they would face in trying to maintain their obligations at domestic and regional levels. The 
stumbling blocks of national interests, the perceived existence of a technology hegemony and 
the different institutional capacities at national level were part of the context that the regional 
framework would have to deal with, in addition to other numerous and fluctuating realities. A 
‘multi-layered convergence’ therefore seems the most feasible option, where countries 
occupy different positions with respect to the ideal ‘converged position’. Figure 13 below is 
one variant of several possible schematic representations of this type of convergence. 
 
 
                                                
87 Own emphasis 
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Fig 13. Schematic presentation of proposed multi-layered convergence 
 
The layers or clusters above would group countries, for example, according to level of 
development and use of the technology and regulatory systems (see Table 1), and would 
mean different obligations on the part of the countries vis-à-vis demands from the regional 
position. This layering would not be without problems, however, as some countries were 
seen to want to collaborate or partner with those that were more advanced than them, but it 
would deal with fears of hegemony or domination by others, making ‘cooperation from 
contribution’ and ‘owning of regulatory processes’ more feasible. The different positions 
would also be useful as benchmarks to measure progress of different countries in the 
development of their systems vis-à-vis their regional partners. Meanwhile, apart from 
layering based on status of entire regulatory systems, the layering could also be issue-
specific; for instance, following the example of EU regulations and directives on pertinent 
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aspects related to development and release of GMOs [e.g. labelling, product release, risk 
assessment and so on] (cf. Wafula and Sikoyo, 2005; Levidow et al, 1996). This approach 
would resonate with what some respondents noted as the need to focus on ‘key and urgent 
matters’ given the pressures governments face from other policy arenas. 
 
Focusing on sub-national sectors (e.g. agriculture, environment or science and technology 
ministries) as convergence targets would also be another type of layering, and respondents 
already indicated there is greater feasibility of these converging within and among 
themselves, particularly at in-country level. Cross-national convergence of practices within 
these national sectors would be easier if the assumption of ‘less heterogeneity among policy 
functionaries in corresponding sectors’ (Meseguer, 2005) can be upheld. Facilitation of the 
cross-national learning by the SNOs, especially through their sector-specific programmes, 
could increase the feasibility of this approach.   
 
Other  researchers have proposed approaches akin to this proposed layering, all related to 
how centralised or diffuse the decision-making system would be; for example Paarlberg 
(2006) talks about the  tightness or looseness of the ‘harmonised systems’, while Birner and 
Linacre (2008) analyse decentralised and centralised governance structures. This thesis 
focused more on the process of attaining convergence, and less on the outcomes of the 
process, and the reasons for this were discussed throughout the thesis. The feasibility of these 
various options presented here therefore is only preliminary speculation based on the 
interactions with policy actors and review of literature, and begs further analysis from both 
theoretical and empirical perspectives. In particular, governance and metagovernance 
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theories should bring immense explanatory power given the dominant roles of both state and 
non-state actors.  
 
With respect to the processes, this section has concluded on the challenges and realities and 
speculated on feasible convergence outcomes. It is further contended that in the final 
analysis, the success of the transnational regulatory arrangement envisaged would be 
measured by its ability to surmount the context and have purposeful impact. This thesis 
presented how the efforts of the three supranational organisations, AU, NEPAD and SADC 
to surmount these challenges can best be described with the aid of the Busch and Jorgens 
typology.   
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9.3 RECOMMENDATIONS  
Regulatory competition among countries is a key issue as countries jostle to position 
themselves strategically to benefit from advances in the technology. At the same time they 
also have to be wary of their obligations to the region. This reality does not seem to be on its 
way out and one opportunity could be for the region to present itself as the entity to compete 
with other regions, both for favourable technologies and products thereof. Development and 
implementation of effective policies and institutional arrangements to this effect may prove 
vital. These speculations however remain subject to further research. 
 
There are contentions in literature regarding whether drivers of convergence are ideational or 
material forces. This research showed the existence of both forces in the SADC quest for 
cross-national convergence of biosafety systems, with the type and strength of each force 
varying in space and time. In times of crises for example, countries were more in need of 
material support, while in the normal course of policy development, ideational forces were 
more dominant. There was a general feeling that countries were more at liberty to amend 
ideas from elsewhere to suit their own peculiarities, than what happened when material 
resources were provided. This issue renders itself to further investigation because of the 
complexities arising from continued limited investment in policy and regulatory processes by 
the regional governments, which left policy makers at a quandary regarding both sources of 
ideas and material resources.  
 
On the whole, further and closer analysis of the convergence that has occurred, from both 
practical and theoretical perspectives is required to confirm and explain some of the issues 
highlighted by this research. A possible approach would be to look at clusters of countries  
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within the SADC region or beyond, e.g. based on the level of development of their systems 
or use of the technology or the other ‘layers’ proposed in 9.2.1. Parallels for countries within 
the same cluster could be drawn based on predictions from the ‘most-similar-systems’ 
approach, and would also help in bringing out the national level factors which facilitate or 
hinder cross-national policy convergence, including whether or not biosafety is a big enough 
imperative to break documented sectoral tensions between environment and trade, among 
others. Further use of the typology proposed by Busch and Jorgens as an overarching 
framework would still be invaluable as this framework largely captures the dominant 
mechanisms within the biosafety arena in southern Africa.  
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APPENDIX 1 - PILOT STUDY CHECKLIST 
 
Towards cross-national convergence of biosafety regulatory systems in the SADC 
region: a comparative analysis of the roles of three supra-national organisations 
 
Research question: 
Whether, how and to what extent have the three supranational bodies (SADC, NEPAD and 
AU) contributed to cross-national convergence of biosafety regulatory systems in the SADC 
region?  
INTERVIEW CHECKLIST 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Section 1 (all stakeholders) 
Date of interview: 
Name of interviewee: 
Name and contact details of institution: 
Level of institution’s operations: Global [ ], Continental [ ], Sub-continental [ ], National [ ], 
Subnational [ ], Other (specify) 
Category of institution’s activities: Policy Research/Advice[ ], Technology Research  [ ], 
Policy Implementation [ ], Technology Advocacy [ ], Other (specify)   
 
Level of focus on biosafety issues (terms based on resources and time) 
 
Main partners for institution (names, and then these will be categorized later) 
 
Section 2 (all stakeholders) 
Legitimacy and mandates issues  
What is the mission and mandate of the organization?  
What approaches and mechanisms are used to discharge this mission? Are there formal 
linkages with stakeholders? 
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How does the organization desire to be viewed by its stakeholders? (Check stakeholder’s 
views on this) 
 
What is the source of legitimacy for the organisation e.g. technical/policy competence, being 
stakeholder-driven, mandated by governments, addressing relevant issues etc? 
 
How does the organisation view other stakeholders/institutions working on biosafety issues 
(investigating synergies, territoriality, conflict etc)?  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Section 3 (all stakeholders) 
Views on convergence of biosafety systems 
Does the organisation have any experience with cross-national convergence of regulatory 
systems? Which areas?  
 
What is the organisation’s standing/position on harmonised/converged biosafety systems; 
positive, indifferent, negative? 
 
Trace the evolution of this position over the study period (probing on motivating or 
compelling factors for the position) 
 
Is there any progress being made towards convergence of biosafety systems? Why? 
 
In the respondent’s (or organisation’s view) how is the process towards convergence taking 
place (checking on stakeholders involved [esp. SADC, NEPAD, AU], processes involved, 
etc)? 
 
What are the main strengths, challenges, opportunities and threats in the current process? 
[Look at issues such as the EU/US divide, multiplicity of policy models, human capacity 
issues, missing links, the research-policy nexus, other external and local/national level 
factors/pressures etc – relate to the three supranational bodies] 
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Is convergence an achievable mission? What should be done differently to realise this? What 
are the trade-offs, and the alternatives? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Section 4 (all stakeholders) 
Table 3: Capturing stakeholder opinions on mechanisms in operation (look at spatial and 
temporal dimensions) 
MECHANISMS 
Harmonization Imposition Diffusion 
Years Years Years 
Stakeholder categories 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Secretariat staff                 
African 
Union 
National offices                
National 
govts 
 
Biosafety 
Competent 
Authorities 
               
Pro-biotech                CSOs 
Anti-biotech                
 
There will be a brief discussion on each mechanism, and in relation to the issues raised in 
section 3, stakeholders will be asked to give their opinion on how they view the mechanisms 
in operation to be. Analysis and interpretation of results in this section will be done in 
conjunction with responses given to other questions and will also serve to gauge 
stakeholders’ understanding of the operations of their programmes or those of the 
supranational organisations.  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Section 5 
Any other comments by respondent 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX 2 - STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE 2 
 
BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICY CONVERGENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
Preamble 
This is the second research instrument in the study towards ‘understanding whether, to what 
extent and how the African Union (AU), New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are influencing cross-
national convergence
88
 of biosafety systems in the SADC region’. This second questionnaire 
raises questions and traces perspectives pursuant to issues emerging from the first round of 
the data gathering process and review of relevant literature, with a particular emphasis on 
assessing the feasibility of convergence and understanding the roles being played by the AU, 
NEPAD and SADC. The data gathered so far has brought out the policy and technology 
context within which the development of similar systems for cross-national regulation of 
biotechnology is taking place in southern Africa.  
 
The questionnaire is pre-coded and has multi-response questions in order to facilitate 
categorization of responses and comparisons. You may use ticks (√) or crosses (x) to indicate 
your responses. All responses given will be treated with importance and confidentiality. 
Please feel free to contact me for any clarifications or comments.  
 
1. Basic information 
Country: _ _____________________________ Gender     Male           Female          
 
Occupation: (Please tick more than one if necessary)     
Researcher (biotechnology or allied science)  
Policy advisor  
Government official  
Private sector official  
NGO staff  
Media staff  
Regional/International Organization staff  
Donor  
Other (specify)  
                                                
88 Convergence can be defined as the tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of increasing 
similarity in structures, processes and performances.  
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Which of the three bodies do you work most closely with? 
AU  
NEPAD  
SADC  
None  
 
2.  Feasibility and extent of convergence 
(a) At what level is it feasible for convergence of biotechnology/biosafety policies to take 
place? 
 High feasibility Medium Low 
Institutional     
Sectoral (e.g. agriculture, 
health, environment, trade) 
   
National  (all sectors)    
Cross-national (clusters of 
countries) 
   
Cross-national (regional)    
 
Comments ______________________________________________________________ 
 
(b) How should convergence take place? 
 Most desirable Medium Least 
Voluntary adoption of 
models (learning, imitation, 
transfer) 
   
Imposition of models and 
practices  
   
Uncoordinated responses to 
pressure 
   
Other (specify)    
 
Comments: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
(c) Best systems would be? 
 Most preferred Medium Least 
Voluntary standards    
Legally-binding standards    
Mixture of the two above    
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Comments: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
(d) Who is best placed to steer the convergence process? 
 Best placed Medium Least  
National governmental 
institutions 
   
Civil society organisations    
Subregional organizations     
Continental organisations    
International organizations    
Donor organizations    
Other(specify)    
 
Comments: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
(e) What has converged so far? 
 High Medium Not at all 
Entire systems    
Entire policies    
Regulations    
Policy scope and objectives 
only,  
   
Institutional arrangements 
only, 
   
None    
 
Comments: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
(f) How has the convergence taken place? 
 Strongest 
influence 
Medium Lowest 
Imposition of practices by organizations     
Experience sharing and linkages among 
countries 
   
Training and workshopping    
Resource-provision by 
donors/development partners 
   
Provision of models    
Leadership and influence by leading 
countries 
   
Uncoordinated learning     
Other (specify)    
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Comments: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
3.  Assessment of organizations 
(a) Who is best placed to steer convergence of biosafety systems in the SADC and why? 
1.  African Union 
 Strong Medium Low 
Relevance of mandate    
Resource endowment    
Capacity to deliver 
(technical and human) 
   
Reach and influence 
(political) 
   
Flexibility    
Clarity of procedures    
Other (specify)    
 
Comments: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
2. NEPAD 
 Strong Medium Low 
Relevance of mandate    
Resource endowment    
Capacity to deliver (technical 
and human) 
   
Reach and influence 
(political) 
   
Flexibility    
Clarity of procedures    
Other (specify)    
Comments: _____________________________________________________________ 
(c) SADC 
 Strong Medium Low 
Relevance of mandate    
Resource endowment    
Capacity to deliver 
(technical and human) 
   
Reach and influence 
(political) 
   
Flexibility    
Clarity of procedures    
Other (specify)    
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Comments: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
(d) In summary, who has contributed the most towards convergence so far? 
 Most Medium Least 
AU    
NEPAD     
SADC    
Other (specify) NGO'S     
 
Comments: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Any other comments 
___________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
 260
APPENDIX 3 - DATA GATHERING LOG 
Biosafety Regulatory Systems Study (2005 – 2008) 
Table A3-1: Stakeholders who participated in the study 
 Code Interactions
89
 Country/Organization Period of Interaction 
1 Pmk1 (S) 1,3 NEPAD – Office of Science and Technology (OST) July 06, Oct 06, Apr - Aug 07 
2 Pmk2 (S) 1,2,3 NEPAD – OST July 06, Oct 06, Apr – Aug 07 
3 Res1 (S) 1,2,3 NEPAD – SANBio Oct 06, Apr – Aug 07 
4 Med1 (S) 3 NEPAD – Media  
4 Res2 (S) 2,3 NEPAD – Biosciences Eastern and Central Africa (BecA), 
Kenya/DRC 
Oct 06, May 07, Jul 07 
5 Res3 (R) 3 UNAM, RAEIN-Africa, NABA and AU Project, Namibia Oct 06, Mar 07 
6 Pmk3 (R) 3 University of Zambia/RAEIN-Africa Oct 06 
7 Pmk4 (R)  2,3 Min of Science and Technology, Zimbabwe Oct 06, Jul 07 
8 Pmk5 (R) 1,2,3 Min of Environment, Lesotho Sept 06, Apr 07 
9 Res4 (R) 1,3 University of Swaziland, Biosafety Expert Sept 06 
10 Res5 (R) 1,2,3 University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Sept 06, Apr 07 
11 Res6 (R) 1,2,3 SADC Crops Expert Aug 06, Mar 07 
12 Res7 (R) 1,2 SADC Standards, Quality Assurance and Measurement 
project 
Sept 06, Mar 07 
13 Pmk6 (R) 1,3 Biosafety Board, Zimbabwe July 06, Dec 06, Mar 07 
14 Ngo1 (R) 1 SADC Biodiversity Support Programme July 06, Apr 07 
15 Pmk7 (R) 1,2,3 SADC Advisory Committee on Biotech and Biosafety July 06, Jul 07 
16 Res8 (R) 1,2,3 Programme for Biosafety Systems (PBS) - Southern Africa July 06, Mar 07, Jul 07 
17 Ngo2 
(OR)  
3 CABE – African Centre for Bio-Entrepreneurship  Oct 06 
18 Ngo3 
(OR) 
3 Kenya Seed Traders Association Oct 06 
                                                 
89 1 – first questionnaire; 2 – second questionnaire; 3 – other formal or informal interactions  
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19 Res9 (OR) 3 University of Nairobi Oct 06 
20 Res10 
(OR) 
3 World Bank funded programme on agricultural research Oct 06 
21 Res11 
(OR) 
3 African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS) Oct 06, Jul 07 
22 Res12 
(OR) 
1,2,3 ACTS – RABESA Project Oct 06, March 07 
23 Res13 
(OR) 
3 Programme for Biosafety Systems (PBS) - East Africa Oct 06 
24 Pmk8 (S)  3 AU Biosafety Project Oct 06, Apr 07 
25 Res14 (R) 3 University of Lesotho Oct 06 
27 Res15 
(OR) 
3 OU/ Commission for Africa Nov 06, Mar 07 
28 Res16 
(OR) 
1,2,3 McEwan College, Canada Jul 06, Sep 06, Mar 07, Jul 07 
29 Med2 (R) 3 Research Africa Oct 06, Mar 07 
30 Med3 (R) 2 SciDev.Net Nov 06, Mar 07 
31 Ngo4 (R) 1,2,3 RAEIN-Africa Mar 07 
32 Res17 (R) 3 Consultant (ex-FAO, and International Atomic Energy 
Agency) 
Jul 06, Mar 07 
33 Res18 (R) 2,3 Scientific and Industrial Research and Development 
Centre, Zimbabwe 
Mar 07 
34 Res19 
(OR) 
2,3 Consultant, UK Mar 07 
35 Pmk9 (R) 3 National Institute for Scientific and Industrial Research, 
Zambia 
Mar 07 
36 Pmk10 
(R) 
1,3 Ministry of Science and Vocational Training, Zambia Dec 06, Mar 07 
37 Ngo5 (R) 1,2,3 Community Technology Development Trust, Zimbabwe Mar 07 
38 Pmk11 
(R) 
1,3 Biosafety Officer, Biotechnology Authority of Zimbabwe July 06, Mar 07 
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39 Ngo6 (R) 1,3 African Centre for Biosafety, South Africa May 07 
40 Ngo7 (R) 2 FoodNCrop/AfricaBio, SA Apr 07 
41 Res20 
(OR) 
2,3 DPP Open University, and Kenya Apr 07 
42 Pmk12 
(OR) 
3 Harvard University Feb 07, May 07 
43 Pmk13 (S)  2 Biosafety Project, AU May 07 
44 Ress21 
(S) 
2,3 North African Biosciences Network – NEPAD/AfricaBio May 07 
45 Res22 (R) 2 University of Namibia Mar 07 
46 Pmk14 
(R) 
1 Department of Agric Research and Extension, Zimbabwe Jul 06 
47 Res23 (R) 1,3 Tobacco Research Board, Zimbabwe Jul 06, Jan 07 
48 Pmk15 (S) 3 SADC Food Security Unit July 06, Mar 07: Facilitated links 
with staff, recognized importance of 
research 
49 Pmk16 
(R) 
3 Former SADC Crops Expert  Sep 06: Was willing, but could not 
comment being now out of the 
system 
51 Ngo8 
(OR) 
2 Advocates’ Coalition for Environment and Development – 
Uganda 
Jul 07 
52 Res24 
(OR) 
2,3 Consultant, Biotech/Biosafety Policy, The Netherlands July 07 
53 Res25 (R) 2 Non-practising biotechnologist, RSA July 07 
54 Res26 
(OR) 
3 Open University Oct 07 
55 Pmk17 
(R)  
3 Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research – Biosafety 
Manager 
May 07 
56 Res27 (S) 3 Nepad OST May 07, July 07 
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Table A3 – 2: Stakeholders contacted but did not respond 
 
57 Res (R) Mozambique Apr 07 
58 Res (R) Mozambique Oct 06, Apr 07 
59 Res (R) Botswana Mar 07 
60 Res (R) Malawi Feb 07 
61 Pmk (R) Department of Agriculture, RSA Apr 07 
62 Pmk(R) Department of Environment, RSA May 07 
63 Res (R) Council for Science and 
Technology (COSTECH) 
Tanzania 
Oct 06, April 07 
64 Pmk (R) Swaziland Mar 07 
65 Res (R) Ministry of Higher Education, 
Science and Technology, Namibia 
Feb 07 
66 Pmk (R) 
 
National Gene Bank, Angola Feb 07 
67 Res (R) Attoney General’s Chambers, 
Mauritius 
Sep 06, Feb 07 
68 Res (R) Mauritius Sugar Research Institute Feb 07 
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Table A3 – 3: Other data gathering opportunities utilized  
Code Event Location and Time Period 
Mtg1 16th International Sociological Association 
Congress 
Durban, South Africa, July 
2006 
Mtg2 ACTS Training Workshop on Biosafety Nairobi, Kenya, October 
2006 
Mtg3 1st Congress of African Scientists and Policy 
Makers  
Alexandria, Egypt, Nov 2006 
Mtg4 NEPAD Health Innovation Systems Workshop Entebbe, Uganda, July 2007 
Mtg5 DPP/Innogen meetings, seminars, retreats, 
reading groups etc 
UK, throughout the study 
period 
Mtg6 Innogen Annual Conferences Sept 2006 and Oct 2007 
Mtg7 Development Studies Association Conference Sept 2007 
Mtg8 Observations during visit to SADC, Pan-
African Parliament or stay at NEPAD 
Botswana and South Africa; 
August 2006; and April – 
August 2007 
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